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ABSTRACT 
Rising Powers and Foreign Intrastate Armed Conflicts: Trends and Patterns of China’s 
Intervention in African Civil Wars 
by 
HODZI Obert 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
What influences one state to intervene in another’s intrastate armed conflict? In answering 
this question, existing scholarship has tended to emphasise the position of the intervening 
state in the international system; suggesting that, that is the main determinant factor of a 
state’s external intervention behaviour. As a result, existing research on intervention in 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts is dominated by a focus on great powers and their 
intervention methods. Employing the neoclassical realist causal logic, this thesis argues, on 
the contrary, that whether a state intervenes in a foreign intrastate armed conflict is a 
factor of both systemic and state level factors. A state’s intervention behavior is therefore 
determined, first, by the increase in its relative economic power, then by its changing 
perception of threat to its interests abroad. What it means is that a state’s position in the 
international system, rising power, great power or small power, is not the only determinant 
factor in exploring its intervention behavior, unit level factors also matter. In advancing that 
argument, this thesis significantly challenges the prevailing assumption that intervention in 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts is a preserve of great powers, and an instrument of their 
foreign policy; and thus, broadens the intervention discourse to include the intervention 
behavior of rising powers. Yet, still there exist, in current literature, a lack of research which 
systematically connects the above neoclassical realist theoretical reasoning with empirical 
analysis of intervention in foreign conflicts by rising powers vis-à-vis the 21st century global 
order recalibrations. By exploring the intervention behaviour of China, a rising global power, 
in intrastate armed conflicts in three countries, Libya, Mali and South Sudan; and by using 
the comparative case study method to assess trends and patterns in its intervention 
behaviour, as its relative economic power increases and its perception of threat evolves, 
this thesis highlights a more systematic interlink between theoretical and empirical analysis 
that takes into consideration the changing status of rising powers in the global system and 
its effect on their intervention behaviour. It therefore makes a case for an empirical study 
of China’s intervention in intrastate armed conflicts in Africa that considers the interactive 
dynamics between systemic and domestic variables in its causal explanation of China’s 
foreign intervention behaviour. In doing that, it points out that understanding intervention 
in terms of great powers and military action limits our exploration of the emerging 
re-conceptualization of intervention, its practice and methods as employed by rising 
powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. The thesis therefore makes a case for an 
innovative (re-)definition of intervention that enables an analytical assessment of the 
emerging intervention practices.  
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CHAPTER 1: Rising powers and intervention in foreign intrastate 
armed conflicts – Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
How does a rising power behave when its relative economic power increases? Does it expand 
its economic interests abroad? And does it increase its intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts which threaten those interests? Conventional arguments in International Relations (IR) 
suggest that generally as states’ economic power rise they follow the same pattern of 
behaviour. “They expand. They send their soldiers, ships, and public and private agents 
abroad…, [and] they exert influence on foreigners in a variety of ways” (Mandelbaum 1988, p. 
134). However, although in principle they follow the same pattern of behaviour, they express 
their expansionist projects in varied ways. “Some emerging powers in modern history have 
plundered other countries’ resources through invasion, colonization, expansion, or even large 
scale wars of aggression” (Zheng 2005, p. 20). Others are more covert, employing ‘non-
threatening’ strategies to take over sector by sector of another state without soldiers being 
involved until their economic and political interests prevail. China is a case in point. As put by 
Janice Gross Stein “in America’s backyard, in Africa, in the Gulf and on its southern and western 
peripheries, China is making deals for resources with no strings attached. Its overseas 
investments are growing as its trade surplus is mounting. And tens of thousands of Chinese aid 
workers and dam builders are found in virtually every corner of the globe – and all this without 
firing a shot” (2010, p. 12).  
The overall common denominator amongst these rising powers is that expansion of their 
interests and foreign policy abroad is often preceded by high levels of domestic economic 
growth, which if sustained over a protracted period of time will result in rise of the state’s 
relative economic power vis-a-vis other existing global powers. In turn, this enables increases in 
the rising powers’ other material capabilities such as military, diplomatic, and political, such 
that the combined growth of the economy and other material capabilities endows upon them 
“newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system to reshape the rules and 
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institutions in accordance with their own interests”1 and more importantly intervene in the 
internal affairs of other states in order to protect and safeguard their interests there. In March 
2016, Wang Yi, China’s minister of foreign affairs captured the linkage between the rise in a 
state’s relative economic power, expansion of its economic interests abroad, and the need to 
protect those interests when he said: “Like any major country that is growing, China’s overseas 
interests are expanding. At present, there are 30,000 Chinese businesses all over the world and 
several million Chinese are working and living in all corners of the world…, China's non-financial 
outbound direct investment reached 118 billion dollars and the stock of China's overseas assets 
reached several trillion dollars. So it has become a pressing task for China's diplomacy to better 
protect our ever-growing overseas interests.”2 This is because “over the course of history, 
states that have experienced significant growth in their material resources have relatively soon 
redefined and expanded their political [economic and security] interests abroad” (Zakaria 1998, 
p. 3). And, in order to systematically give effect to their expansionist endeavours, they 
incrementally revise and expand their foreign policy within the constraints of their domestic 
and international capabilities.  
It is therefore not automatic that once a state’s relative material capabilities increase it can 
revise international rules and institutions to its taste because states do not rise and expand 
their interests abroad in a vacuum. Instead, they rise in an anarchic systemic order already 
dominated by other global powers; and how they express their emergent power is not just 
reliant on their relative capabilities but also on how other states, particularly existing global 
powers, perceive of, and respond to their rise. For instance, “the growth of Athenian power led 
Sparta to conclude that there was no recourse but to fight;”3 while the rise of expansionist 
Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler led to a global war. On the other hand, the rise of 
the United States at the twilight of Britain’s imperial power was largely peaceful4 because 
Britain, “while still enjoying preponderant strength, looked over the horizon…, [and] was able 
to successfully adapt its grand strategy to a changing distribution of power” (Kupchan 2012). 
                                                          
1 Ikenberry, GJ 2008, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive?’ 
Foreign affairs, vol. 87, no. 1, p.26; Hoge Jr, JF 2004, ‘Global power shift in the making: Is the United 
States ready?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 2-7. 
2 People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the press, 9 
March, viewed 22 May 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1346238.shtml  
3 Tritle, L.A. 2010, A new history of the Peloponnesian war, Wiley-Blackwell, pp.36. 
4 Feng, Y. 2006, "The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US", The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83-108. 
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But in all this the root of the rising powers’ rise in the international system and their ability to 
withstand competition and pressure from existing global powers is sustained high levels of 
domestic economic growth; for upward mobility in the international system is no fit for states 
with a low relative economic power.  
An additional factor that determines how a rising power articulates its foreign behaviour as it 
expands abroad are political dynamics in countries that it expands into. By expanding its 
economic interests into a foreign country, a rising power effectively entangles itself with the 
political, social and economic dynamics of that particular country. Unlike the United States and 
West European powers, non-western rising powers such as India, Brazil and China still do not 
give adequate consideration to internal dynamics in countries they expand into, particularly if 
those countries are considered to be of no global consequence, the majority of which are in 
Africa where most lack essential elements of a state and can best be described as ‘quasi-
states’.5 Typically, when rising powers expand their economic interests into such ‘quasi-states’ 
their preoccupation is on wadding off competition from other global and rising powers that 
have rival interests there, yet it is from the ‘quasi-states’ themselves that major challenges to 
their foreign interests emanate from. The reason being that “since the end of the Cold War, 
weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for 
international order” (Fukuyama 2004, p. 92).  
Intrastate armed conflicts6 are the dominant7 challenge in some countries that rising powers 
expand their economic interests into. What makes the intrastate armed conflicts in those 
countries challenging for rising powers is that they pose ‘uncontemplated consequences.’ The 
consequences are uncontemplated because the conflicts are usually fought over issues local to 
the developing country and often have little to do with the rising power, or its interests in that 
country. Yet, the effects, albeit unintended by the warring parties, are indiscriminately felt by 
rising powers with interests there. Examples abound - in the armed conflict between the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) and Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya, US$18-20 
billion worth of investments owned by Chinese private and public enterprises were either 
                                                          
5 Jackson, R.H. 1993, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Cambridge 
University Press. 
6 In this study, the terms, civil war and intrastate armed conflicts are used interchangeably. 
7 Cilliers, J & Schuenemann, J 2013, ‘The future of intrastate conflict in Africa more violence or greater 
peace?’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 246, p.2, viewed 3 January 2014, 
https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper246.pdf  
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destroyed or suspended. In Sudan, China invested US$20 billion mostly in the oil industry 
before the country split after a protracted armed conflict. Two-thirds of its investments ended 
up in the new state of South Sudan, which in 2013 descended into a civil war resulting in major 
losses to Chinese companies.8 Chinese nationals working abroad were also affected. For 
example, in 2011, the Chinese government evacuated more than 35,000 Chinese citizens 
working in Libya9 due to the armed conflict. In Sudan,10 Mali,11 and the Central African 
Republic12 Chinese workers were kidnapped or otherwise killed by rebels; and in 2014, Chinese 
companies had to evacuate Chinese nationals and scale down operations due to the armed 
conflict in South Sudan.13  
The dilemma for rising powers such as China is that the biggest concentration of energy and 
other strategic natural resources needed to sustain their domestic economic growth, which is 
critical to maintaining their relative economic power and global power status lie in countries at 
risk of both political instability and intrastate armed conflicts. As noted by Michael Klare, the 
high concentration of energy resources in countries such as Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and 
Sudan mean that access to such resources is “closely tied to political and socio-economic 
conditions within a relatively small group of countries”14 at risk of instability and armed 
conflicts. Without the military power of the United States or socio-economic and political ties 
that Europe has with developing countries, especially in Africa due to their colonial heritage, 
non-Western rising powers are compelled to engage even more unstable countries like Libya 
and South Sudan for their raw material and energy needs, which plunges them into intrastate 
armed conflicts that they neither contemplated nor possess enough experience to handle. 
                                                          
8 Attree, L 2012, China and conflict-affected states: Between principle and pragmatism, Saferworld: 
London, viewed 3 January 2014, 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/FAB%20Sudan%20and%20South%20Sudan.pdf  
9‘35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya’ 2011, Xinhua, 3 March, viewed 10 January 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/03/c_13759456.htm  
10‘Sudan rebels kill 5 Chinese hostages’ 2008, The Telegraph, 27 October, viewed 10 January 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/3270057/Sudan-rebels-kill-
5-Chinese-hostages.html  
11‘China strongly condemns Mali hotel attack, confirms 3 nationals killed’ 2015, Xinhua, 21 November, 
viewed 21 November 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/21/c_134839619.htm  
12‘Two Chinese kidnapped on Cameroon-C.Africa border’ 2012, AsiaOne, 15 October, viewed 12 March 
2014, http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Crime/Story/A1Story20121015-
377828.html  
13‘97 Chinese workers evacuated from South Sudan to Khartoum’ 2013, People Daily, 25 December, 
viewed 3 January 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8495532.html  
14 Klare, M 2001, Resource wars: the new landscape of global conflict, Henry Holt, New York, p.44. 
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What it means is that when the relative economic power of rising powers increase and they 
expand their economic interests abroad in search of markets and sources of raw materials to 
keep their economies growing, they become even more dependent on foreign sources of raw 
materials for their economic growth, thus compelling then to align access to such primary 
commodities with their national interest and security considerations.15 How then do they 
respond to foreign intrastate armed conflicts that threaten those economic interests? In other 
words, do they increase their intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts as their 
interests expand abroad? What form do their interventions in those intrastate armed conflicts 
take, and are the methods of their intervention evolving?  
 
1.2 Theoretical and empirical research puzzle: Making sense of the 
intervention behaviour of rising powers 
Based on the above questions, and specifically focused on examining the intervention 
behaviour of China in intrastate armed conflicts in three African countries - Libya, Mali and 
South Sudan, the nature of this study’s focus of enquiry is such that it requires both a 
theoretical and empirical analysis of external interventions in intrastate armed conflicts. What 
makes the enquiry significant is that there is a simultaneous increase in intrastate armed 
conflicts in resource-rich countries in Africa, and an unprecedented expansion of rising powers 
such as China into Africa as they search for strategic primary commodities and markets to 
maintain their domestic economic growth and relative economic power.  
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 below, research on how these rising powers respond to 
intrastate armed conflicts in countries they expand their interests into is still limited. Part of the 
reason is that IR scholars and policymakers are predominantly fixated on geostrategic and geo-
economic competition among rising powers and/or dominant global powers rather than 
political and security dynamics in developing countries and how they affect the external 
behaviour of rising powers. In addition, dominant discourses in IR still portray intervention as a 
foreign policy instrument of major global powers, not rising powers. The result is a limited 
scope in understanding of the intervention behaviour of rising powers in intrastate armed 
conflicts in developing countries and how such a phenomenon is transforming the conceptual 
understanding of intervention in international politics.  
                                                          
15 Ibid, pp. xii, 14. 
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Accordingly, focused on exploring the intervention behaviour of rising powers, particularly 
China’s in foreign intrastate armed conflicts within the domain of foreign policy theory, this 
study is focused on exploring the paradox highlighted above – that rising powers need primary 
commodities to sustain their domestic economic growth in order to maintain their relative 
economic power, but those primary commodities are concentrated in countries with high 
probabilities of intrastate armed conflicts; so for rising powers such as China that have a stated 
general policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of their trading partners, how do they 
balance observance to their non-intervention principle and protection of their interests in cases 
of intrastate armed conflicts in a foreign country, which under normal circumstances require 
some degree of intervention in that country’s internal affairs? 
In probing the linkage between a state’s rise in relative economic power, expansion of 
economic interests abroad, and consequent external intervention behaviour where those 
interests are threatened, this study explores the theoretical argument that a state’s foreign 
policy behaviour is determined by its position in the international system. Employing the 
neoclassical realist argument, the study explores whether rising powers increase their external 
intervention behaviour when their relative economic power increases, and when their 
perception of threat to their interests abroad evolves. Since the ‘change in threat perception’ is 
a unit-level variable, the starting point of this study is assessing the impact of the increase in 
China’s relative economic power on its external intervention behaviour. To some extent, this is 
a complex but not entirely novel question – yet with the rise and decline of global powers it 
remains puzzling and relevant to understanding the evolutionary process of contemporary 
rising powers’ external intervention behaviour in areas beyond their geographical regions and 
how that is challenging conventional understandings of intervention and global governance in 
the 21st century. Besides, although states may behave similarly in rising from obscurity to global 
significance, they rise in different domestic and international contexts16 and therefore respond 
differently to both local and global issues – making their succeeding foreign behaviour peculiar.  
The peculiarity of each rising power’s foreign policy behaviour can by no means be fully 
understood from a theoretical perspective without concomitant empirical assessment of the 
behaviour in question. Departing from the tendency to focus on geo-political and geo-
economic rivalry among rising powers and dominant global powers with ‘token’ consideration 
                                                          
16 Zheng, B 2005, ‘China's" peaceful rise" to great-power status’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, p.24. 
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to the colossal implications of intrastate armed conflicts in developing countries, this study 
empirically concentrates on China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate armed conflicts that 
started between 2011 and 2013 in Libya (2011), Mali (2012), and South Sudan (2013). The main 
question that is explored is how and why increases in China’s relative economic power, and 
changes in its perception of foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threats to its economic 
interests abroad, influenced its intervention in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and 
South Sudan over time. In pursuing that line of enquiry, this study seeks to empirically explain 
the temporal variance in China’s intervention behaviour in the three intrastate armed conflicts, 
with the aim of deciphering emerging trends and patterns of China’s intervention in intrastate 
armed conflicts in Africa. 
 
1.3 Why China? 
China is not the only rising power with expanding economic interests across the globe South 
Africa, Brazil, India and Russia have also been classified as rising powers due to their domestic 
economic growth and expanding global influence. This study, however, gives primary focus to 
China because it is undoubtedly the biggest rising power of the 21st century.17 Powered by 
extraordinary economic growth and a demand for natural resources that outstrips its domestic 
supply capacity, China has been compelled to expand outward in search of new markets, 
primary commodities, and energy resources to fuel its domestic economic growth. Its resultant 
global commodity campaign has been breath-taking. “In just over a decade China has risen 
from relative insignificance to pole position in underwriting numerous resource-related 
transactions across the globe” (Moyo 2012, p. 1). Combined with its official policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the implication of China’s insatiable 
demand for natural resources meant that it engaged resource-rich countries such as Sudan, 
South Sudan, Mali and Libya that are susceptible to intrastate armed conflicts and political 
instability, effectively bringing to itself “high geopolitical risks, vulnerabilities and uncertainties” 
(Pang 2009, p. 247).  
Although at first intrastate armed conflicts did not affect China’s interests directly, over the 
past decade, Chinese workers have been targeted while Chinese-operated oil facilities in Sudan 
and South Sudan have been attacked by rebels, putting China’s adherence to its principle of 
                                                          
17 Kristof, ND 1993, "The rise of China", Foreign Affairs, vol.72, no.5, p. 59. 
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non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states to the test. With respect for state 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its African partners forming the 
core of China-Africa engagement, China is caught between the need to maintain access to 
strategic resources and protecting its economic interests abroad, both of which require some 
degree of intervention. This situation makes China a compelling study in assessing whether 
rising global powers expand and revise their intervention behaviour in developing countries 
when their economic interests there are threatened.  
Notably, with the rise of its relative economic power leading to expansion of its economic 
interests overseas, China has begun to increasingly express interest in peace and security 
cooperation with the African Union, pledging to support efforts toward conflict resolution and 
management in Africa, particularly where intrastate state armed conflicts on the continent 
directly threaten its interests. There have however been some perceivable inconsistences in 
implementation of its non-intervention principle.18 Its intervention in African intrastate armed 
conflicts seem to vary with each country. For example, in 2013, Beijing sent its special envoy for 
African Affairs, Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, to mediate between the warring parties in the 
South Sudanese civil war,19 yet it did not do the same for the conflict in the Central African 
Republic despite the conflicts emerging at the same time. In the Libyan conflict, China 
vehemently argued that “there must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil 
war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians,”20 but it was largely supportive of the 
French military intervention in Mali. These contradictory policies make a case for a systematic 
analysis of what really explains this variation in China’s intervention behaviour regarding 
African intrastate armed conflicts.  
On a broader scale, dominant IR theories presuppose that intervention is a preserve of great 
powers (Tillema 1989; Steiner 2004, p. 16). Accordingly, studies on intervention in foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts tend to exclude rising global powers such as China. Where China has 
been specifically included in such research, the focus has mainly been on its role in 
                                                          
18 Gonzalez-Vicente, R 2011, ‘China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors: New 
perspectives for resource curse theories’, The Pacific Review, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 65-87. 
19‘China sends envoy to South Sudan to push peace talks’ 2013, Reuters, 27 December, viewed 10 
February 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-china-sends-envoy-south-sudan-push-peace-
talks/1818388.html  
20 UN Security Council 2011, 6531st meeting, S/PV.6531, 10 May, p. 20, viewed 13 May 2014, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S%20PV%206531.pdf  
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peacekeeping operations or in providing ‘no-strings’ attached aid to states in conflict. By 
including China as a rising global power in the broader ‘intervention in foreign intrastate 
conflicts’ discourse, this study deepens the current research agenda by expanding the 
discourse on China’s evolving foreign policy and behaviour in Africa. It also extends the current 
research on China-Africa relations beyond trade and economics to security and intervention. 
Through a systematic analysis of China’s economic, diplomatic, political and multilateral 
intervention strategies, the study probe peculiarities of China’s intervention strategies in 
African conflicts, questioning whether the strategies are influenced first by an increase in its 
relative economic power, and then secondly by its changing perception of threats to its 
interests abroad. The study therefore contributes to the growing research on China’s ‘non-
intervention’ practice by assessing its intervention strategies in African countries - an area that 
is still developing in scholarly research.  
More importantly, an analysis of China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed 
conflicts is critical to an understanding of its impact on global governance and that of other 
rising powers in general. Considering the combined shift in economic and political power from 
the West to the rest as noted by Fareed Zakaria, how China takes on the responsibility toward 
international peace and security commensurate with its rising global status is not just of 
interest to the United States, but also to the African Union and African countries engaging with 
China. This analysis is particularly compelling for the African Union as it transitions from non-
intervention in the internal affairs of its member states to a more proactive non-indifference 
approach that demands intervention in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide 
and unconstitutional military takeover of governments in line with international norms leaning 
toward responsible sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect. China’s intervention in 
African intrastate armed conflicts is therefore critical to the emerging global peace and security 
order.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
As stated above, this study employs the neoclassical realist theoretical framework to explore 
how increases in China’s relative economic power vis- à -vis other states and changes in 
perception of threat to its interests abroad combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour 
in intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. What is distinct about neoclassical 
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realism is that “it carries with it a distinct methodological preference for theoretically informed 
narratives… that trace the ways different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies” 
(Rose 1998, p. 153). In this study, the theoretically based narrative is combined with historical 
analysis of China’s rise in the international system, the evolving of its perception of threats to 
interests abroad, and their consequential impact on its intervention behaviour.  
The resultant methodology is therefore a qualitative theoretically based narrative and historical 
analysis which supposes a dual-causal focus on both systemic and domestic level factors and 
how they combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed 
conflicts. Furthermore, the study entails interpretation of critical historical events and 
processes relating to China’s relative economic power in the international system and 
articulation and understanding of its non-intervention behaviour over time – this is principally 
done in Chapter 4. A historical analysis of China-Libya, Mali, and South Sudan relations since 
the countries’ independence is also conducted in a way that leads to an understanding of 
various intervention methods employed by China in the three African countries’ intrastate 
armed conflicts, further enabling an assessment of trends and patterns of China’s intervention 
in African intrastate armed conflicts.   
The use of the theoretically based historical narrative and analysis entail the use of case studies 
to effectively trace how an increase in relative economic power translated through perception 
of threat to interests abroad combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour in Libya, Mali 
and South Sudan. Not only is the case study method suitable for a theoretically based historical 
narrative and historical analysis method, it also is suitable for studies that employ the 
neoclassical realist theoretical framework. For, neoclassical realism often “employs the case-
study method to test general theories, explain cases and generate hypothesis… [In order to] 
address important questions about foreign policy and national behaviour, and… produce a 
body of cumulative knowledge” (Elman and Elman 2003, p. 317). As this study is aimed at 
explaining China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts, case studies are the best 
suited method in order to adequately address the matter and assess the emerging trends and 
patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African armed conflicts. 
With a large number of intrastate armed conflicts across the African continent, the main 
challenges that confront studies of external intervention in intrastate armed conflicts include 
the overwhelming need for an all-encompassing analysis of every possible conflict. The 
11 
 
reasoning is often that the more the case studies then the better it is to generalise the findings, 
hence, multiple cases can potentially enhance the scope of a study. Although it is plausible to 
use multiple case studies, taking into consideration time and resource constraints, a choice has 
to be made between scope and depth. Besides time and resource limitations, this study opted 
for only three cases in order to be able to analyse the cases in depth in a manner that would 
enable production of comprehensive ‘cumulative knowledge’. The study therefore employs the 
method of structured, focused comparison. The method is structured in that a general set of 
questions are asked of each case study in order to standardize the collected data, making a 
systematic comparison and cumulation of the case study findings possible; it is also focused 
because it does not deal with every random aspect of the case study instead, it centres on a 
specific aspect of the case being studied.21 Overall, the method of structured, focused 
comparison employs “a well-defined set of theoretical questions or propositions to structure an 
empirical inquiry on a particular analytically defined aspect of a set of events” (Levy 2008:2), a 
method which provides a systematic comparison conducive for generating empirical 
generalisation and testing hypotheses.22 
Intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts can be attributed to multiple causality, which 
places considerable pressure on data collection and selection of cases to be studied in order to 
come up with plausible explanations of why states intervene in some intrastate armed conflicts, 
and also to help explain temporal variation in external intervention behaviour. As observed by 
James Rosenau, single case studies or a collection of multiple case studies may be instructive, 
making interesting contributions to knowledge,23 but without systematic comparison and 
‘scientific consciousness’ they do not add value to hypothesis testing and theory 
development.24 This is where the use of the method of structured, focused comparison 
becomes compelling because it specifically  “seeks to investigate causality and attempts to 
isolate those factors that cause (independent variable) a particular outcome or phenomenon 
(dependent variable)” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p. 46).  
                                                          
21 George, AL & Bennett, A 2005, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, p.67. 
22 Smith-Hoehn, J 2010, Rebuilding the security sector in post-conflict societies: Perceptions from urban 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, LIT Verlag, Muenster, p.46. 
23 George, AL & Bennett, A 2005, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, p.68. 
24 Rosenau, JN 1968, ‘Moral fervor, systematic analysis, and scientific consciousness in foreign policy 
research’, in A Ranney (ed.), Political science and public policy, Markham, Chicago, pp. 197-238. 
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In addition, the comparative method also entails two predispositions. The first predisposition 
has a bias toward qualitative analysis and tends to look at cases as wholes, comparing one with 
the other. Secondly, premised on the assumption that history matters, the method values 
interpretation and context - showing “how historical processes and practices, as well as long-
established institutional arrangements, impact and shape the contemporary environment in 
which decisions are made, events unfold, and struggles for power occur… demonstrating a 
meaningful continuity between the past and the present” (Lim 2010, p. 18). This method 
therefore enables “stating lessons in a systematic and differentiated way from a broader range 
of experience that deliberately draws upon a variety of historical cases” (George 1979, p. 42-
43). Notably, there are four purposes of comparing cases. Cases can be compared in order to 
control, to understand, to explain or to predict. The focus of this study is to explain China’s 
intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts; therefore, the purpose of the 
comparison of cases is to “build theoretical generalisations by collecting case-based 
knowledge…[because] each case or each small-n comparison gives the comparativist another 
piece to work into a larger puzzle” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p. 47). In this study, the larger puzzle is 
to explain why China’s interventions in African intrastate armed conflicts vary over time.  
While acknowledging that “African conflicts are widely varied… [and that] case studies do not 
fit into tidy packages that present themselves for direct comparison” (Boulden 2013, p.16), the 
study notes that the comparative method is “uniquely suited for analysing complex causality, 
i.e. the fact that a particular social phenomenon is probably affected by several economic, 
political, cultural and/or socio-economic factors” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p.43). The set of events 
that will be analysed are intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Specifically, 
the study analyses the Libyan armed conflict between the armed opposition groups later 
organised under the National Transitional Council and Muammar Gaddafi’s government. The 
period under study is February 2011, when the conflict began, until October 2011, when 
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed, signalling the end of the armed conflict between 
the two sides. For Mali, the study focuses on the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and the Malian army’s 
2012 coup d’état. The Tuareg rebellion began in January 2012, and the coup took place in 
March 2012 resulting in the establishment of a government of national unity in August 2012. 
Third the study analyses the intrastate armed conflict between rebels led by Riek Machar and 
the government of President Salva Kiir that began in December 2013 in South Sudan.  
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By focusing on the above specific cases, the study seeks to explain China’s varied intervention 
in these three different intrastate armed conflicts, making it possible to explore trends and 
patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African civil wars, thus enabling the yielding of 
“useful generic knowledge” 25  about China’s intervention behaviour. The “systematic 
comparison and cumulating of the cases”26 therefore makes it possible to hypothesise, make 
theoretical generalisations and produce generic knowledge relating to external intervention in 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This is something that could be replicated and tested in 
other similar studies, particularly those relating to intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts by rising global powers.  
1.4.1 Selection of intrastate armed conflict cases for study 
The Uppsala/PRIO conflict database categorises conflicts as minor or major wars depending on 
the number of battle-related deaths. A minor war is where there are “between 25 and 999 
battle-related deaths in a given year” while “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year” 
are designated as war (Themnér 2013, p. 8). According to the Uppsala/PRIO conflict database, 
25 countries in Africa experienced minor and/or war between the year 2000 and 2013. Out of 
the 25 countries, 12 experienced civil war. The table below shows the number of conflicts that 
were experienced in Africa between 2000 and 2013. 
Figure 1.1: Intrastate armed conflicts in Africa, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict 
                                                          
25 George, AL & Bennett, A 2005, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, p.67. 
26 Ibid. 
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As shown in Figure 1, the peak of internal armed conflicts in Africa was reached in the year 
2001, when 16 minor wars and four intrastate armed conflicts27 were recorded. In 2005 there 
were no recorded civil wars, while conflicts surged in 2006 and reached the level of four 
intrastate armed conflicts in 2013. The highest number of civil wars were recorded in Sudan, 
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless, the armed conflicts in all three 
countries have been protracted, that is, they have occurred over extended periods of time, 
sometimes stretching over several decades and consist of “several crisis episodes of varying 
frequency and intensity.”28 Because of that fact, the profile, causes, and actors involved in the 
conflicts vary over time making it difficult to determine the duration of each episode of the 
conflict. This situation presents significant challenges to a study that seeks to analyse external 
intervention in intrastate armed conflicts over a specific period of time. The intrastate armed 
conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been ongoing for 
decades, hence they are excluded from this study because they fall outside of the period under 
study.  
Furthermore, intrastate armed conflicts that occurred between 2000 and 2005 were not 
included in the study because prior to 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle had 
not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as an international norm. The 
significance of R2P to this study is that it placed a general responsibility on states to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but were they fail to 
discharge that duty, it authorised the international community to take collective action through 
the United Nations Security Council. Since then the principle has been evoked in Cote d’Ivoire 
and Libya. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, China’s intervention behaviour 
in foreign intrastate armed conflicts is therefore affected, hence it is a major factor in that it 
provided legitimation and justification for members of the international community to 
intervene in order to protect civilians in cases where their government cannot protect them 
from genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Although China has maintained its non-
interference principle, the adoption and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect puts 
this principle to the test and has had an effect on its intervention behaviour. While this study 
does not focus on the impact of the Responsibility to Protect on China’s external intervention 
                                                          
27 ‘Intrastate armed conflict’ is used interchangeably with ‘civil war’ in this section. 
28 Carment, D, Samy, Y & El Achkar, S 2009, ‘Protracted conflict and crisis mediation: A contingency 
approach’, in J Bercovitch & S Gartner (eds.), International conflict mediation: New approaches and 
findings, Routledge: New York, p.216. 
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behaviour, it nevertheless recognises that R2P was a significant milestone in global perceptions 
of foreign intervention in other states’ intrastate armed conflicts. Thus the adoption of the 
Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 United Nations World Summit marked the beginning of a 
new external intervention dispensation in global governance.  
After excluding intrastate armed conflicts that occurred before adoption of the Responsibility 
to Protect in 2005, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya were the only countries that had civil 
wars between 2005 and 2013. Of these four countries, Chad and Sudan are excluded from the 
study because, like the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia they are 
protracted conflicts that have been ongoing since 1966 and 1971 respectively and could 
potentially skew the results. Another reason for their exclusion is that the conflicts in Chad and 
Sudan tended to be state-sponsored massacres of civilians who were represented by militia 
groups fighting to protect minority rights rather than seize political power. In Sudan, the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups fought 
against the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed, s government of Sudan-sponsored militia 
group. The main reason for the conflict was oppression of Darfur’s non-Arab population. Hence 
they sought recognition and equal rights for the Darfurians rather than to usurp political power 
from the Khartoum government. Meanwhile, the armed conflict in Chad lasted only for a 
month. In April 2006, rebels seeking to oust the government of President Idris Deby fought 
government forces. By May 2006, the conflict had subsided and President Deby was declared 
winner of a presidential election. The armed conflict in Chad was therefore too short to assess 
China’s intervention.   
In the end, two countries remained as suitable case studies, that is, Libya and South Sudan 
whose intrastate armed conflicts began in 2011 and 2013 respectively. However, selected cases 
should be able to provide “the kind of control and variation required by the research 
problem.”29 Three controlling variables are therefore critical to the selection of cases that 
would be able to explain why China’s interventions in foreign intrastate armed conflicts vary 
over time. The three are: (1) severity of the conflict; (2) level of economic and diplomatic 
engagement with China; and (3) intervention. In terms of ‘severity of the conflict’, South Sudan 
and Libya had at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, hence they are 
                                                          
29 George, AL & Bennett, A 2005, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, p.83. 
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designated as civil wars in terms of the Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict. Secondly, 
both had diplomatic relations with China before the outbreak of their respective intrastate 
armed conflicts and in terms of economic engagement, Chinese private and state-owned 
enterprises had extensive investments in the two countries - oil in South Sudan, and 
telecommunication and infrastructure development in Libya. Thirdly, China’s intervention in 
the two countries’ intrastate armed conflicts varied; in the case of Libya it largely opposed 
foreign bilateral intervention but reluctantly supported limited multilateral intervention, while 
in South Sudan it actively engaged in both bilateral and multilateral intervention. Both cases 
are therefore relevant to discussing why China’s intervention would vary in countries where it 
has comparably significant economic interests and diplomatic relations, and where the severity 
of the conflicts was also largely the same – at least 1000 deaths in one calendar year. 
Yet, two cases that are largely similar are insufficient to determine the trend and pattern of 
external intervention. In addition, the two cases do not provide “the opportunity for finding 
novel theoretical relationships as well as confidence that a study has been conducted in a 
rigorous way… creating a robust set of findings that have relevance in a wide range of contexts” 
(Wicks 2010, p. 289, 290). There is need for a deviant case where China intervened either 
bilaterally or multilaterally even though it had no comparably major economic investments in 
that country, and where the severity of the conflict was less than 1000 battle-related deaths in 
one calendar year. The Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict defines such conflicts as 
minor wars because the battle-related deaths in one calendar year were at least 25. The 
purpose of the deviant case is to identify underlying influences30 of China’s varied intervention 
behaviour in African intrastate armed conflict and to dispel the obvious conclusion that can be 
drawn from the cases of South Sudan and Libya that China intervenes on the basis of severity of 
the conflict and/or economic investments. In that respect, a deviant case assists in probing “for 
new – but as yet unspecified –explanations”31 of China’s varying intervention in African 
intrastate armed conflicts over time and with each country.  
Of all the countries that experienced minor wars between 2005 and 2013, China only 
multilaterally intervened in Mali, which makes it a suitable deviant case because China did not 
                                                          
30 Kazancigil, A 1994, “The deviant case in comparative analysis: High stateness in comparative analysis’, 
in M Dogan & A Kazancigil (eds.), Comparing nations: Concepts, strategies, substance, Blackwell, 
Cambridge, p. 214. 
31 Seawright, J & Gerring, J 2008, ‘Case selection techniques in case study research a menu of qualitative 
and quantitative options’, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 2, p. 302. 
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have significant investments compared to the Libya and South Sudan, and the conflict was 
minor in terms of battle-related deaths.  Considering the above caveats, three cases are 
analysed in this study: (1) Libya, (2) Mali, and (3) South Sudan. What distinguishes these three 
cases from other countries that experienced intrastate armed conflicts in Africa is that the 
armed conflicts in the three countries occurred within months of each other - the armed 
conflict in Libya started in February 2011 ending in October 2011; the Tuareg rebellion that 
culminated in a military coup in Mali took place in January and March 2012 respectively ceasing 
in August 2012 when a government of national unity was established, and lastly, the intrastate 
armed conflict in South Sudan began in December 2013 and is still ongoing. The utility of the 
intrastate armed conflicts happening within months of each other is that it becomes possible to 
examine the trend and pattern of China’s external intervention behaviour and also to examine 
why the intervention varied within a three-year period. Furthermore, unlike single case studies 
which are common to studies on China’s intervention in African conflicts, multiple case studies 
increase the methodological rigor of a study by "strengthening the precision, the validity and 
stability of the findings," (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 29), suggesting that "evidence from 
multiple cases is …more compelling” (Shakir 2002, p. 191).  
In addition, what makes the selected cases comparable is that China’s main interest in each of 
the three countries is a dominant single primary commodity. In the case of Libya and South 
Sudan it is crude oil while cotton dominates trade relations between China and Mali. From 
2011 when South Sudan officially seceded from Sudan, China’s imports from South Sudan are 
100 per cent crude petroleum valued at US$446 million in 2012, US$2.25 billion in 2013, and 
US$3.96 billion in 2014.32  During the same period, China’s imports from Libya constituted of an 
average of 97% crude petroleum valued at US$3.58 billion (2010), US$1.81 billion (2011), 
US$5.55 billion (2012), US$1.81 billion (2013) and US$650 million (2014).33 Although Mali has 
no crude petroleum for export yet, China’s major economic interests in Mali are cotton and 
agriculture. China imports an average of 80 percent of Malian cotton and related products such 
as as oily seeds.34 Mali is also among top African countries that China has agricultural projects 
                                                          
32 The Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d., What does China import from South Sudan, viewed 13 
July 2016, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/ssd/show/2010/  
33 The Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d., What does China import from Libya, viewed 13 July 
2016, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/lby/show/2010/  
34 The Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d., What does China import from Mali, viewed 13 July 2016, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/mli/show/2010/  
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in. In total, Chinese companies hold approximately 26 174 hactares of land under rice and 
sugarcane crops.35  
The tables below show Chinese imports from, and exports to Libya, Mali and South Sudan.  
Figure 1.2: China's imports from Libya, Mali, Sudan (North + South) and South Sudan (Unit: 
US$ thousand) 
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Brautigam, D. 2015, Will Africa Feed China? Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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Figure 1.3: China's exports to Libya, Mali, Sudan (North + South) and South Sudan (Unit: 
US$ thousand) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE, International Trade Centre, and General Customs 
Administration of China statistics. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, China’s imports from and exports to Libya and Sudan 
(North + South) are comparable in that there is a marked reduction in Chinese imports from 
Libya and South Sudan in the years that the countries had intrastate armed conflicts. For 
instance, China’s imports from Libya fell from US$4.515 billion in 2010 to US$2.063 billion in 
2011, although they peaked to US$6.375 billion in 2012 as Libya stabilized, renewed armed 
conflicts explain the downward spiral from 2013 to 2015. By 2015, Libya’s total exports to 
China amounted to only US$949 million. Similarly, Libya’s imports from China fell from US$2 
billion in 2010 to a meagre US$720 million before they peaked again. A similar trend is also 
noticeable in South Sudan, whose trade statistics are combined with those of northern Sudan 
due to the intertwined nature of their economies. The outlier nature of the Malian case is 
reflected in that trade relations between Mali and China are significantly lower than Libya and 
South Sudan. This makes a case for challenging the assumption that China intervenes only 
countries that it has major economic and trade interests in. 
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1.4.2 Data collection and analysis 
Conducting research on China-Africa security engagements is difficult for two reasons: First 
there is lack of easily accessible data, and secondly, the subject is considered highly sensitive by 
both China and African countries, including organisations such as the African Union, so few are 
willing to talk about the subject. Thus, the research began with desk-top data gathering and 
analysis. This effort focused on the theoretical underpinnings of the study; China’s engagement 
in Africa, in particular the selected cases; and also on the context and conflict assessment of 
the selected cases. During this stage, data was mainly obtained from official statements issued 
by international organisations such as the United Nations, and the African Union, and also 
statements of Chinese government ministries, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Communist Party of China. In addition, information from the PRC’s official state news 
agencies such as Xinhua, newspapers, and publications of Chinese international relations and 
security think tanks such as the State Council’s China Centre for International Studies, the China 
Institute for Contemporary International Relations, Shanghai Institute of International Studies 
and the China Institute of International Studies were used. To avoid overreliance on Chinese 
and African sources of information, the research also utilised publications from Western and 
African think tanks such as the Chatham House and the South African Institute of International 
Affairs, as well as official statements from the United States of America, France and the 
European Union on the topic. This constituted the background analysis upon which field 
research and interviews were based. 
What became clear from the analysis of primary and secondary data is that Chinese internal 
policy discussions and documents are not easily accessible. Official data from governments of 
Libya, Mali, and South Sudan was not available online and was hardly accessible. Also, the data 
from African governments, the African Union, and China tended to be official and standardised 
in a manner that suggested it was mostly public relations-cum-propaganda information. 
Because of these difficulties there was need for extensive interviews with Chinese, African 
policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders. Using semi-structured interviews to get 
opinions and views that are not so often contained in official statements, the researcher 
conducted a total of twelve interviews in Hong Kong, Ethiopia, the United States, Taiwan and 
Germany, and also by email with respondents in China, South Sudan, Mali and Libya. Selected 
interviews that were conducted include: an interview with a researcher in China’s Ministry of 
Commerce and six interviews with senior researchers at the Shanghai Institute for International 
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Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Chinese Communist Party School, the China 
Foreign Affairs University, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), and the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch (South Africa).36 
From June to August 2015, the researcher was hosted at the Institute for Peace and Security 
Studies at the Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia as a visiting researcher. The strategic 
importance of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies is that it jointly organizes the Tana 
High-Level Forum on Security in Africa which is attended by former and current African 
presidents as well as high level officials from major countries such as the United States, China, 
and Britain; and it also jointly runs the Africa Peace and Security Programme with the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Department. In the course of the three months, the researcher had 
access to the Institute’s extensive library, and other African peace and security studies experts 
at the Institute. Affiliation to the Institute also enabled the researcher to conduct semi-
structured interviews with three African Union high level officials directly working on intrastate 
armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Three other interviews were conducted with 
conflict analysts at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional 
organization for eight countries in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. IGAD has been playing the 
mediatory role in the South Sudan conflict. Other ad hoc, unofficial discussions on the subject 
matter held with a Chinese diplomat working at the Mission of the People’s Republic of China 
to the African Union, as well as a Norwegian diplomat who had participated in South Sudan 
conflict mediation as part of the IGAD – Plus initiative which includes United States, Norway, 
United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union and the United Nations. Discussions with academics 
in panels on China-Africa security relations at several academic conferences such as the 
International Studies Association conferences in Buenos Aires (2014), New Orleans (2015), and 
Atlanta (2016), as well as other academic conferences in Taiwan and Germany helped in 
gathering insightful opinions that proved helpful to this study. 
Due to the aforementioned data collection methods, the “high proportion of it [collected data] 
is text based, consisting of verbatim transcriptions of interviews or discussions, field notes or 
other written documents” (Ritchie and Spencer 2002, p. 309). To provide structure, meaning 
and coherence to the data, the researcher employed preliminary data analysis ‘in order to 
                                                          
36 All the six think tanks are part of the Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan supported by the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and organized under the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation. The Plan links 16 think tanks in Africa and China together. 
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highlight emerging issues, to allow all relevant data to be identified and to provide directions 
for the seeking of further data’ (Grbich 2007, p. 25); this was done during the data collection 
process. The preliminary data analysis allowed the researcher to identify and follow-up on 
issues previously not considered as central to this research but that emerged from the 
preliminary data analysis as significant research issues. In order to reduce the data into 
meaningful categories, the conceptual mapping approach to thematic analysis was used to 
systematically identify, analyse and categorise patterns within data. Content analysis was 
useful in analysing trends in the three selected case studies, making it possible to develop 
hypotheses about China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts through the 
emergent “trends and patterns of words used, their frequency, their relationships and the 
structures and discourses of communication” (Grbich 2007, p. 112).  
 
1.5 Definition of key terms 
1.5.1 Intervention 
In this study, intervention shall be in reference to political, military, economic or diplomatic 
actions or inactions undertaken by a governmental or intergovernmental actor of the 
international system [with or without consent of the target state], the purpose of which is to 
affect the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate armed conflict.37 As put by Karen 
Feste, the definition of intervention can be extended “to include various forms of involvement 
and assistance by an external state in an ongoing civil war (e.g., U.S. commitments to Greece in 
the 1940s and covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters in the 1980s)” (2003, p. 178). Similarly, 
Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001) also broadly conceptualizes intervention to include “both 
coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military coercive forms of intervention.” 
Specifically, this study is concerned with unilateral actions or inactions such as mediation, 
diplomatic, political, economic or military taken by the government of China or its appointed 
agents, or multilaterally taken through the United Nations Security Council with or without the 
consent of the appropriate authorities in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Actions or inactions 
taken through the United Nations Security Council include abstaining, vetoing, or voting for 
resolutions that lead to multilateral actions such as imposition of no-fly zones, sanctions, 
                                                          
37 Rioux, JS & Bucher, JC 2003, ‘Third party intervention as conflict management: The case of Africa’, 
Paper presented at 16th Nordic and Baltic peace research conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, p.7, viewed 
on 16 June 2014, http://www.institutidrp.org/contributionsidrp/Rioux_7octobre2003.pdf  
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deployment of peacekeepers or other forces under the United Nations. The purpose of these 
unilateral and multilateral actions should be to affect the duration, direction or outcome of the 
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. 
 
1.5.2 Intrastate armed conflicts 
In Africa, intrastate armed conflicts rather than interstate wars are more prevalent and “remain 
the dominant form of conflict.”38 The paucity of interstate wars is attributable to the de facto 
and de jure committal by founders of independent African states to non-interference, respect 
of national sovereignty, and adherence to pre-independence territorial borders.39 However, 
while there was ‘peace’ among states, the majority of newly independent countries 
experienced a surge in civil wars and military takeover of governments. Part of the reason 
these events is that a significant number of African countries gained independence at the 
height of “the Cold War politics of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. [Therefore] Independence converted 
Africa into a battleground for East-West Cold War rivalry” (Francis 2006, p. 46). Within that 
period, there was a steady increase in proxy wars in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Angola, and Mozambique. “After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some previously 
frozen conflicts in Africa reignited violently, including those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Cilliers and Schuenemann 2013, p. 3). Intrastate 
armed conflicts reached their peak in the early 1990s before subsiding. Although there has 
been a significant decline in civil wars compared to the 1990s, they still remain extensive, their 
nature and intensity as well as the complexity of actors involved has also evolved, making them 
more devastating and difficult to conceptualise.  
Scholarly focus on causes and consequences adds to the complexity of reaching a common 
definition of intrastate armed conflicts, hence, it is “an imprecise and poorly observed 
                                                          
38 Cilliers, J & Schuenemann, J 2013, ‘The future of intrastate conflict in Africa more violence or greater 
peace?’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 246, p.2, viewed 3 January 2014, 
https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper246.pdf 
39 The Organisation of African Unity 1964, ‘Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964’ OAU: Addis 
Ababa. At that conference the Heads of State and Government “SOLEMNLY DECLARES that all Member 
States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” 
(AHG/Res. 16(1)), viewed 17 August 2014, 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_17_21_JULY_1964_ASSEMBLY_HEADS_STATE_
GOVERNMENT_FIRST_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf  
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phenomenon”40 to which different conflict databases and studies apply varying methodological 
approaches to defining and analysing it. The resultant effect is that “scholars and analysts 
interested in intrastate conflict are defined and divided by their epistemological worldview and 
methodological approaches,”41 which are usually the result of subjective and ad hoc variables 
such as, ethnicity, poverty, inequality, religion, regime type, resources scarcity that are 
employed to explain the causes and nature of civil wars.42  Consequently, the definition of what 
is a civil war is not universally acknowledged. 
Due to varying methodologies and emphasis on different variables, several definitions of civil 
war exist. In her book, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, Aydin Aysegul 
defines civil war as “intrastate violence that crosses the threshold of 200 fatalities” (2012, p. 
131). The Correlates of War Project conceptualises civil war as being a “sustained combat 
between/among organised armed forces taking place within the territorial boundaries of a 
state system member and leading to 1,000 battle-related deaths (of combatants) per year (or 
12-month period starting from the war onset” (Sarkees 2014, p. 242).  On the other hand, the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
describes civil war as an internal contested incompatibility between the government of a state 
and internal opposition group(s) that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in 
at least 25 battle-related deaths. Unlike the others, Gersovitz and Kriger (2013) do not give a 
death threshold in their definition of civil war; rather, they define it as “a politically organised, 
large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country principally among 
large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical 
force within the country” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, p. 160-161). Although varying in emphasis, 
these definitions “converge around the same key dimensions of the phenomenon,”43 that is, (1) 
a sustained armed resistance/combat, (2) within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign 
state, (3) between the government of the state and one or more internal organised armed 
opposition groups, and (4) reaching a certain numerical threshold of deaths.  
                                                          
40 Collier, P & Hoeffler, A 2007, ‘Civil war’, in T Sandler & K Hartley (eds.), Handbook of defense 
economics: Defense in a globalized world, Volume 2, North-Holland Publications, Amsterdam, p.713. 
41 Newman, E 2014, Understanding civil wars: Continuity and change in intrastate conflict, Routledge, 
London, p.2. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Kalyvas, NS 2007, ‘Civil wars’, in C Boix & SC Stokes (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative politics, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.417. 
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The existence of a state, particularly for African countries such as Somalia whose statehood is 
questioned, is the starting point in determining whether an armed conflict constitutes a civil 
war. Max Weber envisaged a state as “the form of human community that (successfully) lays 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory – and this 
idea of ‘territory’ is an essential defining feature” (Weber, cited in Owen and Strong 2004, p. 
33). An intrastate armed conflict is therefore a civil war, first, because it occurs within the 
territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. What further distinguishes civil wars from other 
equally large scale internal violent conflicts, however, is the civil war belligerents’ objective of 
capturing and possessing the monopoly of force within an international system state. Unlike 
‘one-time-events’ such as political assassinations, a civil war entails “large-scale and sustained 
internal political violence that contests the monopoly of force” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, p. 
161). A civil war is therefore distinct from other forms of internal violence because it is ‘political’ 
in nature and purpose; meaning that, the interest and purpose of the civil war actors must be 
to influence “the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power … [Therefore, they 
strive] for power, either power as a means in the service of other goals, whether idealistic or 
selfish, or power ‘for its own sake,’ in other words, so as to enjoy the feeling of prestige that it 
confers” (Weber, Owen and Strong 2004, p. 33-34). Thus, for as long as the purpose of the 
violence is not for political power, as is the case with organised criminal organisations, or 
terrorist insurgent groups like Al Shabab in Somalia and Kenya, it cannot be defined as civil war.  
A third distinct component of the definition of civil war regards the involved actors, that is, the 
armed opposition groups(s) challenging the monopoly of violence within a state on one hand 
and an incumbent government that possesses such authority on the other. “The challengers 
may seek to replace the incumbents in control of the monopoly of force within the extant 
territory of the state, or they may seek the secession of part of the original territory” (Gersovitz 
and Kriger 2013, p. 161). The incumbent or national government is codified as those “forces 
that were at the start of the war in de facto control of the nation’s institutions, regardless of 
the legality or illegality of their claim” (Sarkees 2014, p. 242), while national institutions are 
defined as “institutions of governance and whichever party begins the war in possession of the 
institutions of governance (parliament, the palace, etc.) may be termed the government. When 
each side in a civil war controls an institution (e.g. Chile’s Congressionist rebellion that pitted 
President against Congress), then the executive or monarch’s faction ought to be termed the 
government” (Dixon 2003, p. 4). “This excludes a number of internal wars from the civil war 
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definition, most notably wars of liberation from colonialism…, [that] are instead listed as extra-
systemic wars” (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, p. 714); or other internal armed conflicts between 
non-state armed groups, or one-sided violence perpetuated by either a government or an 
armed group. The involvement of an incumbent government in an armed combat with one or 
more organised armed opposition groups is therefore essential in distinguishing a civil war 
from other forms of internal violence. 
Although conflict databases such as the Correlates of War (COW) project, Heidelberg Institute 
for International Conflict Research, the UCDP/PRIO and the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) agree 
that a civil war is a sustained armed combat/resistance within a sovereign state between an 
incumbent government and internal armed opposition group(s), they differ on the numerical 
threshold of deaths. The Correlates of War sets the threshold at “1,000 battle-related deaths 
(of combatants) per year (or 12-month period starting from the war onset” (Sarkees 2014, p. 
242). For the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, 
Oslo (PRIO) the internal armed conflict should result in at least 25 battle-related deaths.44 In 
contrast, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, set the threshold at more 
than 1 080 battle-related combatant and civilian fatalities.45  
Differences in the death threshold reflect the divergence of methodologies, data gathering 
approaches and analysis of conflicts by the different databases. Depending on the database, 
death thresholds may relate to the cumulative monthly or annual number of battle-related 
deaths. In some cases, it can be combatant deaths only, as is the case with the COW database, 
or may include both combatant and civilian deaths as in the case of the Uppsala/PRIO database. 
While the death threshold may be used to either include or exclude a conflict from the 
database, both the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the 
Uppsala/PRIO database use it to classify conflicts according to their intensity. However due to 
varying numerical death thresholds among conflict databases, the same conflict may not be 
classified in the same category. Thus, reliance on the numerical death threshold criterion alone 
makes the definition and classification of conflicts uncertain – making it problematic to 
                                                          
44Themnér, L 2013, UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, viewed 
3 September 2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/124/124920_1codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-
conflict-dataset-v4_2013.pdf  
45 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2014, Conflict barometer 2013, HIIK, 
Heidelberg, p.10, viewed 3 September 2013, http://www.frsh.de/fileadmin/beiboot/BB9/BB-9-15-
Anlage.pdf  
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comprehensively analyse the duration, pattern, trend, dynamics and recurrence of the conflict 
over time. So, although, the databases agree on other elements constituting a civil war, they 
significantly differ on the operationalization of the concept. In that case, when “databases are 
so different that they are not based on the same types of raw data, then they probably should 
not be used to test exactly the same theory” (Kauffmann 2008:6), because it would lead “to 
different views of where and when conflict occurs” (UNCTAD 2004, p. 161). 
Debate on the conceptualisation and operationalization of ‘civil war’ by various conflict 
databases is complex, the debate therefore falls beyond the scope of this study. For that 
reason, the study bases its conceptual and operational understanding of ‘civil war’ or intrastate 
armed conflict on one international database, the Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict;46 
and focuses on civil wars that happened in Africa between 2005 and 2013. Uppsala/PRIO 
defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.”47 The 
death threshold of a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths is less than the usual 1 000 battle 
related deaths used by databases such as the COW. However, Uppsala/PRIO categorises 
conflicts depending on their intensity – which is measured by the number of battle-related 
deaths. It codes the intensity variable in two categories: (1) minor – between 25 and 999 
battle-related deaths in a given year, and (2) war – at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in a 
given year.  
This study is concerned with war, that is, intrastate armed conflicts (civil war) defined as a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with or 
without intervention from other states, of which at least one is the government of a state 
results in at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Uppsala/PRIO defines these 
conflicts as internal armed conflict if there is no intervention from other states, and as 
internationalised internal armed conflict if there is intervention from other states. In this study, 
                                                          
46 The dataset is a joint project of the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala University, and 
the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). 
47 Themnér, L 2013, UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, viewed 
3 September 2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/124/124920_1codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-
conflict-dataset-v4_2013.pdf 
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the term ‘civil war’ and ‘intrastate armed conflict’ is used interchangeably to refer to both 
internal and internationalised armed conflicts as defined by Uppsala/PRIO.  
1.6 Study outline  
This study contains nine chapters. The background and introduction of this study has been 
given in this first chapter. The chapter laid the general background of the research context. The 
theoretical and empirical significance of the study was discussed, and a brief introduction of 
the main arguments was made. In a nutshell, it mentions the main case studies - Sudan, South 
Sudan and Libya as well as the minor cases that will be intermittently referred to in the study. It 
then shortly made reference to the neo-classical realist theory, which is the main theoretical 
framework applied in this study.  
The second chapter reviews existing literature on intervention in foreign conflicts by rising 
powers. It assessed the prevailing discourse on the topic and the emerging gaps. The main 
argument advanced in the chapter is that the major gap in existing literature is the lack of 
systematic theoretical and empirical study of intervention in foreign conflicts by rising powers, 
particularly China. Most of the literature on intervention focuses on traditional powers such as 
the United States, France, Britain and multinational institutions such as the European Union 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  
Chapter 3 makes an argument that in external intervention studies, practice has preceded 
theory. The focus of IR theorists has remained on ‘states-that-matter’ such that the theories do 
not explain the behaviour of small or rising states. It therefore made an argument for the use of 
neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework able to explain the foreign policy behaviour of 
rising powers.   
The fourth chapter explores the argument that a state’s position in the international system 
determines its foreign policy and external intervention behaviour. It begins by giving a critical 
historical analysis of China’s evolving understanding of foreign intervention, its foreign 
intervention policy and external intervention behaviour from imperial times to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and until 2015.  The aim is to trace the 
historical evolving nature of China’s foreign policy regarding intervention in other states’ 
internal affairs vis-a-vis changes in its relative economic power and position in the international 
system in order to understanding current Chinese intervention behaviour. 
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Chapter 5 is the first of the three chapters that discusses China’s intervention in specific 
intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. It explores Sino-Libya diplomatic, political and economic 
relations from a historical perspective, and then focuses on China’s economic interests in Libya 
and how the outbreak of the intrastate armed conflict in 2011 affected those interests in a 
manner and scale never before experienced by China in Africa. The main argument advanced in 
the chapter is that China’s response to the intrastate armed conflict in Libya changed from non-
interventionism to ambivalent interventionism. 
Following onto the previous chapter on Libya, the sixth chapter examines China’s intervention 
in the Malian intrastate armed conflict. Through a historical analysis of Sino-Mali diplomatic, 
political and economic relations since diplomatic relations were established in 1960, the 
chapter discusses China’s response to previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in Mali. The 
argument pursued in this chapter is that in hindsight based on its experience in Libya, China’s 
intervention in Mali was, although indifferent, more alert to the threats imposed by the Malian 
armed conflict, enabling it to take more pragmatic strategies.  
As the last in the three chapters assesses China’s intervention in African intrastate armed 
conflicts, the seventh chapter examines China’s intervention behavior in South Sudan. The 
argument advanced in the chapter is that, unlike in Libya and Mali, China’s intervention in 
South Sudan was proactive, purposeful, and assertive, suggesting that its perception of African 
intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its external economic interests is constantly 
evolving. Like the previous chapters, this argument culminated from a tracing of Sino-South 
Sudan relations.  
The last chapter in this study assesses trends and patterns of China’s intervention behavior in 
African intrastate armed conflicts. The assessment is based on discussions of the historical 
evolvement of China’s external intervention behavior in other states’ internal affairs as its 
relative economic power and perception of threat to its interests abroad changed over time.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Bringing rising powers into the foreign intervention 
discourse – A review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Literature on external intervention in intrastate armed conflicts is expanding. But does it 
consider intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts by non-Western rising powers? This 
chapter explores this question by assessing whether existing literature does account for such 
intervention, especially considering that most non-Western rising powers do not entirely 
subscribe to the western-centric order48 or western norms of intervention, Responsibility to 
Protect,49 human rights, good governance, and democracy.50 In exploring the question, this 
chapter examines the adequacy of current Western-centric theoretical and empirical narratives 
in explaining interventions by these rising powers. It then notes that having been explained at 
different levels of analysis using various methods and approaches, intervention has often been 
portrayed as a foreign policy tool employed by global powers to protect their national interests 
and expand their foreign influence. As a result, the discourse on intervention is fixated on non-
consensual intervention by powerful Western states such as the United States, Britain and 
France which possess extensive military power and global influence. Meanwhile, intervention 
by rising powers is either neglected or at best relegated to the peripheries of third-party 
intervention, international politics, and foreign policy discourse.  
Assessing works by international relations and foreign policy scholars, this review of existing 
literature also advances an argument that lack of research which systematically connects 
theoretical reasoning with empirical analysis of intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts by 
rising powers is a major gap in current intervention discourse. This is despite the 21st century 
global order recalibrations necessitated by non-Western rising powers. By advancing that 
argument, it exposes the limitations of current empirical scholarship on intervention in 
intrastate armed conflicts and argues for a more systematic interlink between theoretical and 
                                                          
48 Alexandroff, AS & Cooper, AF 2010, Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global 
governance, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., p. 1; Buzan, B 2010, ‘China in international 
society: Is ‘peaceful rise’ possible?’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 14. 
49 Pang, Z 2009, ‘China's non-intervention question", Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 1, p. 238. 
50 Buzan, B 2010, ‘China in international society: Is ‘peaceful rise’ possible?", The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 13, 15. 
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empirical analysis that takes into consideration the changing status of rising powers in the 
global system and its effect on their intervention behaviour, thereby making a case for an 
extensive empirical study of China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate armed conflicts in 
Africa.  
The objective of this chapter is that any resultant theoretical and empirical study of external 
intervention in intrastate armed conflicts should consider interactive dynamics between 
systemic and domestic variables in its causal explanation of a non-Western rising power’s 
foreign intervention behaviour. This objective is a result of the synthesis of theoretical 
arguments from both international relations and foreign policy fields in order to develop 
explanatory variables that can adequately capture the evolving nature of the foreign policy of 
rising global powers vis-à-vis their evolutionary but competing national and international status. 
This, then contributes to the overall objective of this study, which is to offer explanations for 
the emerging general trends and patterns of intervention by rising powers in foreign intrastate 
armed conflicts.  
 
2.2 International Relations and intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts 
by rising powers 
Hans Morgenthau’s argument is that intervention is a foreign policy instrument used by great 
powers on behalf of their interests. To others such as Tillema (1989) and Steiner (2004, p. 16), 
intervention is a preserve of great powers. Such statements as Morgenthau’s are instructive to 
the theoretical and empirical study of intervention and world politics such that a mention of 
intervention invokes the idea of a great power intruding into the domestic affairs of a small 
state. Part of the reason why intervention is conceived of in that way is because realism is the 
dominant paradigm in the study of international politics51 and, specifically in the scholarship of 
intervention that focuses on great powers (Morgenthau 1967; Bull 1984; Feste 1992). At the 
core of the realist thinking is that although theoretically all states exist within an interstate 
system that supposedly guarantees their sovereign equality, “the strong do to others what 
others cannot do to them” (Mandelbaum 1988, p. 135). Hence, beyond great powers, IR 
theorists, especially classical and neo- realists, have no interest.  
                                                          
51 Mastanduno, M 1997, “Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and U.S. grand strategy after 
the Cold War’, International Security, vol.21, no.4, p.49. 
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Following in the mould of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz emphasised the marginality of 
small states in IR when he stated that ‘Denmark does not matter’ in international politics. 
Stephen Krasner is also reported to have argued that states without hegemonic power were 
irrelevant to IR and the study of global politics. He reasoned: “Sure people in Luxembourg have 
good ideas. But who gives a damn? Luxembourg ain’t hegemonic” (Nossal 2001, p. 176). In 
addition, Robert W. Cox suggests that to the neorealist, “middle and small states do not matter; 
they can be ignored in calculating the configuration of effective power relations” (1992, p. 143). 
Such reasoning among renowned scholars is somewhat representative of the attitude toward 
small states in the capitals of major powers.  Pinar Bilgin therefore argues that the primacy of 
Western-centric IR compels both students and scholars to focus on great powers while 
relegating small states to the peripheries of their thinking.52  
Nowhere is the relegation of non-great powers, that is, rising powers and small state to 
insignificant status evidently ubiquitous than in the literature on state intervention in another 
state’s internal affairs. Immanuel Wallerstein, architect of the World Systems Theory put it that 
“strong states find it far easier to ‘intervene’ in the internal affairs of weaker states than vice 
versa,”53 the major factor being that strong states possess military and economic capabilities 
that other states do not have. For that reason, a distinction is made “between states of general 
interests (system-wide interests) and states with limited interests” (Handel 1990, p. 22). Since 
great powers are states of system-wide influence, their interests, which they ought to protect, 
extend beyond their borders and regions; hence, their “basic foreign policy consists of 
protecting and safeguarding [their] sphere of interest” (Reczei 1971, p. 74).  
This distinction falls into Morgenthau’s assertion that great powers intervene where their 
national interest requires it and where their power enables them to succeed.54 It also follows 
that in order to explain intervention, realists emphasise national interest (Morgenthau 1967; 
Bull 1984; Feste 1992) and power (relative material capabilities) as the causal explanatory 
variables of why global powers intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts and why other states do 
not. The focus on interests and power as factors compelling states to intervene in other 
sovereignties demands further but brief explanation. First, national interests, whether 
                                                          
52 Bilgin, P 2008, "Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 10. 
53 Wallerstein, IM 2004, World-systems analysis: An introduction, Duke University Press, Durham and 
London, p.55. 
54 Morgenthau, HJ 1967, ‘To intervene or not to intervene’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 45, no. 3, p. 436. 
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domestic or foreign, are not exclusive to great powers. Principally, every state, great or small, 
has interests that may extend beyond its territorial boundaries. What, however, differs among 
them is the scope of those interests and the methods of intervention they employ on their 
behalf. More so, the scope of a state’s interests is not static or ‘cast in stone’ so to speak. 
Neoclassical realists understand this better because their main proposition is that states 
expand their interests abroad when their relative material capabilities increase (Taliaferro 2004, 
p. 3; Mandelbaum 1988, p. 134-135; Kennedy 1987, p.  xxii; Zakaria 1998, p. 3). Because of their 
concern with interests and power, classical and neo-realists do not explain the intervention 
behaviour of states whose relative material capabilities are increasing and whose interests are 
expanding abroad. Instead, they ridicule them as “states whose ambitions run ahead of their 
material capabilities”55 – that is, rising powers whose expanding foreign interests are not 
commensurate with their military capabilities.  
Secondly, power is a central concept to international relations theory. Generally, the concept of 
power can be defined either as relational or material. However, “by far the majority prefers a 
material definition of ‘power’ as the capabilities or resources, mainly military, with which states 
influence one another. Power in this view is the actual capacity to raise armies, deploy navies, 
occupy territory, and exert various forms of pressure against other states.”56 Power is therefore 
usually defined as capabilities, “that may or may not be translated into influence over many 
issues”57  rather than control, as argued by those who define power from a relational 
perspective. In his conceptualisation of great powers, Kenneth Waltz defines power in terms of 
material capabilities. He notes that "states, because they are in a self-help system, have to use 
their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests. The economic, military, and other 
capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed because state power is 
multidimensional. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or 
another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population 
and territory; resource endowment; military strength; political stability; and competence" 
(Waltz 1979, p. 131).  
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It can be argued that because great powers possess comprehensive capabilities, they tend to 
have interests that other states do not have, and in turn, their intervention behaviour is 
broader. Although Kenneth Waltz advocates an aggregate understanding of states’ overall 
capabilities in deciding their global power status, scholars such as Christopher Layne (1993), 
give preeminence to military capabilities to determine whether a state is a great power or not. 
They are preoccupied with the “utility and fungibility of military power” (Mastanduno 1997, p. 
49). As a result, according to Jack Levy there are four characteristics that distinguish great 
powers from other states, that is, they possess immense military capabilities which guarantees 
their security from other states; they are able to project their power abroad; they have a 
system-wide concept of security; and they are able to protect their interests abroad more 
effectively than other states.58 
While acknowledging the propensity of great powers to intervene in the internal affairs of small 
states, Richard Little notes that even small states also have a tendency to interfere in each 
other’s domestic affairs on behalf of their interests. 59  For instance, Zimbabwe, Uganda and 
Rwanda are small states in the construct of most IR theory, yet they have militarily intervened 
on several occasions in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) intrastate armed conflicts. 
Although it might be rare for a small state to intervene in states beyond its region, that alone, 
does not mean small states and more so, rising powers should be in the periphery of the 
intervention discourse as they presently are. In that regard, the demarcation of states into ones 
with limited interests and others with system-wide interests only serves to show the scope of 
the reach of their interests and does not explain their intervention behaviour. Accordingly, the 
pervasive argument that the world’s weakest states are the targets of intervention, with the 
world’s most powerful states being the executors60 which is propagated by realists and widely 
accepted in IR, does not hold in elucidating the intervention behaviour of states, great, small or 
rising in foreign intrastate conflicts. 
In an anarchic system as envisioned by neo-realists’ interpretation of international relations, 
“the distribution of power among these units [states] will be the most important variable 
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conditioning their behaviour and the outcome of their interactions over the long run” 
(Wohlforth 1993, p. 2). Steve Chan challenges this neorealist perspective that state behaviour is 
determined by the systemic structure. He maintains that “structure is not everything or even 
the most important thing”61 because it is not always the case that states in the same systemic 
structure behave in a similar manner;62 neither do they share the same interests. One of the 
major effects of focusing on the systemic structure is that it perpetuates stereotyping and 
profiling of state behaviour, which has an effect on how intervention is analysed. Pearson fell 
into the ‘stereotyping trap’ when he concluded that “major powers seem inclined to undertake 
economic or diplomatic-military protective, ideological, or regional power balance 
interventions in distant targets, while middle and small powers are likely to undertake 
territorial and social-protective interventions, as well as regional power balance interventions 
in nearby targets” (1974, p. 262-263). To the contrary, history is awash with states that attempt 
to punch above their weight. Therefore, narratives that confine state behaviour to structure of 
the system disregard those ‘ambitious’ states and expressions of their capabilities in foreign 
interactions. 
Accordingly, the focus on the distribution of power in the interstate system and a bias toward 
military power has significant implications on the study of intervention. First, by explaining 
state behaviour as a function of a state’s international attributes, particularly its relative 
military power,63 the focus of intervention scholarship is transfixed on military intervention by 
great powers, disregarding the economic power and geo-economic influence that rising powers 
such as China have. Even though “markets can have as much influence as militaries”64 realists 
would still argue that rising powers simply are not great powers, hence they cannot do what 
great powers do - “great powers intervene in the periphery because they enjoy a favourable 
international power position” (Toliaferro 2004, p. 3). Second, literature on third-party 
intervention in foreign conflicts is written from the perspective of great powers,65 particularly 
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the United States; and, is predominantly focused on intervention strategies used by such great 
powers. This suggests that intervention is a foreign policy tool66 used by major powers to 
extend their influence and establish hegemony beyond their regions at the exclusion of other 
competing powers.  
This prevalent focus on military capabilities of great powers also promotes the erroneous 
conception of intervention as coercive military action taken by states with higher relative 
capabilities against weaker states.67 The implication is that it effectively inhibits critical 
investigation and analysis of other forms of intervention employed by different states that have 
material capabilities other than military capabilities. As a result, “the foreign policy choices of 
second-tier states [rising global powers] are arrived at deductively, irrespective of whether or 
not they correspond particularly closely either to policy options that have actually been 
adopted or to understandings of those choices within second-tier states themselves” (Hurrell 
2006:6). This is apparent in existing literature. For instance, Stephen Walt asks two questions: 
“How do the great powers choose which states to protect, and how do weaker states decide 
whose protection to accept?” (1987, p. 1). He completely ignores rising global powers, and 
does not ask what they do. The disregard of rising global powers in current theoretical analyses 
is therefore distinct, hence the realist narrative fails to explain intervention by non-global 
powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.  
Contrary to realists’ perspectives, “constructivists focus on identity and ideas through 
enlightened agency” (Snyder 2005, p. 56). They dispute that interests and identities “follow 
either logically or causally from anarchy,” arguing that they are “due to process, not structure… 
structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (Wendt 1992, p. 394-395). In 
her book, The Purpose of Intervention, Martha Finnemore posits that state interests are 
indeterminate because “in any case of intervention, one could impute a very reasonable set of 
interests that would explain intervention and another equally plausible set that would explain 
non-intervention” (2003, p. 5). So, instead of focusing on interests, she argues that focus 
should be on changing perceptions of interests and the utility of intervention as a tool of policy 
(Finnemore 2003, p. 5). She therefore proposed a theory of ‘strategic social construction’ to 
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explain how powerful states determine the values and perceptions regarding intervention 
depending on their current geostrategic and security interests. Nicholas Wheeler concurs, but 
he notes that those values and perceptions have to be accepted by other states in the 
international system as being legitimate and justifiable (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2003, p. 73). 
Thus, “intervention is not just a fig leaf for powerful states to cover their geopolitical pursuits 
but also a result of shifting views within societies about acceptable behaviour” (Ikenberry 
2001).Yet still, like the realists, constructivists acknowledge that “rules about intervention are 
strongly if not entirely shaped by the actions of powerful states that actually have the capacity 
to intervene” (Finnemore 2003, p. 5). This consolidates the realist argument that the 
international system and the status of a state within that system plays a crucial role in 
determining as state’s foreign policy and behaviour.  
A follow-on question to the constructivist’s perspective on intervention is whether states 
intervene on the basis of objective national interests or on interests that are constructed over 
time based on existing and constructed values. Alexander Wendt argues that how a state acts is 
dependent on its identity and related interests. He maintains that “each identity has associated 
needs or objective interests, and actors’ understanding of these in turn constitute the 
subjective interests that motivate their action” (Wendt 1999, p. 198). What Alexander Wendt 
supposes is that a state’s identity shapes its interests upon which its foreign policy actions are 
based. Since he defines “national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, 
consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-
esteem” (1999, p. 198) states’ foreign policy behaviour is foundationally based on its objective 
national interests. The interpretation of those interests, however, vary depending on how a 
state identifies itself. A state that identifies itself as a global power will act differently from a 
state that identifies itself as a rising power or a small state in the Global South.  
The underlying factor among constructivists is that “the political and cultural context in which 
national interests are forged” matters (Burchill 2005, p. 205). Although states have the same 
objective national interests, their self-identity compels them to re-interpret those objective 
interests which explains why a state may behave differently at different times. How a state 
identifies itself determines how it acts in order to protect its interests abroad. National 
interests are therefore subjective interests because states interpret their identity and needs 
based on their different political, economic and cultural contexts. While constructivists assist in 
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understanding identity and interest formation among states, their assumption, particularly 
Alexander Wendt’s proposition that there are objective national interests (physical survival, 
autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem) upon which a state’s subjective 
interests are based suggests that a state’s relative position among other states determine its 
foreign policy actions. When a state expands its interests abroad and increases its material 
capabilities enabling it to have system-wide interests then it will act differently that a state 
experience economic depression and shrinking material capabilities. The implication is that as a 
state interprets its interests broadly, it tends to behave differently. Thus, as put by Alexander 
Wendt “states’ interpretation of these needs tend to be biased in a self-interested direction, 
which predisposes them to competitive, ‘Realist’ politics but that this does not mean that 
states are inherently self-interested” (Wendt 1999, p. 198). 
Other studies on intervention have used economic liberalism to explain how and why third-
party states join ongoing intrastate conflicts. In an article aptly titled “Choosing Sides: Economic 
Interdependence and Interstate Disputes,” Aysegul Aydin notes that “states that are 
interdependent with the conflict participants have a strong incentive to enter these conflicts on 
the side of their trade partner while they avoid supporting the opposite side” (2008:1099). 
After testing her framework against militarised interstate dispute cases from 1870-2001, she 
found that “economic interdependence in the form of bilateral trade is a critical factor in 
understanding whether an ongoing conflict will be joined by third parties” (Aydin 2008, p. 
1099). In the book, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, she consummated her 
arguments into a liberal economic theory, arguing that interveners are motivated by the need 
to protect financial and economic interests of their domestic actors in the conflict states. She 
therefore concluded that states with high levels of trade, foreign direct investments, and 
preferential trade agreements with belligerent states are more likely to intervene than those 
without (Aydin 2012).  
Aydin’s (2012) findings are crucial to this study because states are not just influenced by their 
relative material capabilities in the international system, as realists argue and to some extent 
as constructivists infer, instead, they are also motivated by domestic political processes and 
actors. Hence there is a relationship between a state’s economic interests, domestic processes, 
and foreign policy. However, there are three major distinctions between Aydin’s research and 
this study. (1) Aydin principally concentrated on interstate conflicts, whereas this study entirely 
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focuses on intervention in intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. (2) Aydin applied her theoretical 
framework to United States’ intervention in international armed conflicts, while this study 
focuses on China, a non-Western rising power. (3) In Aydin’s study, motivations and constraints 
for intervention in foreign conflicts are internal to the intervener, that is, the intervener is 
motivated by internal economic interests.68 To the contrary, this study combines systemic and 
domestic motivation and constraints, and departs from the dominance of the United States in 
the existing literature on intervention. Rather, it focuses on a rising global power, China, thus 
putting to test the efficacy of current great-power-focused theoretical analyses of intervention.  
Nonetheless, economic liberalism as advanced by Aysegul Aydin in Foreign Powers and 
Intervention in Armed Conflicts demonstrates the fundamental link between domestic politics 
and economic interests in intervention decisions, but without considering the systemic factors 
that influence foreign policy decisions on external intervention, it lacks the critical ingredient of 
a foreign policy theory. According to Fareed Zakaria a ‘good’ theory of foreign policy  
would first examine the effect of the international system on foreign policy, for the 
most important general characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative 
standing in the international system. [Hence] a good account of a nation’s foreign 
policy will point to the role played by systemic as well as other factors (Zakaria 1998, p. 
16, 17; Zakaria 1992, p. 198).  
The effect of the international system on rising powers and vice-versa is too imperative to be 
ignored – because rising powers are states whose global status is in a transition prompting a 
shift in interests, domestic and international identity, capabilities and domestic processes. In 
effect, broadly “the ascent of these states is addressing imbalances in the global system – and 
in the globalisation process- that up until now have mainly reflected the greater influence of 
traditionally powerful states and commercial actors” (Cooper and Flemes 2013, p. 944).  
Based on the above review, there are several limitations within the classical realist, neo-realist, 
constructivist, and liberal components of IR literature on external intervention in foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts. To begin with, realists and constructivists overly focus on material 
and structural factors in the international system to explain foreign intervention in both 
intrastate and interstate conflicts. By narrowly focusing on systemic variables as the key 
sources of foreign intervention behaviour, their analysis does not explain variations in the 
intervention behaviour of states within the same systemic rank or variations in the intervention 
behaviour of a particular state over time. Secondly, the liberal strand of IR literature on 
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intervention emphasises economic interdependence among states and domestic processes and 
actors such as business interest groups to explain why states intervene in foreign intrastate 
conflicts. Although fundamental, on its own, this approach does not adequately explain 
whether or not the rise in a state’s relative power has an influence on its intervention 
behaviour. The third point is that IR literature focuses on states of global significance, hence 
literature on external intervention is from the perspective of major global powers. By only 
considering major global powers as interveners and the small powers as targets of intervention, 
it disregards the intervention behaviour of states in transition from small powers to great 
powers that is, rising powers. This encourages the “tendency to overstate the causal power of 
structural-global variables” (Regilme 2014, p. 1392); which in turn limits their explanatory 
power and scope of analysis.  
How then can theories of foreign policy and IR explain the external intervention behaviour of 
rising powers? Broadly, there has to be an acknowledgement that the emergence of non-
Western rising powers such as China, Brazil, South Africa, and India “is transforming the 
geopolitical landscape and testing the institutional foundations of the post-World War II liberal 
order… they are intent on altering rules, not adopting them hook, line and sinker. These 
countries do not grant the United States the sole authority to define the limits of responsible 
sovereignty. They believe they are entitled to reshape international arrangements to suit 
themselves” (Patrick 2010). Indeed, the rise of these powers is causing a recalibration of the 
global order. Inevitably, their rise has led to a “relative decline of the United States’ position in 
the world – and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and 
independence, [hence] today’s world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than 
concentrated power” (Haass 2008, p. 46). Where once the United States could unilaterally 
intervene, or influence the international community to support its interventionist policies, it is 
now beginning to face resistance not just from China and Russia, but also from democracies like 
South Africa and Brazil. Libya and Syria present good examples of the diminished dominance of 
major powers’ influence as far as intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts is concerned. 
On the other side, the rise in power by these states has had an impact on their domestic 
political processes and subsequently their foreign policies. No longer are they confined to their 
regions or neighbourhoods; instead they are venturing further afield – challenging assumptions 
that geographical proximity is a factor in their intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. 
In the process, new domestic actors are emerging that are beginning to influence domestic 
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political processes and seeking to influence their countries’ foreign policy and behaviour. There 
is therefore need for a theory that examines both sides, starting from the effect of the 
international system on the foreign policy (intervention) behaviour of rising powers, and then 
moving further to also consider the influence of domestic politics and national interests on a 
state’s foreign policy behaviour. As shall be discussed in Chapter 3, neo-classical realism 
combines those two essential elements and provides a basis for explaining the intervention 
behaviour of rising powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.  
 
2.3 Do existing empirical studies account for intervention in foreign 
conflicts by rising powers? 
Systematic empirical studies on external intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts began in 
earnest in 1996 when Patrick M. Regan published the insightful article: Conditions of Successful 
Third Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts. 69  Before then, earlier research efforts 
concentrated on developing a conceptual understanding of external intervention.70 James N. 
Rosenau led those earlier conceptualisation efforts that became the foundation upon which 
later research was built upon. A majority of the empirical research that followed concentrated 
on external intervention in interstate conflicts and ethnic conflicts (Carment 1993; Carment and 
Rosenau 1995a, 1995b; Khosla 1999).  However, since 1996 research on intervention in foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts has increased, and has basically covered three themes: (1) the effect 
of intervention and intervening actors on civil wars, (2) conditions for successful intervention 
and (3) decision-making by states on intervention. These three themes have often been 
addressed in cross-national studies focusing on intervention in specific civil wars; while in some 
cases “a more qualitative approach often using single cases to describe specific interventions” 
was adopted (Regan 2010, p. 457). In a nutshell, the period from 1996 can be described as “a 
decade of scholarship… [that] addressed issues of when interventions take place and how 
interventions play out when they do take place” (Regan 2010, p. 457). However, despite such 
significant advancement in scholarship on external intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
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conflicts, three basic but fundamental questions have remained insufficiently addressed. Those 
questions are: Who intervenes?71 Does a state’s intervention behaviour change when its 
relative economic power increases? Is the nature and mode of intervention evolving? 
Answering the above three questions has been inhibited by a major assumption that has 
become a universal dogma in intervention literature. The assumption is that major powers are 
the prime interveners in foreign intrastate conflicts outside of their regions; and that for the 
rest of the countries, geographical proximity determines their intervention behaviour. In other 
words, they only intervene in conflicts that are geographically close to them. As a result, the 
intervention behaviour of global powers, particularly, the United States, Britain, and France, 
have dominated empirical studies focused on interventions in foreign internal conflicts.72 Few 
studies have analysed intervention in foreign civil wars by neighbouring countries as well as 
third world countries.73 The main reason for that assumption is that there have only been a 
handful of states that consistently and unilaterally intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts. 
During the Cold War era, Soviet Union and the United States were the major interveners in 
foreign conflicts, albeit using proxies. In the post-Cold War period, the United States became 
the leading consistent unilateral intervener followed by France, which has maintained influence 
as well as economic and political interests in most of its former African colonies.  Subsequently, 
the question of ‘who intervenes’ has not been popular among intervention scholars, because it 
seemed obvious that only major powers intervene in other states’ internal conflicts. 
Accordingly, research on who intervenes in civil wars has remained anchored on great powers 
such that it has fallen short in articulating intervention by other states, particularly, non-
western rising powers.  
As noted above, empirical studies on unilateral intervention suggest that most interventions 
have been conducted by major global powers. Patrick Regan analysed 196 cases of intervention 
in 138 intrastate conflicts that occurred over a period of 50 years, from 1944 to 1994. Of those 
conflicts, he observed that “nearly 40% (76 cases) of all interventions were carried out by major 
powers, 5% (10 cases) of the interventions were under UN auspices, and the remainder were 
attributed to minor powers” (1996, p. 345). China only intervened in 6 intrastate conflicts, an 
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average of once every decade, and all the six interventions where in Asian conflicts. Although 
he did not define major powers, Regan mentioned the United States, Russia, France and Britain 
as being the major interveners – inferring that they are the major powers. Having made that 
observation, he concluded that success of an intervention strategy is not entirely based on 
features of the conflict but on characteristics of the intervention strategy and on the status of 
the intervener. The deduction was that interventions by major powers are more successful and 
common because they, the major powers possess “larger and projectable military forces… [And] 
a wider range of economic resources that can be brought to bear in a foreign policy role” 
(Regan 1996, p. 348).  
Kathman (2010) concurs with Regan (1996) that the characteristic or status of an intervener is 
critical to understanding third-party intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts. Using the connection theory approach, he classified third-party state interveners by 
their status into the following categories: major power intervener, democratic intervener, 
African intervener and neighbour in order to determine which third-party states were more 
likely to intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts. Rising powers were not included in that 
analysis. Like Regan (1996) he concluded that “a slightly larger proportion [of third-party 
intervention in civil wars] is accounted for by global powers… most of whom are geographically 
distant from civil war hot spots” (Kathman 2010, p. 996). The finding, however, contradicts 
claims by other scholars74  who suggest that states are more concerned with conflicts in 
neighbouring countries than in far-off regions.  
On the contrary, a study that focused on Brazil and Venezuela noted that for rising powers, 
distance from the conflict may still be a factor. Referring to the role of Brazil and Venezuela in 
the Israeli-Palestine conflict, Burton (2013) observed that although rising powers were taking 
more action in resolving conflicts in other regions, “the distance and lack of contact between 
emerging powers from the south like Brazil and Venezuela on one side, and Israel and Palestine 
on the other”75 precluded them from effectively resolving the conflicts. All the same, there is an 
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inferred consensus that the status of an intervener in the international system can either 
constrain or expand the number of foreign conflicts that it can intervene in, and how effective 
that intervention will be if it takes place; thus the status of a state in the global system is largely 
considered important to understanding that particular state’s intervention behaviour. However, 
despite the consensus there still is no significant research analysing how changes in a state’s 
international status affects its intervention behaviour. The majority of existing research still 
focuses on intervention by major powers like the United States (Yoon 1997; Findley and Teo 
2006; Aubone 2013). As a result, research on the effects of a state’s rise in power on its 
intervention behaviour in foreign conflicts is still limited.  
One example, however, is a study by Amber Aubone which explained United States’ unilateral 
military intervention in foreign civil wars. She observed that “the United States’ rise in power 
resulted in increased intervention in the affairs of other states in the Western Hemisphere” 
(2013, p. 284). In making that observation, she set a platform for impending research to test 
whether an increase in the relative power of a rising state has any effect on its intervention 
behaviour. Attempts to explore that question are beginning to develop, especially within policy 
research think tanks. In May 2013, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International 
Affairs at the American University of Beirut published a Working Paper titled: Emerging Powers 
and Israeli-Palestine Conflict: The Case of Brazil and Venezuela. The Working Paper examined 
the role of Brazil and Venezuela as emerging powers in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Although 
the Israeli-Palestine conflict is not entirely an intrastate conflict, the paper made useful findings 
that can be tested in other empirical studies.  
Similarly, Saferworld76 published a study on China’s economic and political engagements with 
four conflict-affected countries - Sudan, South Sudan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Although targeted 
at policymakers, the report reiterated the implications of rising powers on global peace and 
stability, especially as they extend their influence to countries affected by intrastate armed 
conflicts. The two reports by Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and 
Saferworld make two essential observations: First, they both note the increasing influence of 
rising powers in the international system and the subsequent impact that the rise has had in 
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the global order that privileged major powers. Second, they observe that the expansion of 
economic and political engagement between rising powers and states in the Global South is 
bringing new realities and changing the context for global governance. In themselves, the two 
observations challenge western-centric assumptions of the pre-eminence of liberal global 
powers in external intervention; thus setting a stage for those assumptions to be reconfigured 
to the new realities of multiple rising powers whose global engagements seem to be reducing 
the spheres of influence of traditional global powers such as the United States.77  
 
2.4 China and Intervention in Intrastate Armed Conflicts in Africa 
As discussed in the previous chapter, China is one of the most significant rising powers of the 
21st century, which in many respects has had substantial implications on contemporary global 
governance. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, the then United States Deputy Secretary of State sparked 
a debate on what it would take to make China a ‘responsible stakeholder’, able to resolve 
global challenges alongside other western global powers. In a speech titled, Whither China: 
From Membership to Responsibility, he said:  
China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to 
consequences and at worst something more ominous… On my early morning runs in 
Khartoum, I saw Chinese doing tai chi exercises. I suspect they were in Sudan for the oil 
business. But China should take more than oil from Sudan – it should take some 
responsibility for resolving Sudan’s human crisis. It could work with the United States, 
the UN, and others to support the African Union’s peacekeeping mission, to provide 
humanitarian relief to Darfur, and to promote a solution to Sudan’s conflicts (Zoellick 
2005).  
In his view, China was acting as an irresponsible global stakeholder, concerned only with 
economic and strategic gains, and failing to intervene where it was supposed to.  
Zoellick’s speech acknowledged that of the current rising powers, China was the most 
significantly able to impose challenges on the systemic order. Second, it gave an impression 
that China should and has the capacity to take more responsibility in resolving internal conflicts 
in countries it trades with78 alongside the United States, the United Nations and other actors 
that presumably hold the same view of global governance as the United States; and thirdly, 
that China should go beyond its own economic and strategic interests. Of more significance 
however, is that Zoellick’s speech portrayed China as a power that needed to be tamed and 
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socialised into a responsible stakeholder within the prevailing liberal world order. That thought 
reflects the dominant opinion in International Relations – “why can China, as an illiberal, 
authoritarian state, make rules for the world regarding humanitarian intervention? Why is it 
not the other way around in which international institutions socialise China into accepting the 
liberal humanitarian norms?” (Lee, Chan and Chan 2008, p. 437). 
In terms of studies on Chinese foreign policy, Zoellick’s speech represents the prevailing view in 
current literature that China is an irresponsible power that constitutes a threat to the present-
day global governance order. It is therefore not surprising that literature on whether China is a 
status quo or revisionist state and how the United States should respond to the ‘China threat’ 
flourished. But, nowhere has the impact of China’s rise in global power and influence been 
seen more than in Africa. What is more interesting is that both China and Africa “relate to the 
global system with a mutually reinforcing sense of historical grievances… they share a neo-
Westphalian commitment to state sovereignty and non-intervention”79 much to the chagrin of 
Western global powers. On one hand, China’s official view of the global system provokes “a 
flurry of criticisms aimed at Beijing’s perceived amoralism” (Taylor 2007, p. 139); and on the 
other, it made China popular among African leaders (Pang 2009, p. 238). Against this backdrop, 
research on China-Africa engagement has progressed from the human rights and good 
governance discourse of the late 1990s to the specificities of bilateral trade relations between 
China and individual African countries, particularly countries that possess strategic natural 
resources such as oil. Be that as it may, research on China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate 
armed conflicts, particularly in Africa is beginning to emerge80 although it is primarily focused 
on China’s evolving foreign official policy principle of non-interference in other states’ internal 
affairs; and China’s peacekeeping operations.  
Research on the above two issues – China’s non-intervention principle, and peacekeeping 
operations - often tends to be based on single case studies, and is overly descriptive without 
systematically connecting theoretical thought with empirical analysis. For instance, much focus 
has been on China’s engagement with Sudan, particularly in relation to the Darfur crisis.81 As 
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observed by Ian Taylor, researchers focusing on China-Sudan relations were mainly concerned 
with “Beijing’s weapons-exporting policy and its involvement in Sudan’s long running civil war” 
(Taylor 2007, p. 143); and they sought to prove the transformation of China’s foreign policy 
from non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states to conditional interference (Pang 
2009). Although, they provide detailed empirical analyses, the analyses are based on diverse 
explanatory variables that differ with each case study such that it is difficult to generalise the 
findings and establish patterns and trends in China’s intervention behaviour. In the end, “most 
of these studies seem to lack a ‘good theory’ that presents ‘the big picture’ of what is 
happening in myriad realms of activity” (Regilme 2014, p. 1395). 
Even in cases where comparative case studies on China’s intervention behaviour are conducted, 
there is a general tendency to lump diverse explanatory variables together and select cases in a 
random unscientific manner. For instance, a report conducted by Saferworld, titled, China and 
conflict-affected states: Between principle and pragmatism compared China’s engagement in 
four conflict-affected countries: Sudan, South Sudan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. With the exception 
of Sudan and South Sudan, there are no significant comparative properties among the four 
countries. As a result, rather than being comparative, the study was in essence a compilation of 
single case studies. Although the report was made for the policymaking community, there has 
been very little attempt in the academic community to disaggregate the empirical data in order 
to develop specific causal hypothesis that can explain whether China’s increased intervention 
behaviour is a result of its increasing relative economic power - a conclusion that is made in the 
report and also in an article by Zhongying Pang.82 What this means is that although these 
detailed empirical studies link China’s intervention behaviour with its increased economic 
engagement in developing countries, the studies are unhelpful in the attempt to develop 
comprehensive and generalizable causal hypothesis that seek to explain its rise in global power 
and increased external intervention behaviour.  
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2.5 Theoretical and empirical implications 
Taking note of the above review, there are two major gaps in literature on external 
intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts. The first gap is that there is a general lack of 
systematic linkage between empirical studies and theoretical analysis of intervention in foreign 
conflicts by non-Western rising powers in both International Relations and foreign policy 
analysis. Literature on external intervention is still fixated on interventions by major powers. 
Small powers are considered to be merely passive recipients of intervention and rising powers 
are conspicuously absent. Although the focus on major powers strengthened various 
intervention models and theoretical frameworks, it has become the major undoing for research 
on intervention because it failed to consider that “the principal characteristic of the twenty-
first century international relations is turning out to be non-polarity: a world dominated not by 
one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising 
different kinds of power” (Haas 2008, p. 44). Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical 
studies on intervention have remained stuck on global powers and have failed to adapt to the 
new global order reality of several rising powers. Thus, existing empirical and theoretical 
understandings of rising global powers as interveners is incapacitated.  
The key reason, as discussed above, is that the main approaches of international relations focus 
on “states that make the most difference” (Waltz 1979, p. 73), that is, the Western great 
powers. The Global South, home to most of the rising powers (China, Brazil, India, Russia and 
South Africa) is still largely disregarded in International Relations theory. Only in the past two 
decades, because of the exponential increase in the relative economic powers of rising powers 
such as China have International Relations scholars started to take notice; but even then, the 
conduct of rising powers is still largely being considered from the perspective of great powers.  
The overarching implication of this focus on global powers is that it has precluded the 
scholarship on external intervention from exploring new intervention strategies peculiar to 
rising powers that often lack the military capabilities of great powers but that do possess 
economic capabilities that great powers no longer have a monopoly on. Notably, power is no 
longer confined to military capabilities but, states “now understand prosperity to be a principal 
means by which countries measure and exercise power” (Froman 2013). Because of their global 
economic influence, rising powers now have interests and influence far beyond their regions. 
Furthermore, these rising powers are challenging “the traditional modes of conducting foreign 
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policy, privileging new kinds of soft power and rewarding new kinds of diplomacy. This is a 
further point of differentiation from liberal modernist middle powers such as Canada and 
Australia, whose foreign policies have been built around the promotion and exploitation of 
these very changes” (Hurrell 2006, p. 4). Thus, narratives that confine their influence to their 
neighbourhood are no longer tenable.  
The second gap is that there is an apparent lack of explanatory variables that fully extrapolate 
the link between a state’s rise in relative economic power and its intervention behaviour in 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This cannot be explained from systemic factors only without 
regard for domestic factors. So, the focus by realists and constructivists on material and 
structural factors to explain the intervention behaviour of global powers is inadequate to the 
extent that it disregards domestic factors such as domestic interest groups. As noted by 
Goldstein, China’s “significance for international security depends upon a variable only loosely 
connected to current patterns of economic and military growth – the country’s future political 
coherence” (Goldstein 1997, p. 39). Domestic factors do matter. Therefore, for as long as the 
analysis “ignores politics, particularly the relationship between foreign policy and domestic 
politics”83 to that extent, it does not adequately explain the domestic dynamics faced by 
emerging global powers, who are caught in-between international expansion and domestic 
alignment with their new realities. The next chapter explores this issue in detail as it discusses 
the neoclassical realist theory and how it can explain China’s intervention behaviour in African 
intrastate armed conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 3: Neoclassical realism: A foreign policy analysis 
framework for rising powers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
States in the Global South are largely in “the limbo of the international system… passively 
absorb[ing] the shock of having been made dependent on other parts of the world” (Bayart 
2000, p. 217). Apart from reliance on other states, they also have no global import of their own, 
their statehood is questioned, and they hardly constitute the focus of International Relations 
studies.84 “Even when they are made the focal point of IR, they are not treated as the referent 
object.”85 In fact, they are confined to the fringes of IR - frequently portrayed as inert 
spectators in the gallery of global power politics. But, as alluded to in the preceding chapters, 
“the transfer of global wealth and power now under way – roughly from West to East”86 is 
turning the tide. China, once the “Sick Man of the East”87 is now the second largest global 
economy, and it has achieved that in less than half a century. Together with other non-Western 
rising powers such as Brazil and India88 these states seemed to be on an “upward trajectory of 
power and influence;”89 a global phenomenon that Fareed Zakaria has described as the “the 
birth of a truly global order”90 and the “third great power shift of the modern era.”91  
This ‘modern era’ global shift in economic power is coinciding with a “shift in relative interstate 
capabilities (power shifts) …, providing exceptional opportunities for rising powers to assert 
themselves both geopolitically and in the global governance arena” (Armijo and Roberts 2014, 
p. 503; Armijo and Katada 2014, p. 5). The entrance of these new rising powers into the 
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international system has also notably eroded United States’ pre-eminence in global 
governance.92 In addition, the shifts are happening in the context of widespread dissatisfaction 
among countries in the Global South with the global governance strategies of the United States 
and its allies.93 Hence, there are far-reaching transformations in the nature of the existing 
‘posthegemonic’ global order, which, John G. Ikenberry define “as an evolving order marked by 
increasingly far-reaching and complex forms of international cooperation that erode state 
sovereignty and reallocate on a global scale the sites and sources of political authority” 
(Ikenberry 2010, p. 18). The United States National Intelligence Council warned that the 
diffusion of power referred to by Ikenberry can significantly reverse “the historic rise of the 
West since 1750 and restore Asia’s weight in the global economy and world politics.”94 That 
reversal, if successful could mean a return to the Westphalian order which was characterised 
by state independence, state sovereignty and non-interference - values that have already 
endeared China to leaders of developing countries, especially in Africa. 
International Relations scholars generally agree that the 21st century has been so far 
characterised by “the rise of the rest… [and by] the creation of an international system in which 
countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in their own 
right” (Zakaria 2008, p. 2, 3). As put by Christopher Layne, the U.S unipolar moment was just a 
geopolitical interlude that carried within it seeds of its own demise, and ultimately gave way to 
multipolarity.95 However, theoretical developments in IR have not kept abreast with this 
unfolding empirical phenomenon. Practice has preceded theory, and the focus of IR theorists 
has remained hinged on explaining the impact of rising powers on the Western-global order 
from the perspective of the United States rather than on seeking ‘rising-power-focused-and-
centred’ theoretical explanations. John Mearsheimer suggested a “theory of international 
politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the 
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system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past 
behaviour of rising great powers” (2006, p. 160). Others have argued that such a theory should 
note that the relationships they “hypothesise about might not apply across all regions of the 
world.”96 Steve Chan further argues that “theories based primarily on Europe’s or America’s 
experiences cannot be automatically assumed to be generalizable to Asia or China but at the 
same time, Asia’s or China’s experiences are also not necessarily unique” (2012, p. 3; Hui 2005). 
What is therefore needed is a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act within the 
international system; and that can only be achieved by focusing on the rising powers 
themselves as ‘referent objects’ rather than focusing on “perceptions and interests calculation 
of the West” regarding them (Bilgin 2008, p. 11).  
 
3.2 Neoclassical realism and rising powers 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, realist theories of international politics explain the foreign 
intervention tendencies of states by centring on systemic elements, and the interests and 
capabilities of great powers.97 They assume great powers expand their interests abroad as their 
relative material capabilities increase. For classical realists, this means that capabilities 
determine interests,98 and that foreign policy ambition including external intervention in 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts, follow the increase in hard power capabilities. Offensive 
realists go further, advancing that “as great powers gain in relative power, they define their 
interests more expansively,”99 forcing them to adopt interventionist strategies to protect their 
interests abroad. This is a common realist explanation also held with minute variations by 
defensive and neoclassical realists. Yet, by merely focusing on international outcomes 
emanating from great power interactions in the international system, these realist theories, 
with the exception of neoclassical realism, do not adequately acknowledge that “while the 
international system may socialize states to respond properly to its constraints over time… it 
cannot alone explain the shorter-term policy choices that states make, which can have 
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dramatic consequences for both national security, and the structure of the international 
system” (Toliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman 2009, p. 8). This is more so when it relates to foreign 
policy choices of rising powers like China regarding threats in African countries – two regions 
that to varying degrees occupied (in the case of China) or still occupy (in the case of the 
majority of African countries) the peripheries of International Relations theory. How then can 
the intervention policies and behaviour of China regarding intrastate armed conflicts in African 
countries be theoretically explained?  
Neoclassical realism seems to proffer a plausible explanatory framework. In general terms, it is 
a theory of foreign policy rather than international outcomes, which explains variations in 
foreign policies and external behaviour of states over time.100 It incorporates “the complex 
model of state-society relations implicit in classical realism, while building upon neorealism’s 
insights about constraints of anarchy and the relative distribution of material power” 
(Taliaferro 2006, p. 470). Systemic and unit level variables are therefore combined to explain 
the foreign policy and behaviour of individual states. As put by Gideon Rose, for those that 
adhere to neoclassical realism, 
The scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its 
place in the international system and specifically by its relative material capabilities. 
This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power 
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must 
be translated through intervening variables at unit level. This is why they are 
neoclassical (Rose 1998, p. 146). 
Based on Gideon Rose’s explanation of neoclassical realism, there are three distinct 
propositions that neoclassical realists make. These are: (1) an increase in relative material 
power of a state will lead to a corresponding expansion of the scope and ambition of its foreign 
policy activity; the reverse is also true, a decrease in a state’s relative material power will result 
in a corresponding contraction of its foreign policy activity; (2) the process in proposition 1 is 
not gradual or uniform because it does not solely depend “on objective material trends but also 
on how political decision makers subjectively perceive them”; and (3) countries with weak 
states take longer to translate the increase in their relative material power into expanded 
foreign policy activity (Rose 1998, p. 167).  
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Propositions 1 and 2 summarise the neoclassical realist causal logic which provide an 
alternative explanation of states’ foreign policy based on interaction between systemic and 
domestic level factors. This makes neoclassical realism distinct from structural realists who give 
primacy to structural factors as the main determiners of international outcomes. The 
neoclassical realist causal logic also places domestic level factors as intervening variables 
between the relative distribution of power among states (independent variable) and foreign 
policy behaviour (dependent variable). The focus is on how systemic and domestic factors 
interact with one another to explain a state’s foreign policy. To do that, neoclassical realists 
emphasise two domestic variables – decision-makers’ perceptions of the distribution of power, 
and domestic state structure - suggesting that both individual decision-makers and domestic 
politics matter in understanding the foreign policy of a state.101  
Realism is generally viewed as a systemic theory that is uncongenial to domestic-level 
theorising.102 And for the reason that neoclassical realism includes domestic-level variables, it 
has been criticised as a reductionist theory. In line with that criticism, Kenneth Waltz warned 
that the inclusion of unit-level variables reduces the theory to a descriptive narrative in which 
variables "have to be added subjectively, according to the good or bad judgement of the author” 
(Waltz 1979, p. 64-65).  Although he made a valid argument, he “grossly misinterpreted the 
relationship between the system and domestic-level variables in realist theory… realism 
provides a deductively rigorous grounding for the inclusion of domestic causal variables… Both 
the systemic environment and domestic process have causal impact because the former 
determines the ends to which actors strive but the latter is the means by which actors obtain 
those ends” (Sterling-Folker 1997, p. 3,4).  Hence, as admitted by Kenneth Waltz himself: “each 
state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its internal processes but its 
decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them” 
(Waltz 1979, p. 73). In view of that, by combining both international and domestic variables, 
neoclassical realism “does not simply state that domestic politics matter in foreign policy, it 
specifies the conditions under which they matter” (Christensen 1996, p. 252).  
In deciding which domestic variables are apt, and under what conditions they matter, Gideon 
Rose suggested that any foreign policy narrative should trace the different internal factors that 
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“combine to yield particular foreign policies.” (Rose 1998, p. 153). Rose’s suggestion is 
insightful. In order to avoid the subjective addition of variables based on an author’s judgement 
as warned against by Kenneth Waltz, only domestic level variables that can explain the causal 
chain connecting the increase in a state’s relative material power (systemic level variables) with 
its foreign policy outputs (dependent variable) should be considered. Yet still, the fundamental 
neoclassical realist assumption that an increase in a state’s relative material power will lead to 
the expansion of its interests abroad as well as increase the latitude and ambition of its foreign 
policy103 does not specify which material capabilities lead to the expansion of what interests 
and where. While this may seem clear in theories of international politics, it is not the case with 
a theory that seeks to explain variations in a state’s foreign policy, particularly foreign policies 
of non-Western rising powers that in most cases lack the ‘hard power’ capabilities of great 
powers.  
 
3.2.1 Relative economic power, the independent variable 
For neoclassical realists, the study of any country’s foreign policy should begin at the systemic 
level. At that structural level, relative power distribution is the independent variable shaping 
the broad pattern of a country’s foreign policy over time and across countries (Rose 1998, p. 
150). Fareed Zakaria concurs. “A good theory of foreign policy should first ask what effect the 
international system has on national behaviour, because the most generalizable characteristic 
of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system” (Zakaria 
1992, p. 482). Aaron L. Friedberg also holds the same view, noting that “structural 
considerations provide a useful point from which to begin analysis of international politics 
rather than a place at which to end it” (Friedberg 1988, p. 8). Neoclassical realism thus claims 
that the broad parameters of a state’s foreign policy are generally determined by the state’s 
position in the international system and specifically by its relative material power (Rose 1998, p. 
146; Toliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman 2009, p. 19; Toliaferro 2006, p. 466). Put differently, 
neoclassical realism “stresses the causal primacy of structural variables, chiefly the relative 
distribution of material power and anticipated trends in shaping states’ foreign policies.”104 This 
mean that in order to explain the pattern of China’s intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate 
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armed conflicts, the starting point is an analysis of its increasing relative material power vis-a-
vis the rest of the international system – such that the preliminary hypothesis is that an 
increase in China’s relative material power leads to a corresponding expansion of its interests 
abroad as well as foreign policy activity, in this case, intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts. 
Before testing the above hypothesis, what needs to be clarified first is the nature of relative 
material power that can lead to expansion of a country’s foreign activities. Hans Morgenthau 
defined power in terms of interests. In general terms though, realists of all strands associate 
power with a state’s military capabilities – “the tangible military assets that states possess” 
(Mearsheimer 2006, p. 72). Military power was and still remains crucial to expansion of a 
country’s foreign activity abroad because in previous times states expanded by plundering 
“other countries’ resources and territory through invasion, colonisation, expansion, or even 
large scale wars of aggression” (Zheng 2005, p. 20). However, unlike their historical 
counterparts, 21st century non-Western rising powers are taking a different approach to 
increasing their relative material power in the international system. Speaking of China – an 
imposing example of how current rising global powers are increasing their relative power in the 
international system, John Mearsheimer said: “China’s economy has been growing at an 
impressive pace without foreign adventures, proving that conquest is unnecessary for 
accumulating great wealth” (2006, p. 84). Indeed, China and other rising powers are increasing 
their global power status through rapid domestic economic growth and increasing their share 
of global wealth rather than through military strength - a phenomenon which led scholars like 
Randall Schweller to conclude that “economic might has supplanted military strength as the 
primary currency of national power and prestige” (Schweller 1999, p. 47). Janice Gross Stein 
also concurs: “Rising powers no longer need military power to secure the resources they need” 
(2010, p. 12). Also emphasizing the primacy of a state’s economic power over its military 
capabilities, Steve Chan maintains that the former, ultimately determines the latter (2012, p. 
170).  
Notwithstanding, the material capabilities that a state controls, whether military or economic, 
determine its relative power. But, there is a distinction between military and economic power. 
Whereas military power is tangible, Mearsheimer describes economic power, of which a state’s 
wealth is one of the major components as being latent power that the state can draw upon 
57 
 
when competing with other rival powers (2006, p. 84). Since the bedrock of economic power, 
and subsequent military power is a state’s domestic economic growth, relative economic 
power is gained by growing a state’s wealth and increasing its global share of wealth. Implicit 
within this understanding of economic power is that the rise and fall of states is often a result 
of unit level dynamics, in particular, the level of a country’s domestic economic growth. As 
noted by Paul Kennedy, “relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain 
constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the 
technological and organisational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society 
than to another” (Kennedy 1987, p. xvi). As a result, “the economic power of states grows at 
different rates, which means that some states are always gaining power and some are losing 
power relative to others” (Layne 2008, p. 13).  
The increase in a state’s economic power can be measured by its rate of domestic economic 
growth in terms of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and technological advances relative 
to others. As an example, based on annual Gross Domestic Product growth in 2007, China’s 
economy grew by approximately 14%, India by 10%, Russia 8%, Brazil 6% while South Africa 
managed 5%, compared to the United States and Germany which expanded by an average 3% 
and 4% respectively. With the global economic slowdown in 2014, India and China grew their 
GDP by 7.4%; Brazil, 0.1%, South Africa, 1.5%; Russia, 0.6%; the United States, 2.4% and 
Germany, 1.6%.105 Figure 3.1 illustrates the uneven rate of annual GDP growth among the 
BRICS countries, and the United States and Germany.  
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Figure 3.1: Annual GDP growth in percentage (%) 
 
The effect of such uneven rates of GDP growth is that “economic power is shifting at a rapid 
pace and the next half-century will see major changes in the relative size and rankings of the 
world economies… [Notably] China will pass the USA in total gross domestic product (GDP) 
measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) terms by 2016, and within a decade 
thereafter in dollar terms at market rates” (Armijo and Roberts 2014, p. 503, 505). Accordingly, 
there is a redistribution of economic power in the international system, which effectively can 
undermine the current liberal international order.106 
Unlike in other rising powers, the extraordinary economic growth in China has been 
accompanied by an increase in high-technology exports,107 and a global expansion of China’s 
economic interests and activities. As shown in Figure 3.2108, China overtook the United States 
and Germany to become the major exporter of high-technology products since 2004.  
 
 
                                                          
106 Schweller, RL 1999, ‘Realism and the present great power system: Growth and positional conflict over 
scarce resources’, in EB Kapstein & M Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar politics: Realism and state strategies 
after the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 31. 
107 The World Bank World Development Indicator Database conceptualises High-technology exports as 
products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific 
instruments, and electrical machinery. Data are in current U.S. 
108 Source: World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
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Figure 3.2: China’s high-technology exports, 2000-2012 
  
As a result, China dominates the global manufacturing sector, exporting its manufactured 
products across the world and at the same time consuming roughly a third of global supply of 
iron, steel and coal among other raw materials.109 “In just over a decade, China has risen from 
relative insignificance to pole position in underwriting numerous resource-related transactions 
across the globe” (Moyo 2012, p. 1). Apart from being the largest consumer of primary 
commodities such as minerals, metal ore, fossil fuels and biomass, its domestic consumption 
levels are now four times larger than that of the United States.110 Furthermore, in 2010, China 
overtook the United States to become Africa’s largest trading partner; that is besides being the 
largest trading partner of the majority of Asian and Latin America countries including India and 
Brazil. China is now also the European Union’s second largest trading partner behind the United 
States, with trade between Europe and China exceeding €1 billion a day.111   
Based on annual GDP growth, high technology exports, and consumption of primary 
commodities, it is projected that the “People’s Republic of China will overtake the USA as the 
world’s largest economic power” (Dadush 2014, p. 13). Although it does not yet possess 
                                                          
109 Ikenberry, GJ 2008, "The rise of China and the future of the west: can the liberal system 
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military capabilities comparable to that of the United States,112 the compounded effect of its 
high domestic economic growth and technological advances gives it extensive global influence 
in world politics, global trade and over other states, particularly in the Global South. As an 
example, China is now one of the major sources of development finance to other developing 
countries in the Global South, representing “a constellation of interests that are not only 
reconfiguring power relations between the North-South but also reflecting a level of South-
South development engagements that are challenging the existing orthodoxy of the 
‘Washington Consensus’” (Naidu, Corkin and Herman 2009, p. 1). Furthermore, as China 
“accomplishes more in her domestic economic reform, the international community and many 
Third World countries share a common expectation that China should assume more 
international responsibilities for the world economy and security” (Yan 2006, p. 7). Indeed, the 
rapid rise in the economic power of China and the other rising powers is “causing a ‘wind down’ 
of Pax-Americana – the period of unrivalled US primacy since 1945” (Armijo and Roberts 2014, 
p. 503). Thus, “economic might has supplanted military strength as the primary currency of 
national power and prestige” (Schweller 1999, p. 47). 
The reason why economic might has gained traction over military power is that a state’s 
economic capabilities can be translated into influence over other states, albeit not as an 
“exemplar of military power” (Strange 1975, p. 211). States that have acquired a “dominance in 
the distribution of international economic capabilities”113 can use their acquired economic 
power “to coerce other states (aggressive economic power) or to defend the state against 
coercion by others (defensive economic power)” (Strange 1975, p. 210). Beyond that, economic 
power also extends to issues of international investment, trade and money regardless of 
whether such power is deliberately exercised by the state to weaken or coerce other states or 
simply to secure income gains for its multinational firms.114 As a result, “in recent decades, 
leaders have come to see the economic clout that trade produces as more than merely a purse 
for military prowess: they now understand prosperity to be a principal means by which 
countries measure and exercise power” (Froman 2014, p. 1).  
                                                          
112 Armijo, LE & Roberts, C 2014, ‘The emerging powers and global governance: Why the BRICS matter, in 
RE Looney (Ed.), Handbook of Emerging Economies, Routledge, New York, p.506 
113 Mastanduno, M 2009, ‘System maker and privilege taker: US power and the international political 
economy’, in GJ Ikenberry, M Mastanduno & WC Wohlforth (eds.), International relations theory and the 
consequences of unipolarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.175. 
114 Strange, S 1975, ‘What is economic power, and who has it?’ International Journal, vol. 30, no.2, p.211. 
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The lateral pressure theory explains how states experiencing such rapid economic growth and 
increases in relative economic power expand their interests and activities abroad. It attributes 
their outward-expansion to a combined effect of internal economic growth and advances in 
technology, and the inevitable inability of the state to meet its demand for resources needed to 
sustain its internal economic growth from domestic sources. The resultant dilemma of rising 
demands and insufficient domestic resources115 generates lateral pressure, which refers to the 
tendency among rising powers and relatively high capability countries to engage in 
expansionist activities abroad when their relative economic power increases. Examples abound. 
“The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the 
United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development” 
(Huntington 1991, p. 12).  So also has been the expansion of China into other countries, 
particularly in the Global South which have vast reserves of strategic raw materials and markets. 
For that reason, when a state experiences rapid domestic economic growth, its relative 
economic power increases, leading it to expand abroad in search of raw materials and markets 
to sustain its domestic economic growth, and heighten its position in the international system.  
For China and other rising powers in the 21st century, it can be argued that an increase in their 
relative economic power, necessitated by high domestic economic growth, is as explained by 
the lateral pressure theory responsible for the expansion of their foreign activity abroad. In 
that sense, the preliminary hypothesis mentioned above can be sheared to parsimoniously 
limit the focus of this study on the increase in a state’s relative economic power as leading to 
expansion of its foreign intervention behavior - making the ‘increase in China’s relative 
economic power’ the independent variable. The first hypothesis that will therefore be tested in 
this study is whether the increase in a rising power’s relative economic power leads to 
expansion of its intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This is an important starting 
point because as put by Fareed Zakaria and other neoclassical realists, any good foreign policy 
analysis should first begin by interrogating the impact of the distribution of power in the 
international system on a state’s foreign behavior. 
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3.2.2 Increases in perception of threat to interests abroad, the intervening 
variable 
Rising powers with increased relative economic power do not expand their interests and 
activities in vacuity, since “other rival Powers are now economically expanding at a faster rate, 
and wish in turn to extend their influence abroad” (Kennedy 1987, p. xxiii). Resultant 
competition from that outward expansion is therefore motivated by a need to gain access to 
scarce raw materials and “to attract investment, to strengthen the global competitiveness of 
their national firms and workers in key high-tech sectors, and most noticeably, to assist (by any 
means necessary) domestic firms competing for a share” in global markets (Schweller 1999, p. 
47). The effect is that even status-quo states are increasingly “concerned about relative gains 
and losses simply to preserve their current relative-power position and, by extension, their 
level of security, prestige, and influence in the system” (Schweller 1999, p. 31). It therefore 
follows that their principal domestic and foreign policy objective is to maintain comparatively 
high internal economic growth116 because any variations to their respective growth rates, no 
matter how modest, can significantly alter the nature of their economy and society,117 as well 
as their position in the international system. That effectively makes their domestic and external 
economic interests matters of national interest. 
Due to strategic importance of positional goods such as global export and import market shares 
and access to scarce resources in foreign countries, rising powers designate them as matters of 
national interest that ought to be protected.118 This is why expansionist economic activities are 
associated with states of high capabilities that can exert their influence on other states, and at 
the same time engage in “intense competition among countries for resources and markets, 
military power, political influence, and prestige” (Choucri and North 1975, p. 28). In order to 
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protect those ‘national interests’ rising powers do not just extend their interests abroad 
randomly. They ordinarily expand into states of comparatively weaker capabilities and mitigate 
probabilities of confrontation with powerful states pursuing similar expansionist objectives. For 
example, at first, “the United States did not expand against strong states that posed a great 
threat to its security but largely against areas that were weak and in which expansion would 
entail a small cost” (Zakaria 1998, p. 184). Yet, even in cases where a rising power adopts such 
strategies, by merely expanding its activities and interests into foreign countries it collides 
“with the spheres of interest of other states – and find itself embroiled in international conflicts, 
crises, and wars that, at least initially, may not have been sought or even contemplated” 
(Choucri and North 1975, p. 1). That collision of interests among expanding states, and the 
uncertainties characteristic of international and intrastate armed conflicts, crises, and wars 
trigger increases in the expanding rising power’s perceptions of threat to its interests in other 
countries.  
In cases of clashes among rival expanding powers over foreign interests or international 
conflicts, the source and nature of the threat is obvious, but that is not the case with threats 
emanating from intrastate armed conflicts in countries where rising powers have interests in. 
Be that as it may, studies on threat perception in international politics principally focus on 
interstate threats, where one state is perceived as a threat by another. Threats emanating from 
intrastate armed conflicts in countries where rising powers expand into normally have 
unintended impact on the rising power’s interests, and so, are at the fringes of international 
relations literature. To put it in empirical terms, there is limited research on, for example, how 
intrastate armed conflicts in South Sudan or Libya are perceived as threats by China in a way 
that warranties its intervention, let alone change its foreign intervention behavior. The reason 
for the limited research in this area is as alluded to in the preceding chapters a result of the 
‘peripherialisation’ of small states, particularly African countries, in IR theory and international 
politics discourse. Secondly, the threats are usually uncontemplated by the expanding rising 
power, and thus they are considered as after-thoughts. Fareed Zakaria describes such threats 
as “grays” and “ambiguous threats” because they are not “black and unmistakable”119 meaning 
they are not as obvious as threats emanating from inter-state conflicts; and so are considered 
to be inconsequential to international relations.  
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In this study, threat is therefore applied “in the passive sense of an anticipation of impending 
danger rather than in its active sense of an undertaking by one actor to impose sanction on 
another” (Cohen 1978, p. 93). It means that the threat arises not as a result of warring parties 
in the South Sudan armed conflict undertaking to cause harm on Chinese interests in South 
Sudan; rather, it is based on China’s perception of threat to its interests defined as the ‘sense of 
an impending danger’ to its foreign economic interests120  even though the warring parties 
might not have directly threatened it. Thus suggesting that “threat may be perceived, and 
countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent” (Cohen 1978, 
p. 93). So, how does perception of a foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat affect the 
rising power’s foreign intervention behavior?  
As put by Christopher Layne, when a state’s economic power increases, it expands its interests 
abroad. It also defines its interests more expansively, and correspondingly its perception of 
threat to interests abroad similarly expands121 -  suggesting that when a state’s relative 
economic power increases, its perception of threat increases thereby influencing its foreign 
intervention behavior as it seeks to allay the perceived threat. That claim seems plausibly 
logical because as predicted by the latent pressure theory, when a state experiences massive 
domestic economic growth, it expands outward in search of raw materials and markets to 
sustain its domestic economic growth. Logically, expansion abroad exposes a state to new risks, 
hence its perception of threat commensurately expands with the growth of its activities in 
foreign countries. Thus, as put by Fareed Zakaria in reference to the United States, as its 
“power grew, areas that were not earlier seen as crucial became vital interests, and crises that 
the United States had blissfully ignored in the past were perceived as threatening. The 
objective threats had not increased, but America’s desire to control its environment had” (1998, 
p. 185).  
The limitation, however, of explaining increases in a state’s threat perception based on 
distribution of power in the international system is that it only gives a “general outline of the 
state’s policy but not its specific responses” (Jervis 1976, p. 17). In other words, rising powers 
with increasing relative material power and expanding foreign interests will have the same 
increase in threat perception, and respond to those threats in a similar fashion. But, that is not 
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the case, because, states behave differently, and the difference in threat perception among 
states can be explained at the unit level, because, for example, structural factors will not 
adequately explicate why China might have a high level of threat perception regarding the 
intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan compared to the one in the Central African Republic or 
Somalia.  
Apart from the systemic level of analysis, threat perception can be analyzed from the level of 
decision-making; bureaucracy; and domestic politics. According to Robert Jervis, “which level 
one focuses on is not arbitrary and is not a matter of taste – it is the product of beliefs (or often 
hunches) about the nature of variables that influence the phenomena that concern one” (1976, 
p. 15). Generally, for neoclassical realists, as argued by Gideon Rose, foreign policy choices are 
influenced by the perception of actual political leaders and foreign policy elites not just the 
distribution of power in the international system.122 Friedberg takes the argument further: 
“even if one acknowledges that structures exist and are important, there is still the question of 
how statesmen grasp their contours from the inside, so to speak” (Friedberg 1988, p. 8). The 
focus on ‘flesh and blood’ foreign policy makers is accentuated by the argument that foreign 
policy elites and political leaders play a crucial role in the shaping of threat perceptions. But 
individuals do not work in isolation, and are often not in full throttle of the foreign policy 
making process - neither are they immune to domestic and international pressures. Reflecting 
the influence of domestic and external constraints on individuals regardless of how powerful 
they might seem, Robert Jervis points out that “in 1937 Clement Atlee said that ‘the foreign 
policy of a government is the reflection of its internal policy,’ when his party took power the 
foreign secretary declared that ‘Revolutions do not change geography, and revolutions do not 
change geographical needs’ (1976, p. 23). The views of individual elites, while influential, are 
apart from ‘geography’ influenced by interest groups, the media and bureaucracies they 
represent, making what appear to be individual perceptions a complex concoction of varying 
views and perspectives within the limits of domestic and international constraints – suggesting 
that the shaping of a threat perception is a consequence of “social and political dynamics, as 
well as events” (Meyer and Miskimmon 2009, p. 626). Thus, as put by Fareed Zakaria, 
“statesmen encounter not only pressures from the international system but also constraints 
that are the consequence of state structure.” (1998, p. 38). 
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The starting point, however, is “to discover who is involved in the foreign policy decisional 
process, what they say, and what they do” (Cottam 1977, p. 54). By asking ‘who’ this study 
departs from the neoclassical realist leaning toward “decisions of flesh and blood” as the 
intervening variable. It focuses on the state, defined as central decision-making institutions and 
actors. The reason for focusing on the state rather than individual decision-makers is that it is 
the state rather than an individual decision maker that not only makes but implements foreign 
policy decisions. Also, it is states that “choose to highlight certain threats and downplay others 
based on their conception of their interests” (Zakaria 1998, p. 184-185). Accordingly, risks 
arising from intrastate armed conflicts in countries where China has interests do not constitute 
a threat “even in the face of objective evidence.”123 They only become a threat when the state 
perceives them to be such, otherwise, “when a threat is not perceived… there can be no 
mobilization of defensive sources” (Cohen 1978, p. 93).  
The implication is that despite its increase in relative economic power and endangerment of its 
external interests by foreign intrastate armed conflicts, China may not intervene unless it 
perceives the foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat warranting its intervention. Thus, it 
can be predicted that rising powers increase their intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts when the state perceives the foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat to its 
economic interests abroad. In that view, this study is premised on the argument that an 
increase in China’s relative economic power has the effect of widening the scope and 
parameters of its foreign policy activities, that is, as its relative economic power increases, it is 
able to expand its economic interests abroad more than it would have had with a lower relative 
economic power. Because of an increase in relative economic power, it now has economic 
interests in many African countries such that if an intrastate armed conflict occurs in any of 
those countries, it will affect Chinese interests there. But, that would not have been the case 
had it not have had interests there. Changes in perception of threat to its economic interests 
abroad is therefore a key intervening variable between China’s rise in relative economic power 
(independent variable) and its intervention behavior in African intrastate armed conflicts 
(dependent variable).124 In other words, China’s perception of intrastate armed conflicts in 
African countries as threats to its interests is the ‘transmission belt’ through which its 
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increasing relative economic power affects its foreign intervention behavior. Yet without an 
increase in its relative economic power and expansion of economic interests abroad, on its own 
threat perception would have no significant effect on its intervention behaviour. 
 
3.3 Tying it together  
As highlighted above, because this study examines China’s intervention behavior in intrastate 
armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan, the question that often arises is: Does China 
intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts, especially in African countries? That question is 
founded on the argument that China, as a non-western rising power has a non-intervention 
foreign policy; but as shown in the following chapters, foreign intrastate armed conflicts are 
putting its non-intervention policy to the test. Structural realists would explain China’s 
intervention in foreign conflicts as an expression of its increasing relative material power, 
because they suppose that when a state increases its relative material power, it expands 
abroad. But, states do not intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts merely because of an 
increase in their relative material power and subsequent expansion of their interests abroad. 
They intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts when their perception of threat increases; 
only when they perceive those foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to their 
interests can they intervene.  
As discussed above, an explanation based on systemic factors only yields general explanations 
that do not give a nuanced understanding of why there are differences in the level and mode of 
intervention in the three countries. That can only be understood by applying the intervening 
variable in-between the independent variable, which is the increase in China’s relative 
economic power and the dependent variable, its intervention in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts. The resultant hypothesis that is tested in this study is that China increased its 
intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts in Africa when it perceived the foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts as a threat to its economic interests there. That means the trends 
and patterns of China’s intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts are a combined result 
of an increase in its relative economic power and changes in its threat perception regarding the 
foreign intrastate armed conflicts. 
Accordingly, the transmission belt through which increases in relative economic power 
(independent variable) affects China’s intervention behavior (dependent variable) in Libya, Mali 
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and South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflicts is its perception of threat to its interests in those 
three countries (intervening variable). Hence, as suggested by neoclassical realists, the starting 
point of any foreign policy analysis is to explore how the international structure affects the 
state’s foreign policy. For that reason, in Chapter 4, this study examines the effect of China’s 
increase in relative economic power on its intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts from a historical perspective. The main objective is to find any generalizable 
explanations that can assist in comparing its intervention in Libya, and Mali to its intervention 
in South Sudan.  
To understand China’s intervention behavior in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and 
South Sudan, the context within which the foreign intervention policies are formulated and 
implemented has to be closely examined. As noted by Gideon Rose, neoclassical realists 
“favour beginning intellectually at the systemic level but then taking care to trace precisely how, 
in actual cases, relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state 
actors” (1998, p. 166). In this case, context refers to both the systemic context and the unit-
level context, which explains why this study first analyses the effect of China’s increase in 
relative economic power (systemic factor) and then assess the impact of changes in its threat 
perception on its foreign intervention behavior. Theoretically informed narratives, and 
historical analysis are therefore employed to understand patterns of China’s intervention in 
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. To put that intervention in historical 
context, the next chapter will trace the evolving nature of China’s intervention behavior from 
imperial times to present day. The aim is to assess whether China’s intervention is historically 
determined by increases in its relative economic power. 
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CHAPTER 4: Exploring effects of the increase in China’s relative 
economic power on its foreign intervention behavior: A 
historical analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Is China’s foreign intervention behavior evolving? Is it increasing its intervention in African 
intrastate armed conflicts as its relative economic power increases? Implicit within these 
questions is an assumption that the relative distribution of economic power in the international 
system determine a state’s foreign intervention behavior. Of course, some would argue that 
the nature of the state and its foreign policy orientation matters more than its position in the 
international system. Their simple empirical argument is that states with a colonial and imperial 
past such as Britain, France and Portugal are inclined to intervening in foreign intrastate armed 
conflicts because of their colonial heritage. Indeed so, France has intervened in its former 
African colonies’ intrastate armed conflicts on multiple occasions in the past fifty years,125 more 
than China, which apart from control of nations such as Tibet and Xinjiang does not have an 
elaborate colonial history.  But, however plausible this argument may be, it does not explain 
whether a state’s intervention behavior is determined by increases in its relative economic 
power.  
In exploring the argument that a state’s position in the international system determines its 
foreign policy and external intervention behavior, this chapter begins by giving a critical 
historical analysis of China’s evolving understanding of foreign intervention, its foreign 
intervention policy and external intervention behavior from imperial times to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and until 2015.  The aim of the 
historical analysis is to give a concrete background of the evolving nature of China’s foreign 
policy regarding intervention in other states’ internal affairs vis-a-vis changes in its relative 
economic power and position in the international system. As put by Suisheng Zhao, being an 
ancient civilization, “history is inscribed in China’s mental terrain” and Chinese intellectuals and 
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politicians have at times “reconstructed history to advance the current political agenda of the 
Chinese government and justify their concept of justice and their view of China’s rightful place 
in the world” (2015, p. 981). Appreciating China’s past understandings of intervention is 
therefore critical to analyzing its current intervention policy and behavior in Africa. Based on 
that background, the chapter then discusses the implication of China’s increasing economic 
power and explores whether it has indeed resulted in an increase in its external intervention 
behavior.  
 
4.2 Imperial China – From Pax Sinica to the Western international system 
of states 
China’s foreign policy on intervention in the internal affairs of other states is an embodiment of 
its historical trajectory as a nation that considered itself the Middle Kingdom, and the epicenter 
of global civilization surrounded by barbaric nations.126 As put by Julia Ching, “through most of 
its history, China saw itself as the global order, surrounded on its borders by subordinate 
neighbors” (2004, p. 246). In John G. Ikenberry’s conception of what powers with a 
preponderance of material capabilities do, imperial China transformed “its favorable power 
position into a durable order that commands the allegiance of other states within the order” 
(Ikenberry 2001, p. 4). It is therefore not surprising that the surrounding nations of Vietnam, 
Burma, and Korea paid tribute to the Chinese emperors confirming the superiority of the 
Chinese civilization. Yet, even as they paid tribute to China,  
Relations between China and Korea or China and Vietnam were not analogous to 
relations between sovereign nations in an anarchic international system or even 
between the colonizing power and its colony; rather, the nations surrounding China 
were considered inferior… Only through adoption of Chinese civilization, which the 
neighboring elites would be exposed to during their voyages to pay tribute to the 
Chinese emperor, would the nations of China’s borders be accepted as anything but 
barbarians (Kornberg and Faust 2005, p. 10). 
But, for as long as the surrounding ‘barbaric’ nations acknowledged the supremacy of its 
emperors, paid tribute and did not threaten its territorial integrity, China left them to 
determine their own internal affairs. Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan concur: “Participants and 
aspiring participants in Pax Sinica…, remained sovereign entities, to the extent that they 
retained their autonomy and independence in conducting their domestic and ‘foreign’ affairs’” 
(Zhang and Buzan 2012, p. 15). As further put by Brantly Womack, “in contrast to the 
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colonialism of Western imperialism, China acted as the passive guarantor of a matrix of 
unequal but autonomous relationships rather than as an active metropolitan power” (2006, p. 
135). Hence, even in the prime of its economic, technological and military power, imperial 
China “apparently never plundered nor murdered – unlike the Portuguese, Dutch, and other 
European invaders of the Indian Ocean” (Kennedy 1989, p. 7). It considered itself the center of 
the global order, and a benevolent civilized superpower dominating its neighbors by cultural 
and economic superiority rather than by military force (Perdue 2015, p. 1003; Suzuki 1968, p. 
183). 
Intervention into the internal affairs of its tributary nations was however not uncommon. Since 
“it was normal for the Chinese to consider the barbarians subjects of the emperor, they 
thought it legitimate to protect these barbarians and their ruler from rebellious elements” (Lam 
1968, p. 169). In other words, as the ‘Son of Heaven’ there was an underlying theory that China 
could “intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary because the Chinese 
emperor was responsible for all the peoples under Heaven and because their rulers were 
viewed as his appointed representatives.”127 Therefore, “China, as the paramount leader, 
maintained order in the system and reserved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its 
vassals” (Wang 2011, p. 145). In Jerome Alan Cohen description, imperial China had the latent 
right of intervention that Chinese emperors activated on occasional basis, especially in cases 
where their direct interests were at risk (Cohen 1973, p. 475).  
China’s intervention in the domestic affairs of vassal states like Korea began as early as the Sui 
dynasty (581-618 CE), and the Liao dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire (907-1125).128 But, 
the most elaborate case of intervention by imperial China happened in October 1788, when the 
Qing emperor sanctioned a military intervention in Vietnam to restore Lê Chiêu Thống to the 
Vietnamese throne. Truong Buu Lam notes that Vietnamese kings “had to acknowledge China’s 
suzerainty and become tributaries in order to avoid active intervention by China in their 
internal affairs” (1968, p. 179).  The threat of China’s intervention was not just peculiar to 
Vietnam but also to other tributary states that bordered China. For most of those tributary 
nations it was prudent for them to surrender part of their sovereignty to China in exchange for 
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economic and trade benefits, military support in cases where their security was threatened by 
other nations, and more importantly, to avoid interference in their internal affairs by Chinese 
emperors (Lam 1968, p. 178; Cohen 1973, p. 476) – suggesting that the threat of China’s 
intervention in their internal affairs was always imminent. 
Notwithstanding, imperial China’s foreign and domestic policies were entwined and driven by 
two fears: (a) barbarian attacks, and (b) internal revolts. The Chinese tended to think of “their 
foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles within the Chinese state 
and society…. [Hence] China’s external order was so closely related to its internal order such 
that one could not survive without the other; when the barbarians were not submissive abroad, 
rebels might more easily arise within” (Fairbank 1968, p. 2,3). It was therefore critical for 
Chinese emperors to maintain order and stability within the surrounding ‘barbarian’ nations, as 
well as within China itself, and that entailed certain measures of intervention in the ‘barbarian’ 
nations’ internal affairs. However, with the rise of Confucius thinking, China’s foreign and 
domestic politics was further inspired by the Confucian Code, which considered warfare to be a 
deplorable activity, and instead emphasized societal stability and order. Accordingly, “armed 
forces were made necessary only by the fear of barbarian attacks or internal revolts” (Kennedy 
1989, p. 7).  
More than being concerned with intrastate armed conflicts in foreign nations, as long as their 
interests were not at risk, Chinese emperors focused on containing internal revolts. As Liu 
writes, the revolts against emperors did not happen very often, but they did happen enough 
times to result in “cycles of order and disorder in the so-called twenty-four dynasties history” 
(1995, p. 205). The fear of internal revolts was further exacerbated by Confucians who 
according to Chan (1973, p. 62) sustained the doctrine of mass revolutions against inhumane 
leaders, an excuse that China also used to intervene in the internal affairs of its tributary states 
(Cohen 1973, p. 474). In concurrence, Yao wrote: “rulers could lose their throne if they lost 
people’s hearts. In other words, if people are not happy with their emperors, they could 
overturn them” (Yao 2011, p. 220; see also Ivanhoe 2004, p. 272). That fear of internal revolts is 
to a greater extent what led to the imperial code enacted during the middle Ming dynasty 
banning the construction and owning of seagoing ships and later any ships with more than two 
masts; all efforts were concentrated on containing any signs of internal revolt and to protecting 
the empire from outside aggressors rather than exploring unknown lands for profit, influence, 
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and gain. This was because for as long as there was a threat of internal revolt, barbaric attacks 
were considered imminent. It was not a misplaced concern of paranoid Chinese emperors 
because as noted by John King Fairbank “most dynasties collapsed under the twin blows of 
‘inside disorder and outside calamity’ (nei-luan wai-huan), that is, domestic rebellion and 
foreign invasion” (Fairbank 1968, p. 3). 
The banning of exploration ships and expeditions three years after the 1433 Zheng He 
expedition to Africa, possibly China’s first engagement with the continent, which were financed 
and sanctioned by Emperor Cheng Zu of the Ming Dynasty (in which Zheng He stopped at the 
city states of Mogadishu and Brawa in Somalia and Malindi in Kenya) and the Middle East had 
long term effects on China’s relative economic and political power. Due to the ban “China did 
not seek information about the outside world. It neither fought external wars nor searched for 
external markets, and foreigners who came to China were welcome so long as they accepted 
the superiority of Chinese civilization” (Kornberg and Faust 2005, p. 8). Its decision to isolate 
itself from the outside world coincided with a decline in its economic growth and technological 
advancement. As put by Paul Kennedy, “the banning of overseas trade and fishing took away 
another potential stimulus to sustained economic expansion; such foreign trade as did occur 
with the Portuguese and Dutch in the following centuries was in luxury goods and (although 
there were doubtless many evasions) controlled by officials.” Fast forwarding to the eighteenth 
century, Paul Kennedy continues: “In 1776 – just as Abraham Darby’s ironworks at 
Coalbrookdale were beginning to boom – the blast furnaces and coke ovens of Honan and 
Hopei were abandoned entirely. They had been great before the Conqueror had landed at 
Hastings. Now they would not resume production until the twentieth century” (1989, p. 8-9). 
But to imperial China that did not matter, because as far as the emperors were concerned, they 
were still the Middle Kingdom at the centre of their known global order. 
 
4.3 Incorporation of imperial china into a truly international system of 
states 
Five centuries after the banning of exploration ships and two centuries since closure of the 
blast furnaces of Honan and Hopei, Deng Xiaoping reflected on the implications of China’s self-
isolation since imperial times in a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory 
Commission of the Communist Party of China in October 1984. As recounted:  
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A closed-door policy prevents any country from developing. We suffered from isolation, 
and so did our forefathers. You might say it was an open policy of a sort when Zheng 
He was sent on voyages to the western oceans by Emperor Cheng Zu of the Ming 
Dynasty. But the Ming Dynasty began to decline with the death of Emperor Cheng Zu. 
In the Qing Dynasty, during the reigns of Kang Xi and Qian Long, there was no open 
policy to speak of. China remained isolated for more than 300 years from the middle of 
the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, for nearly 200 years counting from the reign of 
Kang Xi. As a consequence, the country declined into poverty and ignorance… the 
lessons of the past tell us that if we don’t open to the outside we can’t make much 
headway.129 
Indeed, the decision to isolate itself and discourage private enterprises at the end of the Ming 
Dynasty turned out to have far-reaching detrimental effects on China’s position in a truly 
international system of states that emerged in the sixteenth century in Europe; and on its 
foreign policy regarding intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The decline in 
relative economic power caused by a lack of external trade, banning of explorations that would 
have opened new markets and sources of raw materials, and an isolationist foreign policy 
which was overly suspicious of foreigners and the foreign world, made imperial China relatively 
weaker in terms of economic, military and technological advancement. Because as China 
looked-inward, European powers such as Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Britain that were 
experiencing immense domestic economic growth were looking outward in search of markets, 
new sources of raw materials and labor -  and, in the process entangling themselves in other 
states’ internal affairs.  
As China’s relative economic power declined, European powers such as Britain were becoming 
more dynamic and powerful, and aggressively expanding their interests and influence abroad, 
including into China. Using their preponderance of economic and military, especially naval 
capabilities, they progressively but forcibly incorporated China into the global system of states 
that they dominated (Deng and Wang 1999, p. 11). Just as the African, Asian and Latin 
American polities were compulsorily assimilated into the international system of states in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, China found itself an engrafted weak member of that 
international system. It was no longer the powerful nation at the center of its own global order, 
but one of the many relatively weak states under European domination. Furthermore, contrary 
to the Sinocentric approach of Chinese dynasties to a global order based on the Mandate of 
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Heaven, the new international system of states based on the preponderance of material 
capabilities meant that China was no longer the center of civilization, and no longer were its 
emperors the ‘Sons of Heaven’ ruling with a ‘Heavenly mandate.’ They also lost their latent 
right to intervene in the internal affairs of China’s tributary states, and even where it needed to 
intervene, it simply no longer had the wherewithal.  
The culmination of China’s incorporation into the modern international system of states 
happened in earnest in the years infamously referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’ 
between 1839 and 1949. In that period, China came face-to-face with its two worst fears – fear 
of barbaric attacks, and fear of internal revolts that had influenced its domestic and foreign 
policy for centuries. Starting with the 1838 Yangtze River attack by Britain’s gunboats, and 
subsequent attacks by the militarily and economically superior Japan, France and the Soviet 
Union, China was forced to make major concessions that opened its ports to foreign powers 
resulting in loss of tariff autonomy, territory and sovereignty. But more importantly, the 
‘unequal concessions’ exposed the decline in China’s relative economic power.  Beside foreign 
invasion, China also had to contend with internal revolts that resulted in the fall of its last 
emperor Henry Pu Yi, the twelfth and final ruler of the Qing dynasty. His fall led to the rise of 
Nationalists in 1911, and subsequently the Communists in 1949. It therefore goes without 
saying that from the beginning of the century of humiliation up to 1949 when the communists 
took over, intervention in the internal affairs of its tributary states was a luxury China could 
least afford as it was too busy fighting against foreign intervention in its own internal and 
foreign affairs to bother with other nations. 
The century of humiliation had several other far reaching effects on China’s perception of the 
anarchic international system, and on its role in that global order.  As observed by David Scott, 
“that period of humiliation and unfulfilled potential cast a long shadow that continues to affect 
Chinese foreign policy, strategic culture, and weltanschauung worldview” (2008, p. 3). The first 
implication is that “China was no longer in accord with the Mandate of Heaven, nor was it a 
sovereign state in an international system dominated by Western powers” (Kornberg and Faust 
2005, p. 8). It now constituted part of Third World countries under the overbearing influence, 
and in worst cases colonial dominance by European powers. The Mandate of Heaven that had 
previously legitimated China’s hegemony over other nations and strengthened its claim as the 
center of civilization around which other nations orbited was no longer tenable. The tables had 
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turned. A new global order where cultural superiority did not matter as much as economic, 
political and military superiority had emerged. So, as aptly put by Alison Adcock Kaufman, 
“where Chinese rulers and intellectuals had before had little concept of an ‘international’ arena, 
they now had to grapple with the notion that there existed a global system of power 
relationships whose dynamics – though almost entirely out of China’s control – would 
determine its fate” (2010, p. 5).  
Second, the transformation of China from being a prime civilization at the center of the 
tributary system in a global order whose parameters it largely defined, to being one of the 
Third World countries in the lower tier of states in a Western dominated anarchic international 
system also significantly impacted its foreign intervention policy. No longer did it have claim to 
possessing the latent right to intervene in the internal affairs of its bordering nations. Finding 
itself at the lower end of the international system of states, China had to adapt from being the 
ruler to being the ruled in a systemic order where, as put by Thucydides, “the standard of 
justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they 
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”130 China was therefore 
“not only forced into the international system dominated by European powers where it lost its 
tributary states, but also treated unequally and suffered in the hands of imperialist powers” 
(Zhao 2015, p. 976). Thus, the century of humiliation “replaced and overturned the country’s 
previous preeminence and prestige as the ‘Middle Kingdom’”131  and the impact on its 
perception of intervention and state sovereignty was immeasurable.  
 
4.4 China, the international system, and intervention in Mao’s era 
In imperial times, states that had formed part of China’s tributary system were not considered 
sovereign and equal. They were regarded and treated as barbaric and inferior depending on 
how close they were to Chinese civilization and culture. The concept of equality and state 
sovereignty was therefore unknown in Pax Sinica because in “the traditional Chinese world 
order… [they] did not use concepts corresponding to the Western ideas of nation, or 
sovereignty, or equality of states each having equal sovereignty” (Fairbank 1968, p. 5). But, as 
Mao declared the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Pax Sinica was long gone, in its stead 
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was a Western-led global system of states premised on both equal sovereignty and relative 
power distribution. Accordingly, the view of Mao and the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
regarding foreign, particularly Western intervention was “one of national humiliation and 
international inequalities, as the imposition on one part of the international system (China) by 
another part of the international system (the West)” (Scott 2008, p. 8). The result was a 
replacement by the Communist Party of China of the suzerainty of China with a new emphasis 
on equality of states, respect of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states. 
In a speech made at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference on 21 September 1949, Mao Tse-tung delivered an opening address aptly titled, 
The Chinese people have stood up. He said:  
The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in 
modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression 
and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments… From 
now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-
loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own 
civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. 
Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.132 
Less than a month later, on 1 October 1949, as he proclaimed the Central People’s Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, Mao announced that the newly established government was 
“willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to observe 
the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.”133 The basis of China’s relations and interaction with states in the international 
system was no longer premised on pre-eminence of its civilization and ‘Mandate of Heaven’ as 
in imperial times, but on the power dynamics of an anarchic international system in which 
China occupied the peripheries rather than the core.  
Realizing China’s inferior position within the prevailing Western-led global system, Mao  
quickly embraced the concepts of territorial sovereignty and became a zealous 
defender of its sovereign rights in what the Chinese perceived to be a social Darwinian 
world, in which the status of a nation-state was determined by its economic and 
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military strength… they sought to maximize China’s security by expanding influence 
and control over its neighborhoods, and in some cases, far beyond… [Believing] that 
the world is unjust and unfair only in the sense that China was stagnant and weak 
(Zhao 2015, p. 981; see also, Dreyer 2015, p. 1027).  
In view of that, as China sought to increase its relative material power, it correspondingly 
sought to expand its influence beyond its borders – bringing in a new dynamic to its 
intervention behavior in foreign states.  
By arguing that ‘China had stood up’, Mao and other Communist Party of China ruling elites 
kick-started a process of re-defining China’s role in a global system that it found itself thrust in. 
By all intends and purpose a weak and poor state, still fearful of imperialism and dominance by 
Western powers such as the United States, Britain, the then Soviet Union, and its long-time 
nemesis, Japan, China conceived of its role in international politics on the basis of the 
distribution of relative economic power in the international system. To the Communist Party of 
China, the dominant narrative was that for as long as China was weak relative to other states, 
as it was at that time, it remained susceptible to foreign domination, imperialism and what 
Deng Xiaoping referred to as ‘bullying’ by developed countries.134 Along the same lines as Deng 
Xiaoping, but decades later, President Xi “urged all Party members to firmly keep in mind that 
lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks and only development makes a nation 
strong.”135 To escape the predicament that befalls weak states, China, though relatively weak – 
economically and militarily – began spreading its revolutionary ideology into Africa and other 
Third World countries in order to counter United States’ hegemonism in global affairs.136 In that 
respect, it envisioned itself playing a significant role in international politics, carving a niche for 
itself in the Third World’s struggle for political independence, and in its struggle against the 
Western hegemonism and power-ideological dominance.  
During its formative years, the Communist Party of China ideologically aligned itself with the 
Soviet Union. So when Mao was laying the foundation for the People’s Republic of China, he 
pronounced in June 1949 that in terms of the guiding principles of China’s foreign policy they 
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belonged to “the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union.” Having chosen the Soviet 
side, he then added that “the Chinese people must either incline towards the side of 
imperialism or that of socialism. There can be no exception to the rule. It is impossible to sit on 
the fence. There is no third road.”137 The implication of aligning itself with the Soviet Union was 
that in the early years of CPC rule, China was unable to articulate an independent foreign policy 
regarding its engagement with developing countries, especially in Africa. However, the Sino-
Soviet co-operation on foreign policy principles did not last long. A combination of two 
international factors - the rise of the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the 1950s, and the 
Sino-Soviet fall-out in the 1960s138 gave China an opportunity to articulate the non-interference 
principle abroad, as well as spread its own version of socialism in Africa. Prior to that, Africa 
was to China a region for which “a positive African policy was non-existent… [because] apart 
from the question of distance, the new [Mao] regime was not yet strong enough to adopt any 
meaningful policy towards Africa, despite its ambition to universalize its revolutionary 
experience” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 4).  
Nonetheless, apart from seeing the non-intervention principle as an instrument for protecting 
itself against Western and Soviet interference,139 China also considered it to be an effective soft 
power strategy useful to securing a prominent place among Third World developing countries 
also struggling against United States and Soviet Union’s political and ideological dominance. 
The non-intervention principle therefore enabled China to be flexible and pragmatic in its 
foreign policy while gaining the admiration of states repulsed by the strict ideological demands 
of the United States and USSR. It also helped China to carve a niche for its own politico-
ideological influence in Africa through building bilateral relations with African states 
independent of the Soviet Union.  
The first momentous step toward engaging Africa was made at the Bandung Conference in 
1955 where Premier Zhou Enlai pronounced the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’,140 
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with emphasis on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. He 
explained: “as the Chinese proverb says: ‘Do not onto others what you yourself do not desire.’ 
We are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of 
others.”141 The principle resonated well with African countries that had either attained political 
independence or were still fighting against colonial rule. Three years after the Bandung 
Conference, the Bandung Principles as enunciated by Zhou Enlai were adopted by leaders of 
newly independent African countries at the Accra Meeting of Independent African States which 
was attended by Ghana, Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic (short-lived political 
union between Egypt and Syria), and Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and a delegation from 
Cameroon.142 Among other factors, the emphasis on non-intervention guided China’s efforts to 
gradually assume leadership of the Third World,143 particularly of the subsequent Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), which comprised of developing countries that refused to ideologically side 
with either the United States or Soviet Union. As a result, China attained greater support and 
diplomatic recognition from African countries most of which had previously recognised Taiwan 
instead of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).144  
Having established itself as leader of the Third World,145 China set to establish its own 
ideological and geopolitical dominance in Africa on the basis that it did not interfere in African 
countries’ internal affairs. However as noted by Alaba Ogunsanwo, China’s policy in Africa was 
interlocked to its international strategic interests, and “was a function of her triangular 
relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union” such that to a greater extent, African 
states were “used merely as pawns on the international chessboard” (1974, p. 3; see also Thrall 
2015, p. 4, 6). To draw Africa into its sphere of influence, Mao elaborated the ‘Dual 
Intermediate Zones’ theory in 1963 which posited that “a spacious intermediate zone existed 
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between the United States and the USSR.”146 That intermediate zone consisted of African and 
Asian countries under colonial rule. Mao therefore argued to the satisfaction of several African 
leaders that “the most effective way to oppose the two superpowers was for all non-
superpower countries in between the two political extremes they represented to unite in their 
struggle against imperialism;”147 and “form a new international order” (Yu 1977, p. 1036). 
Satisfied with the reception of his Dual Intermediate Zones theory in Africa and the Global 
South, he then declared, “we must give active support to the national independence liberation 
movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as to the peace movement and 
to just struggles in all countries throughout the world.”148 In 1965, Defence Minister Lin Biao 
reiterated Mao’s call to action, saying that China and other “socialist countries should regard it 
as their internationalist duty to support the people’s revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America.”149 But as shall be discussed below, China’s support to ‘freedom movements’ 
and ‘just struggles’ included significant intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
China’s military support for African liberation war movements began in the late 1950s with 
assistance to Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale which fought for independence from 
France.150 But, “with the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960s, China reversed 
its earlier policy of broad support for liberation organisations, and in general began to be more 
circumscribed in aiding movements that had links with Moscow. This led to a process of 
selecting suitable recipients for Chinese aid” (Taylor 2000, p. 93). The suitable ones where 
those that subscribed to Maoism and were not aligned with or receiving any support from the 
Soviet Union. As an illustration, in Angola, China supported the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) not only because its guerrilla strategies were similar to Mao’s 
‘revolution from the countryside’, but also because UNITA’s rival liberation movement, the 
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Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had strong Soviet links.151 China 
therefore supported UNITA and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) even 
though the two groups were rivals of each other simply for the reason that they both fought 
against the Soviet-backed MPLA. In 1963, the leader of FNLA, Holden Roberto, was promised 
military support by the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi. Almost a decade later, in 1974 FNLA 
“received a 450-ton shipment of arms and benefitted from the assistance of 112 Chinese 
instructors based in former Zaire” (Campos and Vines 2008, p. 34). Meanwhile, in 1964, Jonas 
Savimbi, leader of UNITA “met with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai in China, 
where he received military training and became a disciple of Maoism” (Campos and Vines 2008, 
p. 34). Influenced by its anti-Soviet stance, China ended up joining the United States and 
apartheid South Africa in supporting UNITA, a decision that ended up tarnishing its image on 
the continent,152 but more importantly, exposed China as just like the United States and the 
Soviet Union in seeking to expand their influence over African countries. 
As China’s relative economic power increased by leaps and bounds in the 1960s, albeit not to 
levels comparable to the Soviet Union or United States, it became bolder in its geopolitical 
competition for influence in Africa. Its strategy of choice was to expand its support for 
liberation movements struggling for independence in Africa. In Zimbabwe, a country 
strategically located at the centre of Southern Africa, China supported the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) because its rival, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), military wing of 
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) followed Soviet Marxist–Leninist ideology. Initially, 
ZANU had sought military support from Moscow, but failing to get any, it turned to Beijing. The 
People’s Republic of China took the opportunity to outdo the Soviets, seeing support for ZANU 
as a vehicle by which it could pursue its anti-Soviet objectives in Southern Africa.153 It then 
started providing military training and strategic assistance to ZANLA. “It was [also] under 
Chinese tutorship that ZANLA’s military strategy underwent a fundamental transformation 
from conventional military tactics to the Maoist model, which entailed the mass mobilisation of 
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the population” (Zhang 2014, p. 6). The Maoist combination of guerrilla warfare and political 
education for the masses contributed to ZANU’s triumph over ZAPU at independence in 1980.  
To further strengthen its support for liberation movements in Africa, Chinese military 
instructors were sent from Beijing to several training camps in independent African countries 
such as Tanzania, Ghana, and Congo-Brazzaville. Their instructions were to train liberation war 
fighters from other African countries still under colonial rule in Maoist ideology, guerrilla 
warfare, and war strategies. In Tanzania, the Chinese military instructors set up training camps 
for the rest of Southern Africa and also did the same for West Africa in Ghana.154 For example, a 
group of ZANU liberation war fighters were mainly trained in Tanzania. Besides providing 
training in African countries, some fighters were trained in China. Zimbabwe’s current vice 
president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, went to China in September 1963 for six months’ training in 
military science. In 1966, another group of 11 fighters led by the ZANLA commander Josiah 
Magama Tongogara were trained in mass mobilisation, strategy, and tactics at the Nanjing 
Academy in Beijing.155 Similarly, as Mozambique’s Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO) fought for independence from Portugal, its fighters received training from Chinese 
instructors in Tanzania, and they received weapons from China. “China also coordinated its 
military training for liberation groups with the Organisation of African Unity, providing the 
organisation’s liberation committee with 75 percent of all the military aid that it received from 
countries outside of Africa during 1971 and 1972” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 165).   
However, in its quest to outdo the Soviet Union and expand its influence across Africa, China 
ended up intervening in the internal politics of independent African states. Ian Taylor notes 
that “China adopted an anti-Soviet policy towards the liberation organisations in reaction to 
Moscow and not to the local situation. Whenever a movement indicated a willingness to deal 
with Moscow, China encouraged a rival organisation by switching aid to them, thus aiming to 
thwart the Soviet Union. This became a competition for influence…” (2000, p. 93). Because of 
its anti-Soviet fixation and desire to dominate the African continent, it supported anti-Soviet 
radical dissidents in Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger, and the Congo,156 
much to the chagrin of newly independent African states. As a result, in 1966 Ghana expelled 
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Chinese diplomats from Accra and suspended diplomatic ties with China on allegations that it 
was “interfering in its internal affairs by helping train Africans in secret military camps and 
supporting Nkrumah’s effort to return to power” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 288). Other 
independent African countries that also suspended diplomatic ties with China in protest to its 
interference in their internal affairs, including Benin (1966), Burundi (1963),157 Democratic 
Republic of Congo (1961), Kenya (1967), Tunisia (1967) and the Central African Republic 
(1966).158 In the end, African countries were “worried about trading one foreign master for 
another and regarded Beijing’s radical fervour as potentially subversive” (Raine 2009, p. 19; see 
also Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 165). 
Besides Beijing justifying the interventions as political support for movements fighting for self-
determination, in international law, and to a sizeable number of African leaders, its support of 
liberation movements in their countries amounted to intervention. To settle the issue of 
whether support for rebels fighting for independence is intervention or not, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in a case involving U.S. support for rebels in Nicaragua. The court 
decided that: “The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and 
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in 
breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of 
another State.”159  
Even by China’s own interpretation “making direct contact with the opposition…”160 in this case, 
liberation movements fighting against colonial governments, amounted to intervention. But, 
justifiable as it seemed, China’s support for insurgent groups in countries such as Angola raised 
further suspicion and discontent against its involvement in ideological proxy wars alongside 
Moscow and Washington because it suggested that China’s support for liberation movements 
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was propelled by the primary motive to counter Soviet influence in the Third World,161 and its 
desire to create a third ideological pole. The suspicion was confirmed when Deng Xiaoping said 
that China’s support for liberation movements in the Third World was meant to rally “the 
world’s people to oppose hegemonism, changing the world political balance, frustrating the 
Soviet hegemonists’ arrogant plan to isolate China internationally, improving China’s 
international environment, and heightening its international prestige” 162  (underlined for 
emphasis). 
 
4.5 Domestic economic development first, international affairs later: 
Deng’s China 
Toward the beginning of the 1970s, a mélange of systemic and mostly domestic factors led to 
waning of China’s support for liberation war movements in Africa. The most consequential 
domestic factor was definitely the Cultural Revolution which gained momentum from the late 
1960s. Focusing on containing internal revolts and purging ‘anti-revolutionary’ cadres within 
CPC, support for African liberation movements drifted away from being a priority for Beijing. 
Under the overbearing effects of the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy regressed hence its 
ability to continue financing the ‘internationalisation’ project in Africa was further constrained. 
But, as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, and with the death of Mao on 9 September 
1976 – a man who had singly defined the issues and determined the course of Chinese foreign 
policy especially its support to liberation war movements in Africa,163 China’s domestic and 
foreign policy took a shift. By 1975, Deng Xiaoping had already seized the opportunity and 
declared that it was ‘utterly wrong’ for comrades in the Party to only make revolution without 
promoting production. He therefore declared that the overall national interest was to “turn 
China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defence, and 
science and technology by the end of this century.” 164  
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He also shifted China’s foreign policy from being driven by political and ideological 
considerations to being influenced by economic interests; and from being geographically 
focused on the poor and developing Africa, to concentrating on engaging the developed and 
technologically advanced West. Part of his argument was: 
We have gone on opposing imperialism, hegemonism, colonialism and racism, working 
to safeguard world peace, and actively developing relations, including economic and 
cultural exchanges with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. After several years of effort, we have secured international conditions 
that are far better than before; they enable us to make use of capital from foreign 
countries and of their advanced technology and experience in business 
management.165 
Following on from his argument that China should reengage the West, he toured Europe and 
while addressing a press delegation in the Federal Republic of Germany on 10 October 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping urged China to open up to the outside world in order to advance itself.166 From 
then on, China transfixed its efforts toward economic engagement with developed Western 
countries in order to achieve relative economic development instead of continuing with the 
isolationist and antagonistic policies of Mao.167  With his focus on economically developing 
China, Deng Xiaoping also abandoned Mao’s international revolution agenda which had 
focused on Third World countries in Africa and Asia.  
China’s shift from ‘internationalisation’ of the revolution to domestic economic development 
was not just a response to domestic imperatives but also to systemic pressures. In relative 
terms, China was an economically and militarily poor country compared to the Soviet Union 
and the United States. It was therefore no longer able to measure up to the financial and 
military assistance given to most African countries by Moscow and Washington. In a talk with 
an economic and trade delegation of the government of Madagascar, Deng Xiaoping hinted on 
the withdrawal of Beijing from international engagements due to its weak relative economic 
status in the international system. He said, “at present, we are still a relatively poor nation. It is 
impossible for us to undertake many proletarian obligations, so our contributions remain small. 
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However, once we have accomplished the four modernisations and the national economy has 
expanded, our contributions to mankind, and especially the Third World, will be greater.”168 
This statement by Deng Xiaoping marked one of the first clearest admissions by a Chinese 
national leader that Beijing’s level of  engagement in international engagements was 
determined by its relative economic power, suggesting that for as long as China remained 
economically weaker than other global powers, its foreign policy remained limited until a time 
when its ‘national economy has expanded.  
Deng Xiaoping also reasoned that an economically poor China was vulnerable to bullying by 
other states at the international front. To avoid that situation, it needed to achieve comparable 
prosperity in order to restore “a position for China in international affairs.”169 Giving a speech 
at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 16 January 1980, 
Deng Xiaoping said, “the role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our 
economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a 
position to play a greater role in international affairs.”170 In 1984, he reiterated to the then 
President of Brazil, Joao Baptista de Oliveira, that when China achieves a Gross National 
Product (GNP),  now known as the Gross National Income (GNI) of $1 trillion, it will be able to 
contribute more to mankind.171 Furthermore, at the Third Plenary Session of the Central 
Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China on 22 October 1984, Deng Xiaoping said, 
“what will the political situation be like once we have quadrupled the GNP? I am confident that 
there will be a genuine stability and unity. China will be truly powerful, exerting a much greater 
influence in the world. That’s why we have to work hard. There are 16 more years until the 
year 2000.”172 
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True to the objective, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open-door policy enabled China 
to achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% from 1978 to 2014, “one of the world’s 
best” (Cheng 2014, p. vii).  In 1984, when Deng Xiaoping told the President of Brazil that China 
will be truly powerful and ready to play a significant role in international affairs when it 
achieves a GNI of US$1 trillion, it still had a GNI of $257 billion. By 1998, two years before the 
targeted deadline China quadrupled its GNI to slightly more than US$1 trillion. The table below 
illustrates the extraordinary growth of China’s annual GNI from being a mere US$184.8 billion 
in 1975 when Deng Xiaoping urged his fellow CPC comrades to consider production more than 
revolution to becoming the world’s second largest economy with an annual GNI of US$10,097 
trillion in 2014. 
Source: World Bank. 2015, World Development Indicators. Available at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=NY.GNP.ATLS.CD&period
=#   
In addition, China’s percentage share of world trade grew from less than one percent173 in 1978 
to 12.1%, ahead of United States’ 11.5% and Germany’s 7.7% in 2013. In the same year, 2013, it 
became the world’s biggest merchandise trader ahead of the United States, Germany and 
Japan.174 In terms of trade with other regions, China-Africa trade surpassed the US$100 billion 
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CHINA 184.8 213.3 299.6 372.3 647.5 1175.8 2278.2 5752.3 10097 
FRANCE 363.7 723.6 556.5 1208.8 1542.6 1532 2274.7 2847.7 2844.3 
GERMANY 529.8 1020.1 765.4 1694.8 2414.4 2154.7 2959.4 3662.5 3853.6 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
.. .. .. .. 392.1 250.3 638.5 1425.1 1930.6 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
255.5 500 480.4 988.3 1224.8 1613.4 2485.7 2541 2801.5 
UNITED 
STATES 
1842.2 3048.1 4164.9 6029.5 7760.9 10178.5 13694 15143.1 17611 
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mark in 2008175 and reached $210.2 billion in 2013 making China Africa’s foremost trading 
partner.176 As predicted by Deng Xiaoping this increase in China’s relative economic power 
resulted in extension of its interests and influence Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle 
East,177 thereby enabling it to exert a much greater influence in the world, and expand its 
contributions in the Third World.  
 
4.6 21st Century China, increased relative economic power and 
intervention in Africa 
In terms of relative economic power and global status, the China of the 21st century is miles 
apart from the China of Mao and Deng Xiaoping in the 20th century. Its economy has grown 
exponentially. In less than 60 years it has risen from being the ‘sick man of Asia’ to becoming 
one of the world’s major economies. In fact, according to the World Bank’s 2014 development 
indicators, its GDP based on purchasing power parity stood at US$18 trillion ahead of United 
States’ US$17 trillion178 - eighteen times more than what Deng Xiaoping envisioned it to be by 
the turn of the century. That growth in economic power has expectedly resulted in expansion 
of its economic interests abroad as it searches for new markets and resources to keep the 
engine of its economy running. From being an isolationist underdeveloped country in 1949, it 
has also become the biggest trading partner of the United States, Asia and Africa, with 
extensive trade relations with Europe and Latin America.  
By all standards, the China of today has far exceeded Deng Xiaoping’s expectations, but what 
impact has it had on its role in global affairs? As discussed above, in 1978 and 1984 Deng 
Xiaoping respectively told a Madagascan delegation and the former president of Brazil, Joao 
Baptista de Oliveira, that when China quadruples its economy’s size, it will be ‘truly powerful, 
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exerting a much greater influence in the world’, and playing a significant role in international 
affairs particularly in the Third World. The questions that arise, and what this chapter has 
sought to do, is to explore from a historical perspective whether China’s role in international 
affairs is determined by its relative economic power; and whether its understanding and 
practice of intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts particularly in Africa evolve with 
changes in its relative economic power? What is apparent is that China’s role in international 
affairs, especially intervention in the internal affairs of other states, has historically been 
influenced by its position in the international system, particularly its relative economic power.  
The result of China’s rapid economic growth since 1978 has been a subsequent expansion of its 
economic and political interests in Africa. Initially, the re-engagement with Africa was in 
response to the dilemma of its rising demand for primary commodities and insufficient 
domestic sources for those high-value commodities.179 Second, it needed alternative import 
and export markets to sustain its growing economy.180 In short China was in “pursuit of 
economic self-interest in the form of access to raw materials, markets and spheres of influence 
through investment, trade and military assistance” (Marks 2006). As a result, by the end of 
2013, it had surpassed the United States as Africa’s biggest trading partner, and its direct 
investment in Africa amounted to US$25 billion, with at least 2 500 Chinese companies 
operating across the African continent in sectors that include finance and banking, 
telecommunications, infrastructure development, agriculture, manufacturing and commodity 
broking. In addition to economic interests, it also considered Africa to be “an important 
component in shaping its influence and prestige as a major power”181 and in expanding its 
global influence.  
The expansion into Africa was, however, not without significant geopolitical challenges. Despite 
most African countries having been independent for several decades, European “political 
influence, economic preponderance, and cultural conditioning remain[ed]. Britain and France, 
and with them the rest of the European Community, maintain[ed] a relatively high level of aid 
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and investment, trade dominance, and a sizeable flow of teachers, businessmen, statesmen, 
tourists and technical assistants” on the continent.182 In addition to the European powers, the 
United States, Russia, Japan and other rising powers such as India and Brazil also have 
significant stakes in the politics and economies of African countries. That means as a late-
returnee to Africa, China lacked “the economic and political ties that Western Europe has with 
Africa as a legacy of colonialism, and the economic power that the United States wields 
because of its wealth and influence in international financial institutions” (French 2004). With 
options for economic and trading partners in Africa somewhat limited,183 it was compelled to 
offer resource-rich African countries better terms than those offered by rival global powers.184 
For China, one of those better terms came in the form of promises not to interfere in the 
African countries’ internal affairs, and unlike the West, it did not attach political conditions to 
its development assistance to African countries.185 Just as in the 1950s, Beijing’s emphasis on 
non-interference resonated well with African ruling elites,186 some of whom were bogged down 
by Western demands for political and economic reforms in exchange for aid and development 
assistance.    
Riding on its official foreign policy of non-intervention in other states’ internal affairs, China 
first gained ‘political, economic and military space’ in countries described as ‘outposts of 
tyranny’187  where Western presence and influence was weak. 188 These were countries either 
ostracised by the West for gross human rights violations, terrorism, bad governance and 
authoritarianism, or simply for being riddled with perennial political instability and intrastate 
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armed conflicts.189  Seeing countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, 
Zimbabwe and Angola as opportunities, Beijing was quick to step into the vacuum left by 
Western powers. 190  Also taking advantage of the minimal competition from Western 
companies, whose activities in those countries were inhibited by their governments, 
multilateral sanctions, or domestic pressure,191 Chinese companies flourished as Beijing took 
“up political, economic and military space that was [once] occupied by Britain, France or the 
United States”192 in resource-rich countries like Sudan and Angola. 
Mutually invoking the historical Sino-Africa cooperation in their fight against colonialism, the 
CPC strengthened its economic and political ties with ruling political elites in Africa. As China 
gained access to strategic natural resources, political leaders in countries such as Zimbabwe, 
Libya, Sudan and Angola viewed China’s enthusiasm to trade with them in spite of Western 
sanctions as a source of alternative development assistance, and legitimisation of their 
regimes.193 By accentuating the principle of non-intervention in their internal affairs, “China 
offered [them] not just an alternative path to development, but also an alternative to the 
Western-authored, liberal international order – rejecting, for example, the concept of universal 
human rights.”194 As it gained in economic power and influence in global governance, China 
expanded its tentacles beyond ‘pariah and authoritarian states’ to include African countries 
such as Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, and Botswana that still are strongly aligned to 
the West.  
As China expanded its economic interests in Africa, more and more it found both its 
investments and nationals under threat from intrastate armed conflicts in some of its African 
trading partners. Examples of Chinese nationals being kidnapped for ransom, and investments 
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being caught in the crossfire of armed conflicts abound. For instance, when an intrastate armed 
conflict broke out in Libya in 2011, Zhong Manying, Director of the Department of West Asia 
and Africa under the Ministry of Commerce reported that Chinese enterprises with businesses 
in property, railway, crude oil service, and telecommunication valuing more than $20 billion 
were lost (MOFCOM, 2011). Among those Chinese enterprises were three state oil firms, China 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) and 
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) (Martina and Buckley 2011). In Sudan, China 
invested US$20 billion mostly in the oil industry before a secessionist conflict resulted in split of 
the Sudan into two. Two-thirds of its investments ended up in the new state of South Sudan. A 
further intrastate armed conflict outbreak in South Sudan affected the operations of the state-
owned CNPC, which is a major shareholder in two oil consortia – the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC) and the Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC). 195 Not only have 
the intrastate armed conflicts affected China’s economic interests, its citizens working in Africa 
have also been targeted. For example, Chinese workers were kidnapped and others killed by 
rebels in Sudan.196 In the Central African Republic, two Chinese workers were kidnapped in 
2012197 and more recently, Chinese companies have had to evacuate their nationals and scale 
down operations due to the ensuing civil war in South Sudan.198 More and more, as shall be 
discussed in the next three empirical chapters, China’s adherence to its non-interference 
principle is being put to the test, as it intervenes to protect national interests in Africa. 
What is apparent, however, is that the general trajectory of China’s actual intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states can be explained by its position in the international system and 
increases in its relative economic power. As promised by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and reiterated 
by President Xi in 2015, as China’s economic power increases, it is expanding its interests into 
Africa. In the process, its non-intervention policy is being put to the test, compelling it to 
intervene in some African conflicts, and forcing it to play a bigger role in international affairs. 
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This means that the trend from imperial China is still relevant today, “When Chinese power 
prevailed, the empire was able to force its tribute system and its language of diplomatic 
discourse on surrounding peoples. When the empire was weak, the Chinese perception of the 
world had little effect on the course of events. The ultimate fact is the fact of power” (Schwartz 
1968, p. 278). With “the continued growth of the Chinese economy and with China’s deeper 
integration into the international system, the tendency to keep a low profile in various 
international situations changed… the old strategy of ‘hiding one’s brilliance and improving 
one’s internal strength’ (tao guang yang hui) is no longer viable” (Wang and Rosenau 2009:23). 
Already, “Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping appears to have moved beyond Deng’s 
cautious and cautionary approach and is much in line with what one would expect from a 
reemerging power that accepts its status as a major global power on the rise” (Cook 2015, p. 
113).  
Writing in 2008, John G Ikenberry noted that as China had quadrupled the size of its economy, 
with trillions of US dollars in reserves, its diplomacy was extending its reach to Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East. The implication of that extraordinary economic growth is 
that China is now both a military and economic rival to the US, a factor that is heralding a shift 
in the distribution of global power and putting China on its way to becoming a formidable 
global power. President Xi noted that China was now supposed to protect its nationals and 
interests abroad, which in reality entails intervening in the internal affairs of other states. 
Correspondingly, it is taking a more liberal interpretation of the official non-intervention 
principle. In concurrence, Jian Yang notes that “China’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold 
War has experienced major changes in a liberal direction” (2009, p. 31). Other authors also 
note that since the turn of the beginning of the 1990s, “Chinese foreign policy has become far 
nimbler and engaging than at any other time in the history of the People’s Republic” (Medeiros 
and Fravel 2003). Structurally different levels of relative economic power point to divergent 
patterns in China’s interpretation of its principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states. With a rise in its relative economic power in the 21st century, there should be an 
increase in its intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. 
What is clear from this historical pattern is that in times of expansive rise in economic power, 
Chinese intervention in other states’ affairs is more frequent, whereas in times of decline there 
is less significant intervention abroad. It can be argued that the periods of high economic 
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growth in China are matched with higher activity abroad, making them extroversion times 
whereas the decline periods are matched with less or no activity abroad, making them 
introversion times.  “The extroversion times are matched with greater activity, including 
interventions abroad” (Feste 2003, p. 188). Frank Klingberg (1996) describes this phenomenon 
as being foreign policy mood alternations from introversion to extroversion. From the analysis 
above, toward the end of the Ming dynasty, the Century of Humiliation, and the period from 
Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in 1978 to until the coming in of Hu Jintao can be described as 
withdrawn periods in China’s foreign policy. These periods were “typified by the concern to 
prevent development or expansion of… political and military concerns beyond its own 
borders,”199 whereas the latter years of Hu Jintao and currently President Xi Jinping’s reign 
constitute the extrovert periods of its foreign policy.  
On the other hand, Mao Zedong’s interventionist foreign policy in Africa reflects that even 
though the increase in relative economic power may be minute, a state can still intervene in 
the internal affairs of other states in order to protect its interests abroad.  This does not mean 
that political ideology and/or state interest may be autonomous push factors separate from 
relative economic growth and a state’s position in the international system because unlike Xi 
Jinping who sees China as a global power able to compete with the United States in global 
governance, Mao narrowly defined China as the leader of the Third World with interests to 
protect there. In the Third World, China had a significantly superior ‘global’ position, able to 
influence and intervene in their internal affairs on behalf of its geostrategic and ideological 
interests. As put by Gideon Rose, the increase in its relative economic power, however small, 
was the basis upon which it was able to expand its interests abroad. Mao’s ‘withdrawal’ from 
Africa during the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward when China’s economic power 
was significantly under strain suggests that economic power was the bedrock upon which 
China’s interventionist foreign policy lay. 
This cyclical pattern in China’s foreign policy behaviour, in particular intervention in foreign 
conflicts, reflects the lateral pressure hypothesis and the neoclassical realist arguments that  
States expand when they think they can, when they perceive relative increases in 
national power, and when changes in the relative costs and benefits of expansion make 
it profitable for them to do so… [because] as states grow wealthier and more powerful, 
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they do not only seek greater worldwide political influence (control over territory, the 
behaviour of other states, and the world economy) commensurate with their new 
capabilities, but they will also be more capable of expanding their interests and, if 
necessary, of waging large-scale wars for this purpose (Feste 2003, p. 189).  
With its new economic power, China has international interests, and the capacity to project 
both military and non-military power to protect and advance those interests. Thus the “Chinese 
foreign policy establishment has come to see the country as an emerging global power with 
varied interest and responsibilities – and not as the victimised developing nation of the Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping era” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003). Hence, “as China’s economy 
continues to grow and as its political ambition continues to develop, so will its influence around 
the world” (Wang and Rosenau 2009, p. 7). Thus, as put by Li Cheng, director of the John L. 
Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institute, “as a major power, China’s voice should be 
heard, and views should be delivered… [Since] along with its rising international status, China 
also shoulders more responsibilities and obligations in narrowing the rich-poor gap, promoting 
South-South cooperation and other global affairs.”200 This is because “the way Chinese policy 
changes and how it responds to the challenges of the twenty-first century will be critical not 
only to the future of conflict-affected and fragile states, but to global security and stability and, 
consequently, to China’s own sustained economic growth and modernization” (Mariani 2015, p. 
267). 
Nevertheless, still the position of China in the international system and its relative economic 
power is only sufficient in explaining in the abstract the changing nature of China’s intervention 
policy and behavior. It does not explain China’s specific intervention behavior in individual 
African countries because the “foreign policy of any country is, after all, designed to promote 
as far as possible the interests of that country as perceived at each particular moment by the 
country’s leaders. Changes in some aspects of foreign policy may not necessarily reflect 
changes in the concrete situation but rather a change in the perception of the policy-makers or 
a calculation that such change would have desirable results” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 20).  
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CHAPTER 5: China and the Libyan civil war: Case of ambivalent 
interventionism? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the historical evolution of China’s intervention behaviour vis-a-vis 
the trajectory of its transition from being the ‘Middle Kingdom’ to being a state within the 
modern international system. What became apparent is that as its relative economic power 
vacillated due to changes in its domestic economy, so did its intervention in African states’ 
internal affairs. With Deng Xiaoping pursuing the ‘Socialist Modernisation’ programme, Africa 
no longer fit into the grand scheme of China’s domestic and foreign policy – simply put what 
followed was a “decade of neglect by China”201 because it “not only viewed Africa as largely 
immaterial in its quest for modernisation, but also saw that the rationale behind its support for 
anti-Soviet elements in the continent was no longer valid” (Taylor 1998, p. 444). It was only 
after the Tiananmen Square incident that China revived its political and diplomatic engagement 
with Africa, but still its role in the continent’s internal affairs remained minimal. Its focus on 
Africa was reinforced when, due to lateral pressure caused by high domestic economic growth, 
it aggressively sought new markets and sources of energy and other strategic primary 
commodities. Only then did it vigorously renew its re-engagement with resource-rich countries 
in Africa. With its gigantic oil and gas reserves and lucrative opportunities for Chinese 
multinational companies in the construction and telecommunications sector, Libya was a 
natural target for China’s ‘going out’ strategy.  
Building on that broad history of Sino-Africa relations, and particularly on the thesis that China 
expands its interests abroad when its relative economic power increases, this chapter discusses 
China’s intervention in Libya’s 2011 intrastate armed conflict. It begins by exploring Sino-Libya 
diplomatic, political, and economic relations from a historical perspective, and then focuses on 
China’s economic interests in Libya and how the outbreak of the intrastate armed conflict in 
2011 affected those interests in a manner and scale never before experienced by China in 
Africa. The latter part of the chapter examines China’s unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral 
intervention in the conflict. Overall, the main argument advanced in this chapter is that China’s 
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response to the Libyan intrastate armed conflict reflects an indecisive foreign policy on 
intervention in foreign conflicts that gravitated from non-interventionism to ambivalent 
interventionism.  
 
5.2 Background of China-Libya relations 
Relations between China and Libya began in the 1950s through what began as indirect 
interactions at conferences such as the 1955 Bandung Conference202 and the Afro-Asian 
People’s Solidarity Conference held in late December 1957. China’s drive to directly engage 
Libya, however, gained momentum as part of Beijing’s wider “diplomatic offensive in North 
Africa… the region of Africa that had the largest number of independent states; Beijing believed 
it could persuade several to recognise the PRC” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 228). As a result 
of that concerted diplomatic offensive, China established its first African embassy in Cairo, 
Egypt in 1956. A year later, a Commercial Officer at the Chinese embassy in Cairo, Chan Hiang-
Kang, established China’s first official trade relations with Libya, alongside other North African 
countries. The relations got a further boost when the International Liaison and Organisation 
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council’s 
Commission for Cultural Relations with foreign countries jointly organised visits to China for 
delegates from twenty-seven African countries including Libya in 1958-9. The visits by the 
African delegates “were naturally expected to support diplomatic recognition and the opening 
of trade relations after independence” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 35; see also Larkin 1973, p. 29). 
However, the outcome was not outright successful for China, because in 1959 the Kingdom of 
Libya under King Idris established and maintained full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.203 
When Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi (popularly known as Muammar Gaddafi) 
came into power after the 1969 coup d'état against King Idris, he was “a 27-year old signals 
officer driven by grand ambitions, fierce hatreds and a pathological penchant for meddling in 
the affairs of other countries, made possible by the huge flow of oil revenues at his disposal.”204 
Partly because he was an anti-Communist and pro-Arab Unity nationalist – ideologies that were 
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inimical to China, he was at first not keen on establishing diplomatic relations with China. He 
therefore maintained Libya’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan until 1978. However, possibly due to a 
combination of acknowledgements by Zhou Enlai of Gaddafi’s support for the anti-imperialist 
movement, and “China’s support for the Arab states and the Palestinians against Israel,”205 
Muammar Gaddafi acquiesced to recognising the People’s Republic of China in 1971. In fact, it 
was a unilateral decision that he made “while there was still an ambassador in Tripoli 
representing Taiwan.”206 Libya-Taiwan diplomatic relations still remained until August 1978 
when the People’s Republic of China and Libya officially established diplomatic ties.   
On consummation of their diplomatic relations, China and Libya immediately entered into their 
first trade agreement, the agreement for cooperation on the economy, science and technology 
in August 1978, which came into force four years later.207 In 1982, the countries signed the 
Agreement on Establishment of the Sino-Libyan Joint Committee on Economic, Trade, Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation, and the Sino-Libyan Mutual Cooperation Program. Further 
agreements were signed concerning the sending of Chinese medical teams to Libya between 
1983 and 1994208and follow-on agreements on cultural cooperation (1985); scientific and 
technological cooperation (1990), and cultural and information cooperation (2001). In addition, 
although there were several exchange visits between the two countries in the course of 
Gaddafi’s rule over Libya, official visits by heads of state of both Libya and China were rare. The 
only time Gaddafi made a state visit to China was in 1982, “during which the two countries 
signed an accord to set up a mixed committee for trade, economic, science and technological 
cooperation.”209 Two decades later, China’s President Jiang Zemin and Vice-Premier Qian 
Qichen made a two-day state visit to Libya – the first visit by a Chinese President to the North 
African country.210 In between, China’s Vice-Premier Li Peng visited Libya in May 1984; in 
January 1996, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Libya. In 
September of the same year, a delegation led by Zinati Mohammed Al Zinati, Speaker of the 
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General People’s Congress of Libya, paid a goodwill visit to China. Libya’s Secretary of Foreign 
Communication and International Cooperation, Abdul-Rahman Mohammad Shalgam, then 
visited China in May 2000; and the following year, in January 2001 China’s foreign minister 
Tang Jiaxuan visited Libya.211 The last visit by a high ranking Chinese official before Gaddafi’s fall 
in 2011 was by foreign minister Li Zhaoxing in January 2006. The fact that five years passed 
without high level official visits between the two countries somewhat reflects the uneasy 
relations between China and Libya. 
5.3 Troubled diplomatic relations 
By the time a mass revolution against Muammar Gaddafi started in February 2011, Libya-China 
diplomatic relations had gone through turbulent times – causing China “occasional 
indignity.”212 For example, at the same time that Muammar Gaddafi was hosting China’s 
foreign affairs minister Li Zhaoxing in Libya and confirming his country’s commitment to the 
one-China principle, his son Sayf al-Islam Gaddafi, President of the Gaddafi International 
Foundation for Charity Associations and acting as his father’s envoy met President Chen Shui-
bian in Taiwan. On behalf of his father, he went on to invite President Chen to visit Libya “in 
order to facilitate bilateral economic, science, technology, tourism, education and military 
exchanges, and exchange representative offices.”213 Much to the vexation of Beijing, President 
Chen made a transit stop in Tripoli four months later in May 2006.214 Regarding that visit, Liu 
Jianchao, the PRC’s foreign ministry spokesman vented Beijing’s anger in the following terms:  
Regardless of China’s persuasion and strong opposition, Libya insisted on allowing Chen 
Shui-bian to stop over and discussed with him setting up representative offices on each 
other’s territory… This is a serious violation of Libya's long-term commitment to the 
one-China policy and will exert a negative impact on China-Libya relations… We 
demand that Libya live up to its commitment and immediately cease all official 
exchanges with Taiwan in whatever form so as to maintain the overall China-Libya 
relations.215  
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Further infuriating China and causing it to lose face was that four months before President 
Chen’s stopover in Libya, the spokesman of China’s foreign ministry, Kong Quan, had 
confidently declared China’s appreciation for the Libyan government’s adherence to the one-
China policy.216 Nonetheless, despite China’s stern rebuke over President Chen Shui-bian’s visit 
to Tripoli, Libya did not cease relations with Taiwan. Instead, the Taiwan Commercial Office 
began operating in Libya just two years after President Chen’s visit to Tripoli.217  
Libya’s foreign policy and relations with China, as it has with other countries, was generally 
unpredictable because of the prominent and direct role that Muammar Gaddafi played, which 
ensured that foreign relations were personality-driven and depended on his personal relations 
with leaders of the respective foreign countries.218 For instance, when Gaddafi was incensed by 
China’s lack of support for his ‘integrated Africa’ initiative, under what he termed the United 
States of Africa, Gaddafi publicly criticised China for attempting to ‘colonise’ Africa for its own 
benefit and for its lack of support for integration and cooperation of African countries. Two 
years later, at the 2009 Fourth Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which 
was held in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, Libya’s foreign minister Moussa Koussa also complained 
about China’s ‘divide and rule’ of African countries. He remonstrated that Beijing does “not 
want the African Union, or African unity, but rather China wants to cooperate with Africa as 
separate nations, rather than as a union…”219 
Apart from accusing China of being divisive to Africa, Gaddafi and his foreign minister 
continued to accuse China of colonising the continent. In an address to Oxford University 
students via satellite, Gaddafi contended that there was a geopolitical conflict between China 
and the United States over Africa and that the two countries were using different strategies 
and approaches to colonize the continent and benefit from its resources. He said:   
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There is a colonialism that imposes itself by force [United States] and another that uses 
gentler methods [China]. There is a soft and a harsh colonialism. But in the final 
analysis, colonialism is one and the same. As I said, there are those who welcome China. 
We all seek a deterrent against the harsh approach of American penetration. This 
makes us take China's side. However, China must know that we are aware that it could 
turn into an imperialist power. If it wishes to settle in Africa or to plunder Africa's 
resources at a low price and sell its manufactured products at an exorbitant one, it will 
turn into a colonial power.220 
His foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, put it in even more crude terms, arguing that reality on 
the ground suggested “something akin to a Chinese invasion of the African continent.” 221 He 
then concluded his criticism by advising China not to resettle its citizens in Africa under the 
pretext of employment and investment.  
Both accusations touched a nerve in China because it had carefully cultivated an image and 
identity as Africa’s all-weather benevolent equal partner interested in mutually beneficial 
engagements unlike the ‘exploitative’ West.  Although there is no evidence of China’s specific 
response to Gaddafi and Moussa Koussa’s allegations that it was driving toward colonising 
Africa, China has consistently negated those accusations, arguing that it is Africa’s development 
partner. Regardless, Libya’s accusations against Beijing reflected the problematic nature of the 
two countries’ relations. In fact, Maximilian Terhalle puts it that “Gaddafi’s outspoken 
sympathies for and close ties with Taiwan and his well-known policy to raise resentments 
among African states against China’s economic engagement on the continent made it 
somewhat easier for Beijing to vote in favour of the resolution [UNSC Resolution 1970]” (2015, 
p. 170). That United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) imposed sanctions, asset 
freezes, and an arms embargo on Libya, and as well as on selected individuals that included 
Gaddafi, his sons, and close associates. However, as put by David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman 
in their book, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, despite their awkward relations, 
China was still “willing to suffer an occasional indignity because of Libya’s significant oil 
resources in which China has shown increasing interest” (2012, p. 228). But exactly how much 
of those oil resources did China get from Libya?  
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5.4 China-Libya economic and trade engagements 
Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion barrels, the ninth largest reserves in the 
world.222 According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), the country 
“holds the largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, the fifth-largest amount of 
proved natural gas reserves on the continent, and in the past years was an important 
contributor to the global supply of light, sweet (low sulfur) crude oil, which Libya mostly 
imports to European markets” (2015, p. 2). Before the intrastate armed conflict in 2011, as 
shown in the diagram below, Libya produced an estimated 1.65 million barrels per day of high 
quality sweet crude oil, up from the 1.4 million barrels per day produced in 2000, and slightly 
lower than the 2008 average of 1.74 million barrels per day.223 In mid-2011, oil production in 
Libya was reduced to its lowest level as mass demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime 
escalated to an intrastate armed conflict.  
Figure 5.1: Crude oil production in Libya, January 2010 to October 2015 (million barrels per 
day) 
 
Before the intrastate armed conflict, approximately 85% of Libya’s oil exports were destined for 
Europe, especially the West European countries of Italy, Germany, France and Spain.224 Italy 
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was the top destination. This dominance by West European countries of Libya’s oil and gas 
exports was driven by two major factors: (1) Western Europe’s need to diversify energy sources 
and reduce its dependence on expensive gas and oil from Norway and Russia; and (2) the 
opening up of the Libyan oil industry after lifting of international sanctions against the Gaddafi 
regime in 2003. Also, building on already existing economic relations between Libya and 
Europe, as well as a shift toward the West by the Gaddafi regime in the 2000s, European 
companies, especially Italian ENI, Spanish Repsol, and Total from France took the opportunity 
to dominate the Libyan energy sector. But in order to diversify its export oil market, the Libyan 
National Oil Corporation (NOC) maintained “a balance in its relationships between North 
American, European, Brazilian, Chinese, Russian, Turkish, Indian and other corporate entities 
that were investing in Libyan energy markets” (Campbell 2013, p. 6). This situation provided 
China with an opportunity to enter into the Libyan oil industry, albeit on a smaller scale than 
the Europeans. Although it was a late entrant in Libya’s energy sector, China still managed to 
increase its share of Libyan oil exports from 4.2% in 2008 to a peak of 13% in 2011.  Western 
Europe, in particular Italy, however, remained the highest importers of Libyan oil. 
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The table below shows the major destinations of Libyan oil in percentage of its total oil exports 
from 2008-2013. 
Figure 5.2: Libya's petroleum crude exports by destination (%), 2008 – 2013 
 
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/2709/2008/  
To Libya, China was one of its major oil buyers, but to China, Libyan oil only constituted a 
fraction of its total oil imports. As shown in the diagram below, in 2010, Libyan oil only 
represented 3% of China’s total crude oil imports. By the end of Libya’s intrastate armed 
conflict in September 2011, Libyan oil exports to China had been drastically reduced to 
approximately 1% of China’s imports. In 2013 it was further reduced to about 0.8% of total 
Chinese oil imports.225   
  
                                                          
225 Jiang, J & Sinton, J 2011, ‘Overseas investments by Chinese national oil companies’, IEA Energy Papers, 
no. 2011/03, OECD Publishing, Paris, viewed on 10 June 2015, p.27, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kgglrwdrvvd.pdf?expires=1456063139&id=id&accname=guest&check
sum=EA84CD4E1E7E7AD5D92BCC1CF35BC439    
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Figure 5.3: China’s petroleum crude imports from selected African countries (%), 2008-2013 
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/2709/2008/  
 
Among China’s African sources of oil, Libya fell far behind Angola, which has consistently 
remained the largest source of China’s oil imports from Africa. At its peak, Angolan oil 
constituted 17% of China’s total oil imports in 2010 and 14% in 2013. In contrast, to date Libya 
remains a small exporter of oil to China, and still is outside the league of China’s largest African 
suppliers of oil – Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan 
(Alessi and Xu 2015).  
Before the conflict in 2011, China made several unsuccessful attempts to increase its stake in 
the Libyan oil industry. For example, China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) “offered 
to assist Libyan counterparts in offshore exploration and the building of new pipeline system” 
(Engelbrekt and Wagnsson 2014, p. 3). It then “partnered with Libya’s NOC to build pipelines 
and carry out exploration projects, and was seen to have a strong relationship and business ties 
with the Gaddafi regime” (Jiang and Ding 2014, p. 28). Perhaps confident of its relations with 
the ruling elite in Libya, and seeking to further increase its stake, in 2008 CNPC attempted to 
acquire a controlling stake in the Verenex Energy Inc. of Canada, including its Libyan assets, but 
was blocked by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC). Later into the deal, NOC chose to 
exercise its right of pre-emption, effectively blocking CNPC’s bid to acquire Verenex Energy 
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Inc.226 “Verenex had been working on gas and oil exploration in the Ghadames Basin since 2006 
and had reported several discoveries” (Taib 2010, p. 25.1). What bothered CNPC and the 
Chinese government is that Libya ended up paying far less than the $499 million that CNPC had 
offered, raising suspicion that the blockage was a political move by the Gaddafi regime to 
maintain ownership of oil reserves within the hands of the Libyan government as a matter of 
national interest. With attempts to increase its stake in the Libyan energy sector, China 
remained a comparatively small player, exploiting only a fraction of the Libyan oil exports. 
 
5.5 China’s involvement in Libya’s industry 
Beyond the oil industry, Chinese firms were major players in the construction and 
telecommunications sector of the Libyan economy. At the time of the conflict in February 2011 
at least 75 Chinese private and state-owned firms were operating in Libya227 - “mainly in the 
fields of telecommunications, irrigation and rail construction” (Engelbrekt and Wagnsson 2014, 
p. 3). Although Libya was not among the top 20 African destinations for China’s Outward 
Foreign Investment (ODI),228 it still provided a huge market for manufactured Chinese products 
and was a lucrative source of infrastructure development contracts for private and state owned 
Chinese firms. This was “partly because the energy sector in Libya [had] already attracted 
scores of foreign companies, including giants such as BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, with the Chinese 
companies arriving too late to enter the market” (Zhang and Wei 2012, p. 44). Yin Gang, a 
senior researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, concurred 
with Zhang and Wei’s observation. He stated in an interview in 2011 that the most important 
relationship between Libya and China was not oil but the export of Chinese technology to 
Libya,229 as well as infrastructural development – especially in the railway construction and 
telecommunications sector.  
Unlike their Chinese counterparts in the energy sector, China’s private and state-owned 
construction and telecommunication companies found Libya to be profitable. Contracted 
infrastructure development projects funded by the Libyan government attracted large Chinese 
                                                          
226Ibid. 
227 Pierson, D 2011, ‘Libyan strife exposes China’s risks in global quest for oil’, Los Angeles Times, 9 March, 
viewed 10 June 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/09/business/la- fi-china- oil-20110310  
228 Zhang, J & Wei, WX 2012, ‘Managing political risks of Chinese contracted projects in Libya’, Project 
Management Journal, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 43. 
229 Branigan, T 2011, ‘China looks to protect its assets in a post-Gaddafi Libya’, The Guardian, 23 August, 
viewed 10 June 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/23/china-assets-post-gaddafi-libya 
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private and state-owned enterprises, such as the Changshu Construction Group, a Jiangsu 
based enterprise which was contracted to construct a university town in Libya. Other major 
Chinese state-owned enterprises with investments and construction projects in Libya included 
China Water Resources and Hydropower Construction Group, China Communications 
Construction Group, China Railway Construction Engineering Corporation, China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation, China Gezhouba Group Corporation, China Building 
Materials Group Import and Export Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation, China 
Metallurgical Group Corporation, the Workers International Engineering Co., Ltd., China 
Communications construction Group, China metallurgical construction Co., China Civil 
Engineering construction Corporation Limited; and two major private firms in the 
telecommunications sector – ZTE and Huawei. Of the major Chinese companies operating in 
Libya, thirteen, which included Metallurgical Corporation of China, China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation, and China Railway Construction Corporation, are directly under the 
central government.230 The table below gives a summary of the most significant projects and 
investments by Chinese firms in Libya.  
  
                                                          
230 Song S 2012, ‘China seeks compensation in Libya’, Global Times, 7 March, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/699098.shtml 
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Table 5.1: Investments by Chinese firms in Libya 
Company Name Ownership Investment Project Investment Amount 
China Railway 
Construction 
Central 
enterprises 
There are three general 
contracting project 
Total $ 4.237 billion, 
currently unfinished 
contract amount 
$ 3,551,000,000 
Chinese 
Architecture 
Central 
enterprises 
2007 to enter Libya engaged in 
engineering contracting projects, 
duration 40 months, nearly half of 
the project amount 
The cumulative 
contract amount of 
about 17.6 billion yuan 
Gezhouba Group Central 
enterprises 
Construction of 7300 housing units 
in Libya 
Contract amount 5.54 
billion yuan, a total 
project amount of 
16.8% 
China 
Metallurgical 
Central 
enterprises 
In Libya build 5,000 units of 
residential projects and 
subcontracted cement plants, two 
unfinished projects 
Contract amount of 
about 5.131 billion 
yuan 
China Oil and Gas 
Group 
Central 
enterprises 
2002 to enter Libya, before civil 
unrest there has five subsidiary 
companies 
unknown 
China 
Hydropower 
Central 
enterprises 
Projects under construction 6 The total investment of 
1.788 billion US dollars 
CCCC 
Construction 
Central 
enterprises 
Libya Misurata 5,000 units of 
housing project 
$ 4.8 billion investment 
In Engineering 
Group 
Central 
enterprises 
Housing Construction Investment Amount 
$ 4,000,000,000 
Beijing Hongfu Private 
Enterprise 
Libya in 2009 to 5,000 units of 
housing and turnkey facilities 
project 
Equivalent to about 3.4 
billion yuan 
Ningbo Century 
Huafeng 
Private 
Enterprise 
In Libya, the construction of a 
large housing project 
Contract amount of 
about 3.354 billion 
yuan 
ZTE Private 
Enterprise 
Mobile communication network 
construction 
$ 092.7 million 
Huawei Private 
Enterprise 
FTTH (fibre to the home) and other 
projects 
$ 040 million 
Source: Sohu, Inc. 2011, A List of Chinese Enterprises’ Investments in Libya. Available at: 
http://business.sohu.com/20110823/n317112596.shtml  
 
The China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship Annual Report of 2010 reported that China’s 
imports from Libya increased by 22.6% to reach US$3.17 billion in 2009. It also reported that by 
2009, Libya had the third largest project signed with a Chinese company in Africa – the Surt-
Tripoli section, valued at US$24.2 billion; the other two major projects were the Central and 
western sections of the East-West expressway project in Algeria (US$62.5 billion) and the social 
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housing project in Angola valued at US$35.4 billion.231 By 2010, trade volumes between the two 
countries reached US$6.58 billion.232 The boom in trade between Libya and China was such that 
the Afriqiyah Airline launched a twice-per-week direct flight from Tripoli to Beijing in order to 
cater to rising travel demand by Chinese business people and workers.233 However, according 
to the Annual Report on the Development of Africa, jointly published by the Social Sciences 
Academic Press, the Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, and the External Relations Bureau of the Ministry of Culture released in Beijing 
on 4 July 2012 “there was a sharp trade decline between China and Libya in 2011, a 58 percent 
year-on-year decrease.”234 Mei Xinyu, a researcher at the Ministry of Commerce affiliated 
Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation confirmed that in the first 
eight months of 2011, trade between Libya and China fell by 51.4 percent year-on-year, 
amounting only to US$2.16 billion.235 
 
5.6 Implications of the Libyan armed conflict on China’s economic and 
trade interests 
Apart from drastic reductions in trade volumes between Libya and China there were several 
other direct and indirect implications of the Libyan armed conflict on China’s economic 
interests there. Foremost, as the Libyan government struggled to contain the rebels, let alone 
maintain law and order, construction sites and commercial enterprises were indiscriminately 
looted and destroyed. In the first week of the conflict alone, a report in the Global Times 
suggested that 27 Chinese construction sites were pillaged and wrecked. The wanton 
destruction increased as the conflict intensified. A number of other Chinese companies started 
reporting not just destruction of their properties but also an increase in threat to their 
personnel – leading some to suspend or totally abandon project sites.  
                                                          
231 FOCAC 2011, ‘China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship Annual Report 2010’, FOCAC, 22 June, 
viewed 10 June 2015, http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t832788.htm  
232 Mei, X 2011, ‘China-Libya ties still vital’, China Daily, 2 November, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-11/02/content_14020093.htm 
233 FOCAC 2010, ‘Direct flight route between China and Libya launched’, FOCAC, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t766530.htm  
234 FOCAC 2012, ‘China-Africa trade hits historic high’, FOCAC, 6 July, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t948493.htm  
235 Mei, X 2011, ‘China-Libya ties still vital’, China Daily, 2 November, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-11/02/content_14020093.htm 
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Some, especially the large Chinese firms, took several unorthodox measures, including hiring 
local militias as security details in a bid to protect their assets and at the very least mitigate 
losses. The China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a state-owned enterprise 
that operated in Libya, recorded its on-site equipment, and signed material devolution 
agreements with local management commissions, the military, and customers before 
evacuation. The China National Machinery Industry Corporation (SINOMACH) also made 
arrangements with local staff and residents to guard their assets as Chinese nationals were 
evacuated. But as the fighting intensified, those measures also proved to be ineffective. The 
situation was rather different for most small- and medium-sized enterprises that could neither 
afford private security nor had local political and military connections to have their assets 
protected in their absence.236 For example, Century Huafeng, a medium-sized enterprise from 
the Zheijang province reported extensive attacks, armed robbery and loss of all their 
documents to a fire. It ended up closing the site.  This was the same with other small and 
medium enterprises that continued to suffer major losses due to lack of resources and 
inexperience in risk mitigation strategies in armed conflict situations such as was obtaining in 
Libya. 
For some Chinese firms it was not destruction of property but just the threat of destruction 
that forced them to suspend operations. Large state-owned corporations such as the China 
State Construction Engineering Corporation announced suspension of operations because its 
20 000 residential construction project worth 17.6 billion Yuan (US$2.68 billion) was under 
threat. The China Railway Construction Corporation left behind US$4.24 billion worth of 
unfinished projects in Libya. State-run Metallurgical Corporation of China suspended two 
projects worth 5.13 billion Yuan, 237  while Sinohydro Corporation and the China 
Communications Construction Corporation also suspended their multi-billion dollar projects. 
Since most of these large firms worked on contracted projects financed by the Gaddafi 
government which also guaranteed their security, they found it fairly easy to suspend 
operations without fear of incurring as large losses as the small and medium enterprises.  
                                                          
236 Zhang, J & Wei, WX 2012, ‘Managing political risks of Chinese contracted projects in Libya’, Project 
Management Journal, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 49. 
237 ‘China counting financial losses in Libya’ 2011, Global Times, 4 March, viewed 10 June 2015, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/629817.shtml  
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In addition, UN sanctions against Libya’s National Oil Corporation, and other Libyan oil 
companies decreased income from oil and gas upon which the Libyan economy was overly 
dependent. Further sanctions and asset freezes against major Libyan financial investment 
vehicles controlled by the Gaddafi regime as well as the central bank of Libya translated the 
intrastate armed conflict into an economic crisis. As a result, Libya’s real GDP shrunk by 27.8% 
in 2011, and oil production plummeted to almost zero.  The consequential reduction of the 
Libyan government’s revenue was particularly detrimental to Chinese firms because most of 
their Libyan projects were contracted projects commissioned and financed by the Libyan 
government. With sources of revenue drastically reduced and fiscal focus flatly placed on 
containing the rebellion, the Libyan government’s capacity to meet its financial and contractual 
obligations to Chinese firms was further reduced. Because “overseas contracted projects are 
characterised as long-lasting and requiring input in the prophase”238 Chinese companies had 
already expended large amounts of their money ahead of time setting-up fixed assets such as 
offices and purchasing equipment and materials such as construction equipment and raw 
materials. Most Chinese companies ended up losing those initial investments, and despite 
assistance from the Chinese government, they are still struggling to get compensation for their 
losses from the Libyan government.  
Loss of revenue due to UN sanctions and the combined effect of suspension and abandonment 
of projects due to intensified fighting between rebels and Gaddafi’s forces meant further losses 
of revenue by Chinese firms. In particular, revenue in the form of “performance bonds, 
advance payment bonds, to maintain the normal operation of projects”239 was lost due to force 
majeure, a common clause in business contracts that relieves both parties of their contractual 
obligations when events such as war that are beyond the control of both parties prevent them 
from fulfilling their contractual obligations. The loss of revenue meant that Chinese firms could 
not pay their suppliers and other contractors, giving the Chinese firms poor global credit ratings.  
To pacify reports that Chinese investments in Libya had gone to waste, Zhu Weidong, deputy-
director of the African Law and Society Research Centre at the Xiangtan University in Hunan 
Province, wrote in Global Times that the losses were not as severe because most Chinese 
companies had received 15% of their payments in advance from Libyan outsourcers in order to 
                                                          
238 Zhang, J & Wei, WX 2012, ‘Managing political risks of Chinese contracted projects in Libya’, Project 
Management Journal, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 46. 
239 ‘Chinese enterprises in Libya investment list’ [中国企业在利比亚投资情况一览 ] 2011, SOHU 
Finance, 23 August, viewed 10 June 2015, http://business.sohu.com/20110823/n317112596.shtml  
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purchase necessary materials and equipment before construction projects began. He explained 
that apart from three companies that had completed over 30% of their projects, such as Beijing 
Hongfu Group, Beijing Construction Engineering Group, and China State Construction 
Engineering Group, which had completed 50% of its contracted project, the rest of the 
enterprises did not incur major loses. However, data published by the Ministry of Commerce 
showed that 50 projects undertaken by 75 Chinese companies worth approximately US$18.8 
billion had been severely affected by the Libyan conflict.240  
Further exacerbating the loss for Chinese companies operating in Libya is that domestic banks 
made compensation claims against some Chinese companies. Media in China reported that 
Sahara Bank, which is part of the French bank BNP Paribas, had already made compensation 
claims for advance payment guaranteed by the bank against several Chinese companies. 
Affected companies included the state-owned engineering and construction company, China 
Gezhouba Group Corporation, as well as Sinohydro Corporation, and the Beijing Hongfu 
Construction and Engineering Group. Hu Jiangu, director of the Chinese Academy of 
International Trade and Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce, explained 
that it was improper for Sahara Bank to make such claims because there still was half a year 
before the guarantee expired. He also argued that advance payment guarantees are for use by 
local Libyan developers who would have made advance payments to Chinese enterprises 
engaged in construction projects, and get bank guarantees to hedge risks against that payment. 
Nonetheless, Sahara Bank made a claim of about 400 million Yuan (US$61 million) against 
Beijing Hongfu Construction and Engineering Group. Other sources suggested that the biggest 
claim of an undisclosed amount was against China Gezhouba Group. Overall, the net effect of 
such claims is that credit ratings of Chinese companies were negatively affected.241  
In addition to losses of revenue, assets and equipment, Chinese companies also incurred 
evacuation and resettlement expenses for their Chinese workers in Libya. Although Chinese 
nationals were not specifically targeted, the intensity of the fighting and destruction of some 
Chinese projects made it impossible for their safety and security to be guaranteed. Also there 
was a growing anti-foreigner sentiment across Libya, particularly against nationals of countries 
                                                          
240 Zhu W 2011, ‘Business losses in Libya bloated by careless media’, Global Times, 21 April, viewed 10 
June 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/647393.shtml  
241 Li, Q 2011, ‘Compensation claims may weigh on business losses in Libya: report’, Global Times, 28 
March, viewed 12 June 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/638773.shtml  
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that were perceived as supporting the Gaddafi regime. As highlighted above, major Chinese 
firms were somewhat aligned to the Gaddafi regime because they were contracted and paid by 
his government. All these factors increased threats against Chinese nationals. Chinese firms 
were therefore compelled to arrange for the evacuation and resettlement of their workers to 
secure areas within Libya, and if they had the means, back to China. Although the Chinese 
government ended up assisting with the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, most 
companies had already started the evacuation process before. In the end, approximately 36 
000 Chinese nationals who had been working on various projects in both private and state-
owned companies were evacuated from Libya.  
 
5.7 China’s intervention in Libyan armed conflict 
The monumental impact of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict on Chinese businesses and 
economic interests was largely undisputed; but in a bid to avoid public discontent, China’s 
Ministry of Commerce attempted to play down the nature of companies affected and the 
extent of their losses. Zhong Man-ying, Director of the Department of West Asia and Africa 
under the Ministry of Commerce, put the figure of affected Chinese firms at a modest 26, and 
disputed that China had direct investments in Libya or that state-owned companies had been 
affected. However, reports soon emerged suggesting that as many as 75 Chinese firms, 
including at least 13 state-owned enterprises, had approximately US$18-20 billion worth of 
investments at the time of the conflict in Libya. Those media reports, as well as the fact that 
over 35,000 Chinese nationals were marooned in Libya, increased pressure on Beijing to show 
effort toward protecting and guaranteeing the security of Chinese nationals and interests 
abroad.  
That it was the first time China had been confronted by an intrastate armed conflict in Africa 
which had such a direct, visible, and grand scale effect on its interests and nationals abroad 
became obvious as the conflict intensified. Besides exposing China’s unpreparedness, lack of 
contingency planning, and inability to take concrete and decisive action regarding foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts, the Libyan conflict put China in an embarrassing Catch-22 situation. 
On the one hand, its foreign policy principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states proscribed it from taking any direct action in Libya, but on the other hand, there was 
increasing domestic pressure for the PRC to protect Chinese nationals and interests abroad, 
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and also incessant calls internationally for Beijing to act like a responsible global power able to 
actively participate in global efforts toward resolving conflicts. Both the international and 
domestic demands for China to take action entailed some level of intervention in the internal 
affairs of Libya, putting Beijing in a quandary – whether to take action and risk flouting its own 
foreign policy principle of non-intervention, or not take any action to protect its nationals and 
interests abroad and risk losing credibility among the Chinese. Balancing the different interests 
proved to be tricky for Beijing and as discussed below, it reflected itself in its ambivalent 
interventionist strategies as it got to grips with a changing perception of foreign intrastate 
armed conflicts as threatening to its interests abroad.   
 
5.7.1 Non-intervention 
China’s relations with African countries is predicated on the principle of non-intervention in 
their internal affairs, and that includes intrastate armed conflicts. There were some exceptions 
though, as discussed in Chapter 4 during Africa’s struggle for independence and when China 
was engaged in competition against the Soviet Union over geopolitical influence in Africa, it 
supported anti-Soviet liberation war groups and rebels across the continent. That was in the 
1950s, 60s and 70s, since then, there have been rare cases of significant Chinese intervention in 
Africa’s intrastate armed conflicts. Part of the reason is that unlike armed conflicts in its 
immediate Asian region, intrastate armed conflicts in Africa posed no particular direct threats 
to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic and political interests, or even to its 
nationals working there. Before outbreak of Libya’s intrastate armed conflict, threats to China’s 
national interests and nationals working and living in African countries were minor and limited 
to isolated cases of kidnappings, robberies and in rare cases murder, which normally was of a 
civilian nature. In such cases, the responsibility to protect Chinese nationals and its overseas 
investments fell on the Chinese firms operating abroad and mostly on the hosting African state. 
So, since there had never been an intrastate armed conflict that threatened its interests and 
nationals at a scale as that of Libya, Beijing generally viewed intrastate armed conflicts in Africa 
as non-threatening to its nationals and national interests there. Thus, Beijing and most Chinese 
firms in Africa emphasised commercial risk rather than political and security risk management. 
The focus on commercial risk rather than political and security risk made sense because in most 
cases major Chinese investments were a result of bilateral consultations between the Chinese 
government and the respective African government in which the investments would be based. 
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Libya was not an exception. Huge energy and infrastructure development projects, especially 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises, were often a result of state-to-state consultations 
between Beijing and Tripoli. In addition, because it was the Libyan government that contracted 
Chinese firms to undertake infrastructure development projects, such as building of university 
towns and rail construction, it guaranteed their security. It was therefore a forgone conclusion 
that the security of the Chinese firms and nationals working on those projects was the 
responsibility of the Libyan government. So when the Libyan intrastate armed conflict began, 
the Chinese government made frantic demands on Gaddafi’s regime to guarantee the security 
of Chinese investments in that country as well as to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals 
working there.  
In cases where intrastate armed conflicts and political instability threatened Chinese 
investments and nationals in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan or 
Nigeria, Beijing’s strategy was to prop up regimes in those countries through financial, 
diplomatic and sometimes military assistance, as well as through formal and informal networks 
with ruling elites in those countries. For as long as those ruling elites remained in power, 
Chinese interests, nationals, and investments in those countries were secure. The existence of 
such an inter-reliant relationship between the security of China’s foreign investments and the 
security of regimes in some African countries was, however, problematic. A major challenge for 
China is still that if the regime that guaranteed security of its interests, firms, and nationals is 
overthrown, then its interests, investments and nationals operating in that country would be 
exposed, or in some cases targeted by the new regime for their (perceived) support of the 
fallen regime. It is therefore not surprising that at the beginning of Libya’s intrastate armed 
conflict, Chinese foreign policymakers perceived it to be another internal conflict that the 
Gaddafi regime was able to quash without much ado; hence they were convinced that for as 
long as the Gaddafi regime remained in power, its nationals and investments were secure, 
meaning there was no need for Beijing to take any intervention action until it was clear that the 
Gaddafi regime was losing power.   
As in all cases where China evoked non-interventionism, it was notably silent regarding the 
Libyan conflict, something that reflected its initial confidence in the ability of the Gaddafi 
regime to restore order. The media in China also largely ignored the conflict until foreigners 
working in Libya were targeted in xenophobic attacks. With over 35,000 Chinese nationals 
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under threat who were working on various projects worth approximately US$20 billion, it 
seemed only natural that the media turned its attention to their plight.  In addition to 
heightened media attention to threats of losing major investments and Chinese nationals, 
domestic public opinion242 and growing popularity of the issue on Weibo forced the Chinese 
government to at least acknowledge the Libyan conflict and consider taking some level of 
action to avoid domestic public discontent. Being careful to avoid picking any sides in the 
conflict or issuing statements perceivable as interference in the Libyan intrastate armed 
conflict, Beijing issued several statements urging parties in the conflict to resolve their 
differences amicably and guarantee the security of civilians, particularly Chinese nationals.  
However, with intensification of the conflict, Beijing’s calls for dialogue and protection of 
foreigners rang hollow because they were devoid of action.  
Three other reasons explain China’s silence at the beginning of the conflict and then the tepid 
statements urging parties in the Libyan conflict to resolve their differences peacefully that 
followed. First, it considered the Libyan state to be more centralised, and capable of reigning in 
the protestors than had been the case for the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt respectively. Indeed, in the initial stages of the protests, the 
Gaddafi regime appeared in control and able to restrict the protests within particular areas 
such as Benghazi. Also, Gaddafi’s defiance and violent crackdown on protestors gave an 
impression that he was determined to quash the demonstrations before they spread across 
Libya. Focusing on Gaddafi’s ruthlessness and determination, Chinese foreign policy makers 
saw no need to intervene or take a decisive position regarding the conflict. They reasoned that 
the protests and demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime were a passing phase, and based 
on previous effects of other Arab Spring protests in countries neighbouring Libya, it was 
Beijing’s view that the Libyan conflict was not worthy of meddling into the murky waters of 
Arab conflicts, hence it adopted political passivity and avoided taking any concrete position or 
action regarding the protests as it had done in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. Also, China 
regarded the Gaddafi regime to be more powerful and stable and incapable of being 
overthrown by a group of protestors.  
The second reason is that China separated business from politics. Its deputy foreign minister, 
Zhou Wenzhong, had said, “business is business. We try to separate politics from business” 
                                                          
242 Sun, Y 2014, Africa in China’s foreign policy, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., p.10 
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(Whalley 2011, p. 235). The underlying philosophy of that principle was that for as long as 
internal conflicts did not affect its business interests there was no need to intervene. Since 
previous conflicts of a similar nature in Tunisia and Egypt had not significantly affected Chinese 
investments or threatened Chinese nationals living in those countries, there was no need for 
Beijing to take action. Not taking action meant that China would let the Gaddafi regime deal 
with the conflict on its own. Moussa Koussa, the former Libyan foreign affairs minister, 
criticised China for taking that position in African matters. He argued that “genuine cooperation 
must include politics… and should not be limited to building roads and schools. It is true that 
this is required, but international cooperation is not based on constructing buildings and giving 
aid, but rather through political positions" (Shichor 2014, p. 128).  
The third reason is that “there was no love lost between Beijing and the Gaddafi regime” 
(Calabrese 2013, p. 10). As discussed above, Gaddafi had only visited Beijing once in 1982, and 
the last high-ranking officials from Beijing had last visited Libya in 2006. Besides, diplomatic 
relations were tense due to continued semi-official relations between Libya and Taiwan. To 
China, Muammar Gaddafi was nothing to get concerned about except when he (Gaddafi) 
justified his government’s crackdown on protestors by saying “the unity of China was more 
important than those people on Tiananmen Square.” To that, Beijing responded by censuring 
all media reference to the crackdown on protestors in Libya, and in particular, Gaddafi’s 
reference to Tiananmen Square. Apart from that censorship, China did not make any significant 
changes to its stance of non-intervention in the initial phases of the Libyan conflict.  
 
5.7.2 Transition from non-intervention to pragmatic intervention 
Mass revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt left Beijing’s foreign policy of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states unscathed – the majority of protests in the Arab world had not 
turned into full scale intrastate armed conflicts. But Libya turned out to be different. As the 
Gaddafi regime began using heavy military equipment and live ammunition to disperse 
protestors243 in order to reassert its authority, the mass protests escalated into an armed 
conflict that attracted global attention. Also, in protest against Gaddafi’s harsh military tactics, 
professional army personnel defected with their weapons and joined civilian protestors, adding 
a new military dynamic to the mass protests. To replace the defectors and strengthen his forces, 
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Gaddafi used the country’s oil wealth to recruit a private army of mercenaries from sub-
Saharan African countries such as Niger, Chad and Mali. In retaliation, protestors organised 
themselves into armed rebel armies, which in turn escalated the protests into a fully-fledged 
armed conflict. This had not been the case in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt or Algeria, but as put by 
Jack A. Goldstone, when protestors started using violent action, the Gaddafi regime was 
emboldened in its use of more violent force even against unarmed civilians, as it depicted them 
“as a threat to social order, and justified using repressive tactics against them” (Goldstone 2012, 
p. 115). Using mercenaries244 and special guard units loyal to him, Gaddafi vowed to track down 
and kill the protestors ‘house by house’ like rats,245 which resulted in indiscriminate violence 
against civilians perceived to be anti-Gaddafi. Faced with such a formidable and determined 
Gaddafi force, the armed protestors then sought international support to militarily fight against 
the Gaddafi regime leading to international involvement in the conflict.  
A combination of internationalisation of the Libyan conflict, and increasing inability of the 
Gaddafi regime to guarantee security of foreign investments and foreign nationals, all drew 
Beijing’s attention. In addition, the threat to Chinese nationals raised domestic demands for 
Beijing to protect its nationals abroad, effectively bringing to question China’s perception of 
and response to threats emanating from African intrastate armed conflicts. What also drew the 
ire of Chinese officials is that as soon as rebels organised themselves into the National 
Transitional Council, they issued veiled warnings to China because of its passive resistance to 
their struggle against the Gaddafi regime. Because some of Chinese investments and projects in 
Libya were a result of its bilateral arrangements with the Gaddafi regime rather than being 
pure business contracts, they were vulnerable to changes of government. 246 With several of its 
state-owned enterprises such as CNPC and the China Railway Construction Company having 
won large contracts, and over 75 other Chinese companies operating in the country, in addition 
to over 35 000 Chinese nationals in Libya, China’s strict adherence to its foreign policy principle 
of non-intervention in Libya’s armed conflict was put to the test. Also put to the test was its 
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long-held perception that foreign intrastate armed conflicts, or more generally political issues 
in African countries, were non-threatening to its interests in those countries.  
The above factors combined to put pressure on Beijing to take action in order to protect both 
its foreign investments and nationals in Libya.247 The factors also compelled China to consider 
political instability in Africa to be threatening to its interests there, thus its perception of the 
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya metamorphosed from being regarded as a non-threatening 
internal issue to being regarded as threatening. The effect was a re-consideration of its 
absolute non-intervention approach to the Libyan conflict. But what proved to be a challenge 
for Beijing, and what influenced the rest of its responsive action to the Libyan conflict, was the 
need to strike a balance between protecting its interests in Libya and maintaining its foreign 
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. It is here that pragmatism 
proved to be an asset for China. From passive and tepid statements urging parties to the Libyan 
conflict to resolve their disputes through dialogue, Beijing experimented with both multilateral 
and bilateral actions aimed at protecting its interests in Libya. In particular, it found multilateral 
interventions to be a discreet intervention option which struck a delicate balance between its 
identity as a non-interventionist power, and intervening to protect its nationals and 
investments under threat in Libya. 
 
5.7.3 China’s complicity in multilateral intervention in the Libyan intrastate 
armed conflict 
To strike a balance between non-intervention and protecting its interests and nationals in Libya, 
Beijing chose United Nations-led multilateral intervention. The first UN multilateral action that 
China supported was imposition of sanctions against members of Gaddafi’s family and inner 
circle. On 26 February 2011, a few weeks after the Libyan mass demonstrations escalated, 
China opted not to veto UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) when it was tabled for 
adoption at the 6 491st meeting of the Security Council. Among other things, the resolution 
condemned “the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of 
peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting 
unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made 
from the highest level of the Libyan government.” Have placed responsibility for the ‘hostility 
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and violence’ against the civilian population on political leaders in Gaddafi’s government, the 
Security Council referred the situation to the International Criminal Court for investigation and 
imposed an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on Gaddafi, his family and close officials.  
Beijing’s support for imposition of sanctions and referral of the Libyan situation to the 
International Criminal Court was in stark contrast to its principle of non-intervention in Libya’s 
internal conflict, since as previously put by its Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, China 
is “also against embargoes” (Whalley 2011, p. 253). This is because, previously China had 
vetoed UNSC resolutions that imposed sanctions on countries such as Zimbabwe, Burma, North 
Korea, and Sri Lanka for gross human rights violations and violence against civilians. Its 
argument in those several cases was that imposition of sanctions against a sitting head of state 
amounted to interference in his/her country’s internal affairs. It further reasoned that such like 
resolutions did not assist in resolving conflicts, but instead tend to escalate the situation. 
Speaking after vetoing a resolution that sought to impose sanctions against Mugabe and his 
government in Zimbabwe, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao argued that 
“passing a sanctions resolution against Zimbabwe would not help to encourage the various 
factions there to engage in political dialogue and negotiations and achieve results.”248 
Considering that initially China advocated political dialogue amongst warring parties in Libya, 
and that the Libyan government was not agreeable to sanctions being imposed against its 
leaders or that the situation be referred to the ICC “it was impossible for China to support UN 
intervention” (Shih and Huang 2014, p. 147) but it did. 
Against its tradition of non-intervention and opposition to sanctions, China still voted in favour 
of sanctions against Gaddafi’s regime.249 Its ambassador to the United Nations justified his 
country’s deviance by arguing that regional organisations such as the Arab League, the African 
Union, and the Secretary General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference were in favour 
of the resolution as a way of compelling Gaddafi to the mediation table. In proffering that 
argument China absolved itself of the responsibility to explain why it had deviated from its non-
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intervention principle. Furthermore, based on its UNSC voting history, China is not known to be 
influenced by pressure from regional or non-international organisations, but by its own 
interests. So even though it explained its support of the resolution on the basis that it was in 
the interest of cooperation with the international community, and stability of Libya, the 
overarching reason is that the Resolution enabled protection of its investments and nationals in 
Libya.  It also allayed concerns from the international community that it was passively 
condoning the massacre of civilians by the Gaddafi regime.  
With domestic pressure increasing over China’s seeming inability to protect it nationals and 
interests abroad, Resolution 1970 was critical to disproving its critics.  The resolution 
“expressed concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya…. [Urging] the Libyan authorities to ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and 
their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country.”250 In fact 
Ambassador Li Baodong’s statement after voting for Resolution 1970 confirmed that the 
immediate cessation of violence through peaceful means such as dialogue were important 
insofar as they guaranteed that the safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya was 
assured throughout the process.251 Thus China’s voting in favour of the resolution was also 
meant to prove to its citizens concerned about the welfare of their compatriots in Libya that it 
was taking serious efforts to protect them and secure national interests abroad. 
Despite Beijing’s justification, Resolution 1970 was a collective intervention into the internal 
affairs of Libya, to which Beijing took part by voting in favour of the resolution. From a 
functional perspective, the UNSC Resolution tilted the balance of power in the Libyan conflict in 
favour of the rebels rather that the Gaddafi regime because the arms embargo, asset freeze 
and travel ban was imposed on officials in Gaddafi’s regime only. By cutting off the supply of 
weapons, and financial resources, the UNSC Resolution set up Gaddafi to fail in the ensuing 
intrastate armed conflict. China’s complicity in the collective intervention in Libya’s intrastate 
armed conflict is confirmed by attempts by Beijing to exonerate itself for the subsequent 
military intervention by NATO. Ambassador Li Baodong justified China’s support of the UNSC 
intervention in Libya by saying that China had voted in favour of the Resolution after taking into 
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account the special situation in Libya, and regard for concerns and views of Arab and African 
countries. Still that did not change the fact that according to China, imposition of sanctions on 
the government of another state is interference in that country’s domestic affairs. In fact, that 
was the basis China had vetoed other UN resolutions that sought to impose sanctions on 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the military junta in Burma, and the leaders of North Korea. 
According to Joel Wuthnow, China acted to protect its investments and nationals because “on 
Libya, China observed a leader acting erratically and endangering not only oil producing 
facilities in rebel-held eastern part of the country, but also the lives of some 40,000 of Chinese 
citizens, who would later have to be evacuated” (2013, p. 131). 
The second UN mandated multilateral intervention was declaration of a no-fly zone in Libya. 
Instead of voting in favour, this time China abstained, resulting in adoption of UNSC Resolution 
1973 (2011) on 17 March 2011. The resolution was compelled by failure of the Gaddafi regime 
to comply with Resolution 1970(2011); as well as continued escalation of state-sponsored 
violence against civilians, and systematic human rights violations such as arbitrary detentions, 
enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions. Circumstances leading to adoption 
of the resolution are important to understanding why China’s abstention signified its intent to 
use multilateral institutions to resolve the Libyan conflict. First, building on its argument that 
on Libya it was guided by wishes of regional organisations, China claimed to have abstained 
because the Council of the League of Arab States had resolved at an extraordinary session held 
in Cairo, Egypt on 12 March 2011 to “call on the Security Council to bear its responsibility 
towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take the necessary measures to impose 
immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places 
exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people 
and foreign nationals residing in Libya.”252  
However more importantly, China and the rest of UNSC members were aware that Mustafa 
Abdel-Jalil, leader of the National Transitional Council, had lobbied regional organisations, the 
European Union, and for United States to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. For example, on 
March 10, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil met Nicholas Sarkozy, the then president of France; subsequent 
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to their meeting, Sarkozy announced France’s recognition of NTC as the legitimate government 
of Libya. Nicholas Sarkozy then lobbied other EU members at the EU summit in Brussels on 11 
March 2011 to support the no-fly zone proposal, arguing that “the strikes would be solely of a 
defensive nature if Mr. Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-
violent protesters.”253 True to NTC’s wishes, Resolution 1973 (2011) authorised member states 
“acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation 
with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”254 It then 
imposed a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya in order to help protect civilians and authorised 
Member States to strictly enforce the arms embargo and an asset freeze on Libyan government 
institutions such as the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign Bank, the Libyan 
National Oil Corporation, and Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, as well as the assets of 
officials within the Gaddafi inner circle. Of the fifteen countries in the UN Security Council, ten 
voted in favour of the Resolution with five (China, Brazil, Germany, India and Russia) abstaining. 
With knowledge of NTC’s lobbying of both regional organisations as well as European powers 
and the United States, it was insincere for China to argue that in abstaining it was merely 
following the wishes of regional organisations, when it was clear that the no-fly zone was 
intended to incapacitate the Gaddafi regime for the benefit of the NTC.  
By decapitating Gaddafi’s air force, Resolution 1973 skewed the armed conflict in favour of the 
National Transitional Council, which by that time was already engaged in a full armed combat 
against the Gaddafi regime. China’s withholding of its veto on Resolution 1973 was in more 
ways than one a passive consent to a multilateral military intervention in the Libyan conflict. As 
put by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, “a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to 
destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes 
around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that’s the way it 
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starts.”255 Chinese diplomats at the United Nations and foreign policy makers in Beijing were 
aware of these dynamics, and its abstention was calculated to give the impression that it was 
opposed to the intervention but only gave in in order not to spoil international efforts toward 
resolving the conflict. This was a convenient excuse for China because it helped it maintain the 
façade and re-assure African countries opposed to the Resolution that it still adhered to 
principles of non-intervention.  
China’s insincerity soon emerged when NATO began bombing Gaddafi’s air force installations 
just as Robert Gates had warned. As soon as African countries started complaining against what 
they termed Western military intervention in Libya, China quickly joined them, arguing that it 
had supported the resolution out of the impression that it was meant to protect civilians rather 
than institute regime change. If indeed China believed that, which is highly unlikely, it was 
naive of its foreign policy makers to think that by abstaining it was not participating in military 
intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict because China’s abstention from UNSC 
resolution 1973 paved way for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. China’s “abstention over 
Resolution 1973 allowed it to walk a tight rope between supporting intervention and adhering 
to its non-interference principle” (Kassim 2014, p. 35). As a result of that abstention, Yun Sun 
argues, that “China sees its acquiescence as directly contributing to the fall of Muammar 
Qaddafi” (2012, p. 1). For that is what China had done: it had together with other Western 
powers militarily intervened in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict and effectively assisted the 
NTC to topple the Gaddafi regime. 
 
5.7.4 Engagement with the NTC and mediation attempts 
At the height of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, China made unprecedented steps toward 
reaching out to both parties in the conflict. Xinhua described the reaching out to warring 
parties in Libya as “taking a practical and constructive approach to the Libya issue by mediating 
between the two conflicting sides.”256 By any stretch of the practice of mediation, China’s 
reaching out to both the Gaddafi regime and the NTC, was in no way a mediation effort. In 
many respects it turned out to be more of a public relations exercise meant to curry favour 
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with the NTC which Beijing had snubbed since its formation. Part of the reason for its action is 
that as the conflict intensified, it became clear that the NTC was gaining international 
recognition as the legitimate representative of Libya from countries such as France, Britain, the 
United States, and some Arab countries. Beijing therefore reasoned that continued snubbing of 
the NTC was not going to be in its best interest, especially after the NTC announced that in the 
reconstruction phase it was going to give preference to businesses from countries that had 
supported its struggle against the Gaddafi regime. Up to that point China had not made any 
direct contact with the NTC or openly supported its struggle against Gaddafi; it therefore made 
the unprecedented step to make contact with them even though Gaddafi’s regime was still in 
power. This was contrary to Beijing’s own non-intervention principle which inhibits contact 
with opposition groups in another country because it constitutes intervention in that country’s 
internal affairs.  
The first confirmed contact between China and the National Transitional Council happened on 
2 June 2011 when China’s Ambassador to Qatar, Zhang Zhiliang, met NTC Chairman Mustafa 
Abdel Jalil in Doha, Qatar.257 A statement by China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei 
confirmed the meeting but did not provide intricate details except that “the two sides 
exchanged views on the Libyan situation” and that “the Libyan crisis can be resolved through 
political means and that the future of Libya is decided by the Libyan people.”258 Following the 
first meeting in Doha, Li Lianhe, a Chinese diplomat in Egypt, met with Mustafa Abdel Jalil when 
he visited the headquarters of NTC in Benghazi on 6 June 2011. As part of his visit he inspected 
the humanitarian situation and property of Chinese businesses in Benghazi.259 Subsequently, on 
22 June 2011, Mustafa Abdel Jalil visited Beijing on a two-day visit, during which he met Yang 
Jiechi, China’s foreign minister. In the meeting, Foreign Minister Yang said, “since its creation, 
the NTC has increased its representativeness and gradually become a major political force. 
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China sees it as an important dialogue partner.”260  In addition, a statement by China’s foreign 
ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, confirmed that to China, the National Transitional Council was 
indispensable to resolving the conflict in Libya for the benefit of its businesses, hence its 
readiness “to stay in contact with all parties including the Libyan National Transitional Council 
to push for an early political settlement of the Libyan crisis.”261  
In honour of its pledge to stay in contact with the NTC, on 6 July 2011 Chen Xuedong, Director-
General of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs in China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs met members of the NTC including deputy head of the NTC Executive Office, Ali 
al-Isawi, and head of the Executive Board’s foreign affairs office. The meeting had two main 
objectives: the first was to implore the NTC to support African Union’s mediation efforts. To 
that effect, Chen reiterated China’s recognition of the NTC as an ‘important dialogue partner’ 
critical to resolving the conflict in Libya through political dialogue and settlement. The second 
and more important reason for the meeting came to light when Chen sought assurances from 
the NTC that it would guarantee the safety of Chinese nationals and assets in areas that it 
controlled.262 The NTC officials undertook to protect Chinese nationals working in Libya and 
their property and expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to strengthen relations and 
promote a peaceful settlement of the Libyan crisis.263 
Although the Chinese foreign minister had met with Libya’s foreign minister (General People's 
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya) Abdul Ati Al-Obeidi, a 
special envoy of the Gaddafi regime in Beijing on 8 June 2011,264 it is Beijing’s contact with the 
NTC that is an exception to its non-interference policy. By China’s own definition of 
interference in the internal affairs of another state, establishing ties and maintaining relations 
with the NTC while the Gaddafi regime was still in power was a direct bilateral intervention in 
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the Libyan intrastate armed conflict. Global Times, a media outlet that “often reflects 
conservative, and even nationalistic, opinions that do not represent the official line”265 justified 
China’s engagement with both the NTC and the Libyan regime in the following terms: “closer 
contact with Libya’s two camps shows China is dedicated to helping seek peaceful and quicker 
solution to the protracted civil strife in the North African country.” Nonetheless, the most 
significant motivating factor in meeting both sides was revealed in China’s official media, which 
suggested that maintaining close contact with both sides to the Libyan conflict enabled China 
to comprehensively keep abreast with the current condition of its investments and assets.  
The coinciding of China’s ‘mediation’ efforts with international recognition of the NTC at the 
expense of the Gaddafi regime implied a pragmatic intervention by China meant to mend 
fences with the NTC before it assumed total control of Libya. That way, whichever side won, 
Chinese investments would have been secured. Articles jointly published in Global Times and 
Xinhua concurred: “It is only natural that China is keeping a close eye on its investments there” 
266 by keeping “closer contact with both sides… China assess the latest development in Libya 
more comprehensively, know the current condition of its investments and assets there more 
clearly, including uncompleted infrastructure projects and equipment, and better protects its 
lawful and justifiable investment interests there.”267 Another article published in Xinhua also 
argued that the ‘mediation’ was pragmatic because “Libya’s prolonged civil war… posed serious 
threats to foreign investments, including those of China, in the country.”268 The ‘mediation’ was 
therefore meant to protect Chinese interests and nationals in Libya rather than seriously 
mediate between the warring parties. The main motivation was to gather information on the 
state of its investments as well as ensure their security. 
Furthermore, three years later, Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Envoy for African Affairs, 
confirmed that China had indeed violated its own non-intervention principle when he said: “I 
think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries… we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition… 
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when you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.”269 Yin Gang, an African 
affairs expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of West Asian and African 
Studies interpreted Beijing’s meeting with opposition leaders in foreign countries which have 
intrastate armed conflicts as part of its mediation efforts.270 But, as put by Zhong Jianhua, 
meeting rebels or opposition forces amounts to intervention in another country’s internal 
affairs. However, He Wenping, Director of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, in justification of the PRC’s reaching out to the NTC while Gaddafi was still in power, 
said: “once things became clear, and we knew that even the people in Tripoli supported the 
NTC (National Transitional Council), there was no reason for China not to support the NTC, and 
then we recognised the NTC and give them support.”271 He Wenping “often reflects China’s 
position on Africa issues” (Shinn 2013), thus her statement confirms arguments that China only 
recognised the NTC in order to protect its investments and guarantee its businesses’ return to 
Libya. 
Also suggesting China’s mediation efforts were insincere are allegations published in a Final 
Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) 
concerning Libya. Media reports suggested that the Gaddafi regime had tried to secure arms 
from China in violation of the arms embargo. Although The Guardian newspaper noted that 
further research was required to determine whether or not the violation occurred, other media 
reports insisted that the state-owned China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), China 
Precision Machinery Import-Export Company, and China Xinxing Import and Export Company 
negotiated with Libyan officials in Beijing to buy arms worth approximately US$200 million in 
July 2011 in breach of the UNSC arms embargo.272 According to Denny Roy, documents 
                                                          
269 Fabricius, P 2014. ‘Beijing’s peacemaking efforts in South Sudan.’ Institute for Security Studies, 6 
November, viewed 21 December 2014, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/beijings-peacemaking-efforts-
in-south-sudan 
270 Zhou, L 2014, ‘Chinese diplomats make exception to non-interference rule by meeting South Sudan 
opposition’, South China Morning Post, 5 November, viewed 5 November 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1632138/chinese-diplomats-make-exception-non-
interference-rule-meeting-south  
271 Martin, P & Cohen, D 2011, ‘Through Chinese eyes: He Wenping (part 3)’, The Interpreter, 2 December, 
viewed 12 June 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/02/Through-Chinese-eyes-He-
Wenping-%28Part-3%29.aspx  
272 ‘China confirms weapons firms met Gaddafi envoys in July’ 2011, BBC News, 5 September, viewed 12 
June 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14785688 ; Branigan, T 2011, ‘Chinese arms 
companies ‘offered to sell arms to Gaddafi regime’, The Guardian, 5 September, viewed 12 June 
2015,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/chinese-arms-companies-weapons-gaddafi-
regime  
130 
 
implicating the state-owned Chinese companies were discovered by anti-Gaddafi forces in 
Tripoli. He argues that “the Chinese companies proposed delivering the weapons through 
intermediary countries such as South Africa or Algeria to shield China from criticism” (Roy 2013, 
p. 244). Jiang Yu, spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, admitted that “the Gaddafi 
regime sent representatives to China in July to meet individuals from relevant Chinese 
companies without the knowledge of Chinese government departments.”273 She, however, 
refuted claims by Omar Hariri, head of the transitional government’s military council and the 
Libyan military spokesman, Abdulrahman Busin, that the guns had been delivered to Libya and 
that they had “hard evidence of deals going on between China and Qaddafi,”274 arguing that no 
contracts were signed and no weapons were delivered,275 she maintained that “China exercises 
strict management over all military exports.”276 It is, however, questionable whether Libyan 
officials would visit Beijing and have meetings with state-owned arms companies without the 
knowledge of the Chinese government.  
 
5.7.5 Evacuation and protection of Chinese nationals 
The magnitude of threat to Chinese nationals in Libya was greater than at any point in the 
history of China-Africa engagement. As it became clear that the intrastate armed conflict in 
Libya was intensifying and that foreigners were in danger, domestic pressure on the Chinese 
government to secure the lives of Chinese nationals increased. In fact, one of the major reasons 
China had supported UN intervention in Libya and engaged in low-key mediation efforts was to 
secure its nationals in Libya. As put by Maximilian Terhalle, “another key driver behind’s China’s 
support of UN intervention in Libya was to protect its citizens” (2015, p. 170). In February 2011 
China chartered planes from Air China and buses and ocean liners from Greece and Malta in 
order to evacuate Chinese citizens in Libya. Most of the Chinese nationals stranded in Libya 
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were employees of Chinese companies operating there.277 In total China evacuated 35,860 
nationals from Libya with assistance from countries such as Greece, Malta, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Turkey, and Jordan that provided transportation and temporary shelter to the evacuated 
Chinese nationals. The PLA as well as Chinese companies operating in Libya such as China 
Communications Construction Group and the China Railway Construction Corporation, 
contributed to the evacuation of the Chinese nationals.278 
Some media reports suggested that the Chinese Defence Ministry had authorised the Chinese 
navy to conduct escort missions in the Aden Gulf in order to provide support and protection to 
ships evacuating Chinese nationals in waters surrounding Libya.279 The 4 000 ton missile frigate, 
Xuzhou was diverted from the coast of Somalia on 24 February 2011 “in the Asian power’s first 
naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea and its first deployment of military hardware in a 
civilian evacuation mission.”280 The Xuzhou is armed with weapons that include HHQ-16 
surface-to-air missiles and carries a Z-9 helicopter. According to Jeremy Page the evacuation 
reflected the mounting domestic pressure on Beijing to protect its growing foreign interests 
and increasing numbers of Chinese citizens working abroad. More importantly, it illustrated the 
Chinese Navy’s ability to operate far beyond China’s in order to protect the country’s perceived 
foreign interests.281 President Hu Jintao was quoted saying: “spare no efforts to ensure the 
safety of life and properties of Chinese citizens in Libya.”282 In order to coordinate evacuation 
efforts, “the State Council of China set up the emergency command headquarters to the Libyan 
crisis to lead all relevant organisations to create solutions and negotiate with the Libyan 
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government to protect Chinese expatriates and overseas assets” (Zhang and Wei 2012, p. 48). 
The implication is that while evacuation might not be considered as intervention in the strict 
sense of armed interventions such as the NATO-led military intervention, it involved a violation 
of Libyan sovereignty, and was done without the consent of the Libyan government. But the 
most significant implication is that it transformed China’s perception of threats emanating from 
African intrastate armed conflicts from considering them as inconsequential to its interests in 
Africa, to regarding them as detrimental to both its economic interests and citizens there thus, 
compelling it to modify its non-intervention policy.  
 
5.8 The ambivalence of China’s intervention in Libya 
China’s ambivalent multilateral and unilateral intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed 
conflict reflected a state struggling to reconcile “the nexus of intervention, state sovereignty 
and the use of force” (Richardson 2012, p. 45). In effect, the Libyan conflict  
Set its own precedent for international dilemmas in implementing UN Security Council 
resolutions in support of the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ on the one 
hand, and the involvement of Western military intervention to implement it, on the 
other. The former present[ed] moral pressure, and the latter creat[ed] discomfort. It is 
almost as if the solution is more problematic than the problem (Aybet 2011).  
China was largely unprepared, and to a greater extent was inexperienced to deal with that 
paradox, because before the Libyan conflict, concerning Africa China had successfully portrayed 
an imagery of being able to strike a balance between safeguarding its expanding economic 
interests in Africa, and respecting the host African countries’ sovereignty through non-
intervention in their internal affairs. But as highlighted above, the intrastate armed conflict in 
Libya and its accompanying threats to China’s economic interests scuttled that delicate balance, 
exposing Beijing’s unpreparedness, lack of concrete foreign policy strategy, and inability to 
decisively deal with threats emanating from foreign intrastate armed conflicts.   
As discussed above, the Libyan conflict also tested China’s overriding perception that intrastate 
armed conflicts in Africa were not a threat to its economic interests or nationals there. The 
shock of realising that they actually were a threat to its interests seem to have had a 
transformational effect on how Beijing considered and responded to the threat, and on how it 
reacted to subsequent intrastate armed conflicts in Mali and South Sudan. Part of the 
transformational effect was an incipient change to its overall perception of foreign intrastate 
armed conflicts in Africa as threats to its national interests. Because in most cases the change 
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in threat perception is not usually distinct but gradual, in the case of China, the process of that 
threat perception transformation was characterised by a distinct sense of lack of clarity and 
consistency between rhetoric and action on how to intervene and safeguard its interests in a 
way that balances “its traditional commitment to ‘non-interference’ with its responsibilities as 
a great power” with interests abroad (Pang 2009, p. 237).  
The effect of the recalibration and rethinking process is usually characterised by lack of clarity 
on foreign policy. Thus, as China was compelled to respond spontaneously to the threatening 
effect of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, it did not “know when, where and how to use its 
power” (Wang 2013). The result was ambivalence in its intervention behaviour, which reflected 
itself in the difference between China’s rhetoric and actions in Libya. On the one hand it 
condemned intervention in Libya’s domestic affairs, but on the other, it supported multilateral 
intervention that affected the direction, duration, and outcome of the intrastate armed conflict 
in a direct way. On the one hand it condemned Western manoeuvres toward ousting the 
Gaddafi regime, but on the other, it engaged and recognised the Libyan opposition when 
Gaddafi was still the leader of Libya in blatant violation of its own non-intervention principle.  It 
can therefore be argued that based on how it responded to the Libyan conflict, China’s foreign 
policy was ambivalent, “did not reflect a clear and well developed policy… [and] strong rhetoric 
[was] often used to compensate for weak or incoherent policies.”283 Thus, “China should be 
counted in the group of ambivalent interventionists” (Engelbrekt 2014, p. 51).  
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CHAPTER 6: China and Malian intrastate armed conflicts: A 
responsible, benevolent major power? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As the intrastate armed conflict in Libya ended with the death of Muammar Gaddafi, another 
conflict emerged in Mali. Although different in nature, the Mali and Libya conflicts were 
interlinked in that weapons and Tuaregs who had fought as mercenaries for the Gaddafi regime 
returned to aid the struggle for independence of Northern Mali. While the government of Mali 
struggled to contain the Tuareg rebellion, a group of disgruntled Malian soldiers mutinied and 
overthrew the government in Bamako.  The internationalisation of the conflict, and the fact 
that it had emerged hardly six months after the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, made it 
impossible for China to ignore it as it had done previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in 
Mali. Besides, China had had unbroken diplomatic relations with Mali since 1960. Furthermore, 
there were Chinese nationals and investments in Mali, with the possibility of the conflict 
spiralling into neighbouring countries such as Niger where China has uranium mining 
concessions (Shaw 2013). Again, the question of how China responds to threats posed by 
intrastate armed conflicts on its interests, both direct and indirect, emerged. 
Based on this background, this chapter examines China’s intervention in the Malian intrastate 
armed conflict. Like the previous chapter, it begins by giving a historical analysis of Sino-Mali 
diplomatic, political, and economic relations since diplomatic relations were established in 
1960. In giving the historical analysis of Sino-Mali relations, the focus is on China’s response to 
previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in Mali. The aim is to draw comparisons with its 
intervention in the 2012 coup d’état and the Tuareg rebellion. The argument pursued in this 
chapter is that with hindsight concerning the effect of the Libyan crisis on its interest there, 
China was more alert to the threats the Malian armed conflict potentially had to its interests in 
Mali and the Sahel region.  
 
6.2 China-Mali political and diplomatic relations 
Since establishing diplomatic relations on 27 October 1960, China and Mali maintained 
uninterrupted ties despite adverse internal and external political dynamics in Mali. To start 
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with, in its external relations, even at the peak of Sino-Soviet wrangling in the 1960s, Mali 
maintained ties with both China and the Soviet Union. It was, however, not just Mali that 
played both sides; other independent African states did the same - maintaining political, 
economic and military relations with both China and the Soviet Union, and at times playing the 
two against each other. During the Cold War era, African leaders, according to Lucy Corkin 
were “experts in appearing to emulate the ideologies of their patrons in order to coax out 
further material support,”284 and Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita played that game well. He 
received extensive aid, political support285 and military equipment from the Soviets as well as 
China despite warnings of the Soviet Union’s imperialist tendencies from Beijing. But unlike 
other independent African countries, and to its advantage, Mali pragmatically and consistently 
avoided taking sides in the 1960s Sino-Soviet squabbling – something that Alaba Ogunsanwo 
refers to as “a practical application of the non-alignment principle developed in the period of 
the cold war” (1974, p. 217). Nonetheless, a common anti-imperialist ideology286 in the 
formative years of Malian independence and President Modibo Keita’s “socialist ideology and 
mode of production, with heavy emphasis on the role of the public sector in the economy”287 
inclined Mali toward Mao’s China rather than toward the Soviet Union or France, its former 
colonial master.  
To show the depth of their political and diplomatic relations, Sino-Mali high level official visits 
were common. Official visits between the two countries started off with Premier Zhou En-lai’s 
official tour of ten African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia) between 14 December 1963 and 4 February 1964. As part of the 
maiden official trip by a Chinese national leader to Africa, Premier Zhou visited Mali from 16 to 
21 January 1964. At the time of his visit, several agricultural projects such as rice and sugar 
cane growing, as well as infrastructure development projects were already underway, all 
funded by Chinese money and overseen by Chinese technicians. To show its appreciation for 
the assistance rendered by China, the Malian government went all-out to show its 
indebtedness to Premier Zhou, Vice-Premier Chen Yi, and their entourage. Mali declared “a 
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holiday for all government offices and public and private enterprises in Bamako and its 
outskirts…, [in order] to accord a welcome deserving the great Chinese-Malian friendship.”288 In 
the Malian town of Koulikoro, the Mayor, Mamadou Diarrah made Premier Zhou an honorary 
citizen of Koulikoro. But amidst that pomp and fanfare, in his meetings with President Keita, 
Premier Zhou “enunciated the eight principles observed by the Chinese Government in 
providing economic and technical assistance to other countries.”289 He also “shared with Keita 
China's experiences on governance and economic development, which covered the capacity 
building of the governing party, the elimination of the residues of colonialism and the 
importance of safeguarding economic independence” (Zeng 2014). The thoughts were then 
encapsulated in a joint communique that the two parties published on 21 January 1964. 
Impressed by President Keita’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonial rhetoric and appreciation for 
China’s assistance by Malians, Premier Zhou and Chairman Liu Shao-chi invited President Keita 
to visit China. Within months of Premier Zhou’s departure from Bamako, President Modibo 
Keita led a delegation of fifty-one on a tour of Asia, with Beijing being the main destination. It 
was during his visit in Beijing that the Sino-Mali Treaty of Friendship was signed in November 
1964. With this agreement, several trade and economic agreements were reached. In the same 
mould as the TAZARA railway, China agreed to fund construction of the Guinea-Mali railway. 
The agreement for its financing and construction was signed in May 1968 by China’s finance 
minister Li Hsien-nien and by the Guinean and Malian foreign ministers in the presence of 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Three months after the signing ceremony, Chinese technicians conducted 
the preliminary surveys of the rail project in Mali and Guinea. But four days after they left 
Bamako, President Modibo Keita was overthrown on 19 November 1968 in a coup d’état led by 
Captain Yoro Diakité.290 All in all, from 1960 until 1968, when President Keita’s rule was ended, 
fifty-five Chinese delegates had visited Mali; excluding the fifty-one delegates that visited China 
with President Keita in September 1964, fifty-six Malian delegates visited China (Ogunsanwo 
1974, p. 269,270). 
On taking over power from President Modibo Keita on 19 November 1968, Captain Yoro Diakité 
suspended the constitution and handed over power to a 14-member Comité Militaire de 
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Libération Nationale (CMLN - Military Committee of National Liberation). Under the leadership 
of Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, the CMLN governed Mali from 1969 to 1979. In June 1974, 
Malians approved a new constitution that paved the way for a transition to a civilian 
government. However, in a bid to maintain political power, Traoré’s government sponsored the 
Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM - Malian People’s Democratic Union) which 
Moussa Traoré led. Unsurprisingly he won the 1979 elections, as well as, the successive 
elections until he was deposed in 1992. In all this turmoil, China maintained relations with the 
ruling regime of the day, without any sense of obligation to the deposed governments.  
Unlike his predecessor, Modibo Keita, Moussa Traoré had a pragmatic foreign policy approach. 
He rejuvenated relations with France and opened ties with the United States and other 
Western powers while maintaining close connections with both the Soviet Union and China. In 
comparison, Sino-Mali relations measured by official visits between the two countries 
increased more during Moussa Traoré’s leadership than in Modibo Keita’s. For example, in June 
1973, Moussa Traoré visited China and met with Chairman Mao; he also visited China in August 
1981, June 1986 and January 1989. China seemed to positively reciprocate Traoré’s visits 
because Chinese government, military, and CCP officials, including “Zhang Dazhi, commander 
of the Chinese artillery (May 1971), Geng Biao, Vice-premier (October 1978), Huang Hua, Vice-
premier and concurrently minister of foreign affairs (November 1981), Liu Kai, assistant to 
minister of national defence (March 1982), Tian Jiyun, Vice-premier (December 1984), Wang 
Hanbin, Vice-chairman of the National People's Congress (September 1989, Qian Qichen, 
Member of the State Council and concurrently minister of foreign affairs (January 1992)”291 
visited Mali on official state and party business. 
Despite the seemingly cordial relations between Moussa Traoré’s regime and Beijing, there was 
silence from Beijing when he was deposed by junior officers led by Amadou Touré in 1992. 
Having overseen reform of the constitution and a democratic election, Amadou Touré handed 
over power to the democratically elected government of Alpha Oumar Konaré. President 
Konaré made two state visits to China, in December 1992 and September 1996. Other Malian 
high level officials that visited China during the Konaré regime include Prime Minister Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita (August 1994 and October 1999), Ali Nouhoum Diallo, Speaker of the National 
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Assembly (July 1995), Moussa Balla Coulibaly, Chairman of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council (March 2000), 292  Moctar Ouane, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation (August 2009). Also, “in 2009, Minister of Territorial Administration and Local 
Communities General Kafougouna Kone, Minister of Communications and New Technologies 
Diarra Mariam Flantié Diallo and Minister of Health Oumar Ibrahima Toure visited China.”293 
From China, “General Liu Jingson, commander of Lanzhou Military Zone (July 1995), Major 
General Chen Youqing, Political Commissar of Communications Department of the 
Headquarters of the General Staff (December 1995), General Zhou Kunren, Political Commissar 
of the General Logistics Department (July 2000) and General Chen Bingde, Commander of Jinan 
Military Zone (June 2002) paid visits to the Republic of Mali one after the other.”294 The 
highlight of Sino-Mali political relations during President Amadou Toumani Touré’s time in 
power occurred in February 2009 when President Hu Jintao arrived in Bamako for a one day 
state visit.295  
 
6.3 Sino-Mali economic and trade relations 
Beyond politics, Sino-Mali relations came to be more economically defined soon after Mali’s 
independence. In February 1961, just a year after Mali’s independence, the two countries 
signed a goods and exchange payment agreement, which “called for the export to Mali of 
machinery, farm machines and tools, scientific instruments and electrical appliances, chemicals, 
drugs and medical apparatus, metalware, and steel products, etc., but this could better be 
described as aid, as Mali had at that time relatively little to export to China in return” 
(Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 86).  The 1961 agreement was consummated in November 1964 when 
the two countries signed a treaty of friendship during President Keita’s visit to China at the 
invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai. Following the treaty of friendship, a host of other economic 
and trade agreements, including Chinese technical and financial assistance for construction of a 
radio transmitter, a cinema, and a hotel in Mali were agreed upon. The Chinese government 
bore three-quarters of the projects’ costs, and it also agreed to send technicians to work on the 
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projects. The rest of subsequent projects were funded partly through a US$3 million credit 
facility requested by President Keita’s government, and was advanced to the Central Bank of 
Mali. The credit facility was one of the first cases of an African country requesting loans and 
development assistance from China, and it set the tone for subsequent Sino-Mali engagements.  
China was also quick to bring to fruition the economic and trade undertakings it made to Mali 
soon after establishing diplomatic relations. By January 1962, three months after signing the 
Sino-Mali economic and technical cooperation agreement in September 1961, Chinese 
agricultural experts arrived in Bamako to start working on irrigation projects that included rice 
and sugar plantations. Following a resounding success of the sugar plantation project, China 
provided further economic and technical assistance for the building of Mali’s first sugar refinery 
in the Segou region. At its completion in 1964, Mali was able to process 400 tonnes of sugar 
cane daily, enabling it to export sugar in the region and beyond. Other notable Chinese 
supported projects included a match factory completed in Bamako in 1967, a textile mill built in 
Segou in 1968, a tea plantation, and cement works. But since Mali lacked strategic mineral 
resources, China concentrated on infrastructure development and agricultural projects such 
that “the presence of Chinese agricultural and technical personnel remained the symbol of 
Chinese commitment” to its relationship with Mali (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 216).  
As Mali was landlocked, semi-desert and poor country lacking in both financing and skilled 
personnel, President Modibo Keita was impressed by the Chinese development assistance 
model. Instead of merely providing funds and expecting Mali to complete the projects on its 
own, as Western governments did, China provided both financing and personnel to implement 
their aid and infrastructure projects. Chinese aid and technical assistance in the agricultural, 
infrastructure and rail construction sector thrived. And from its early days of independence 
“when most external actors limited their activity to supplying the equipment with which Mali 
was supposed to embark on economic development, China went further to build factories 
which they only handed over after completion” (Anda 2000, p. 218). These actions endeared 
China to both civilian and military leaders in Mali. In fact, President Modibo Keita was highly 
appreciative of that Chinese model of development assistance, and he made it known to 
Premier Zhou Enlai when he visited Mali in January 1964. At a function held in Premier Zhou’s 
honour, President Keita paid “warm homage to the P.R.C. for the low cost of its technical 
assistance, for the readiness of its technicians to adapt themselves to the life of our people, for 
the speed and competence with which the projects undertaken by the People’s China are 
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carried out one by one, and all these things are done without the slightest intention of 
interfering in our internal affairs” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 159-160).  
To Mali, then and to date, China epitomised a benevolent development partner, uninterested 
in seeking hegemony or intervention in its internal affairs, unlike France and other Western 
countries. The main reason is because, unlike its neighbour Niger which has rich uranium 
reserves, Mali had “relatively little to export to China,”296 because its “mineral sector [was] 
dominated by the production of gold. No other mineral commodities [were] produced in 
significant quantities in the country” (Soto-Viruet 2012, p. 28.1). Accordingly, China’s economic 
and trade relations with Mali were better described as aid and assistance. By the time the 
crises of 2012 began, China and Mali had had fifty years of unbroken diplomatic and economic 
relations – making China one of Mali’s four biggest trading partners. In the course of those five 
decades, Mali benefitted from three debt reliefs provided by China in 2001, 2006 and 2008. 
The indebtedness of Mali and debt reliefs given by China does not me China only suffered 
losses, it still derived benefits from the bilateral relationship. According to Beijing’s Eight 
Principles of China’s Assistance to African Countries espoused by Premier Zhou Enlai during his 
visit to Africa in 1964, China did not consider “its financial aid as a unilateral grant, but rather a 
mutual and reciprocal process from which China also benefits” (Zeng 2014).  
By the turn of the 21st century, trade and economic relations between the two countries had 
significantly developed from just being aid and assistance to joint ventures in Mali’s agricultural 
sector and the construction industry created huge opportunities for Chinese state and private 
owned enterprises. The sector that recorded the largest boom in Sino-Mali relations is the 
construction industry. In 2002, Mali was advanced a loan by the Chinese government to 
construct five football stadiums that were used when Mali hosted the 2002 Africa Cup of 
Nations, Africa’s biggest football tournament. Major Chinese investments were in rail 
construction. Interestingly, major construction deals were reached even after the 2012 
intrastate armed conflicts in Mali, suggesting that China’s intervention in Africa is not just 
driven by perception of threat to current economic interests but also to anticipated interests. 
In December 2015, the state-owned China Railway Construction Limited (CRC) announced that 
Mali and Senegal had signed a US$2.7 billion contract for CRC to rehabilitate the Bamako-Dakar 
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railway line.297 Also, Chinese investments in Malian agricultural sector flourished, making 
cotton China’s biggest import from Mali. From a trade value of US$23.35 million in 2002, Sino-
Mali trade grew to approximately US$130 million in 2010.  
 
6.4 Insurrections and coup d’états: A test to China’s non-intervention 
principle 
Since 1960, Mali has had persistent internal insurrections298 including three successful coup 
d’états, and multiple Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali. Throughout all these events China 
maintained its non-intervention posture, continuing diplomatic and political relations with each 
successive government. However, it was not long before attempts were made to forcibly China 
in the internal politics of Mali. The first case happened when President Keita, who was facing 
popular dissent due to his government’s widespread corruption, declining economy, and his 
own version of a ‘cultural revolution’, persuaded China to support his people’s militia project, 
as he feared a looming popular uprising. Military overthrow of governments in the West 
African region, particularly the coup d’état against President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, made 
a military rebellion in Mali imminent. To counter that possibility, President Keita established a 
‘people’s militia’ twice the size of the country’s army. Turning to China for support of the 
‘people’s militia’, three military delegations from Mali visited Beijing between October 1966 
and July 1968. By the third visit in 1968, China agreed to provide Mali with uniforms and 
weapons, but before the militia was consolidated, President Keita was overthrown in a military 
coup by junior army officers led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré in November 1968. Considering 
that Modibo Keita’s socialist policies were rhetorically moulded along Chairman Mao’s 
economic and political ideology, one would have expected China to come to his rescue; instead 
China issued no public statement and maintained diplomatic ties with the new Traoré regime 
as if power had been transferred to Lieutenant Moussa Traoré procedurally.  
When he announced his takeover of power from President Modibo Keita to cheering Malians, 
Moussa Traoré promised rapid development, revival of the economy, and an end to corruption. 
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However, ten years into his rule, a failing economy, stagnant development, widespread 
corruption, and abuse of power resulted in internal resistance and an attempted coup against 
his own government.  When the 1978 attempt by the military to overthrow him failed, Moussa 
Traoré became even more heavy-handed, ruthlessly purging political and military opponents 
and banning opposition political parties. In the process of wanting to maintain political power, 
he triggered a string of protests and widespread riots between 1991 and 1992 that eventually 
resulted in his ouster by the military in 1992. Again, China, which had maintained good 
diplomatic ties with Moussa Traoré as discussed above, simply moved on with the new regime 
without even a public statement being issued concerning the coup d’état.  
On taking over power from Moussa Traoré, Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, the coup leader, 
immediately instituted a transitional committee that oversaw adoption of a new constitution, 
facilitated the holding of democratic elections, and then oversaw transition of power to a 
civilian government in that same year.299 Alpha Omar Konaré won those elections and 
established Mali’s first democratically-elected government since independence. His election 
ushered in a period of political stability, and successive democratic transitions of power from 
one civilian government to the other until 2012.300  
In 2002, Amadou Toumani Touré returned to power after winning a landslide in an election 
marred by political fraud and irregularities. But his government’s failure to contain the Tuareg 
rebellion in northern Mali, “as well as the lack of resources at the disposal of the army to deal 
with the brewing insurgence”301 led to his ouster in 2012. He was toppled in a military rebellion 
led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who declared himself leader of a transitional authority 
called the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’État 
(CNRDR - National Committee for the Return of Democracy and the Restoration of the State).302 
However, due to regional and international pressure, the CNRDR agreed to hand power over to 
a civilian transitional government led by President Dioncounda Traoré, the country’s former 
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speaker of parliament, following an agreement brokered by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) between Sanogo and Touré in which they both agreed to resign. 
Nonetheless, soldiers loyal to Amadou Toumani Traoré attempted to wrestle back political 
power, leading to a violent backlash from the military junta that had installed President 
Dioncounda Traoré. International and regional pressure again resulted in presidential elections 
that Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won in August 2013.303 
Amidst the above seriate of coup d’états and insurrections, the Tuareg in northern Mali were 
engaged in a persistent and prolonged armed struggle for self-determination against the 
successive Malian governments since Modibo Keita’s reign. Between 1962 and 1964, the first 
Tuareg rebellion started but was ruthlessly crushed by the better equipped Malian military. 
Since then, there were intermittent but largely unsuccessful Tuareg insurrections until 2013 
when they briefly declared unilateral independence. The Tuareg, a nomadic people inhabiting 
northern Mali and adjacent parts of the Sahara Desert in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, were 
politically and culturally excluded by Malian governments. Also, being “nomads of the white 
race, [they could] neither conceive nor accept to be commanded by blacks whom [they] always 
had as servants and slaves” (Lecocq 2005, p. 54). Determined to achieve independence from 
southern Mali, their struggle for self-determination was led by the following major groups:  
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad – Popular Movement of Azawad - (MPA); Tuareg Front 
Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azaoud - Tuareg Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FPLA); 
Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali - the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance (ATNM); and the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).  
A combination of regional and domestic factors produced a favourable environment for a 
major Tuareg offensive against Bamako. Domestically, they took “advantage of the power 
vacuum caused by the coup and the incertitude surrounding Bamako… [to carry] forward their 
task for an independent State” (Roberto, Closs and Ronconi 2013, p. 76). Regionally, the fall of 
the Gaddafi regime propelled the Tuareg rebellion in two ways. First, there was an overflow of 
small arms and heavy weaponry such as NR-160 rockets, BM-21 multiple-launch rocket systems, 
                                                          
303 ‘Ibrahim Boubacar Keita wins Mali presidential election’, 2013, BBC, 13 August, viewed 13 July 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23677124  
144 
 
9M22M rockets, and UB-32 rocket launchers from Libya.304 Militants who raided Libyan 
government’s armouries sold the weapons to Islamic groups and the Tuareg. Second, the 
Tuareg who had been working in Libya’s oil and construction industry returned to Mali due to 
increased xenophobic attacks as the Gaddafi regime crumbled. Returning to Mali also were 
Tuareg mercenaries who had fought in the Libyan war on behalf of the Gaddafi regime.305 
These diverse Tuareg groups returned with military weapons, and equipped with modern 
fighting and insurgent experiences.306 Joining forces with the MNLA, which was formed in 2010, 
along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine (formed in 2012), Al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) 
they seized control of northern regional capitals of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu before taking total 
control of the rest of northern Mali. By 6 April 2013, they had declared independence of 
northern Mali, renaming it Azawad with Gao as its capital. It was only through the military 
intervention of France that Malian government’s authority was re-established in northern Mali 
(Francis 2013, p. 3). 
 
6.5 From indifference to ‘concern’  
From the military overthrows of Modibo Keita to the present government of President Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita; and from the first Tuareg rebellion in independent Mali in 1962 to the Tuareg 
declaration of independence in April 2013, China was careful not to entangle itself in the murky 
terrain of Malian politics. Professing strict adherence to its foreign policy principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states, it avoided siding with any regimes in Mali. In 
fact, in the first two coup d’états China did not issue any public response, either in favour of or 
condemning the military takeovers of governments in Mali.  Diplomatic relations remained, and 
so did its development projects. Only in one incident did the overthrow of a president result in 
disruptions of Chinese projects in Mali. When President Keita was overthrown in November 
1968 the joint Guinea-Mali rail project funded and constructed by the Chinese was suspended. 
The suspension was, however, not a Chinese initiative but a result of Guinea’s unwillingness to 
work with the new military government of Moussa Traoré. As a result of the rail project’s 
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suspension, a few Chinese technicians working on the project left Bamako – but the majority of 
their Chinese colleagues working on other projects remained.  
China approached the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali with the same attitude as it did the 
SPLM’s struggle for independence of South Sudan - it regarded the Tuareg’s struggle for 
independence as Mali’s internal affair. Because of its friendly relations with successive Malian 
governments – military and civilian, it simply ignored, or at best was indifferent to the Tuareg 
struggle for greater autonomy and self-determination. As in the case of its reaction to southern 
Sudan’s own struggle for independence from the Sudan, China maintained its rhetoric on 
respect for national and territorial integrity of its partners, as well as its non-intervention 
principle in the internal affairs of other states. On those bases, China contended that it could 
not support secessionist groups. But as will be argued in the next chapter on South Sudan, 
Beijing’s policy regarding support to opposition groups in Africa was not consistently 
implemented. In Mali, Beijing was consistent in its indifference to the Tuareg rebellion, 
concentrating instead on managing its relations with successive Malian regimes to which it 
generally “developed vested interests in the stability of a friendly African state… [Such that] for 
the African state concerned, friendship with China removed a potentially dangerous and 
powerful external source of inspiration for rebellious and discontented elements” (Ogunsanwo 
1974, p. 174).  
Overall, Beijing’s indifference to military overthrows of governments and the Tuareg rebellion 
in Mali was strategic and pragmatic, leading to unintended benefits. For example, at the time 
Modibo Keita was overthrown, his government had approved the Soviet Union’s 1968 invasion 
of Czechoslovakia despite China’s advice not to. The new regime of Moussa Traoré immediately 
reversed the approval and castigated the Soviet Union for being imperialist, much to the glee of 
Beijing. Similarly, by ignoring the Tuareg rebellion, China continued to foster and maintain 
cordial relations with successive Malian governments – shrewdly preventing the Tuareg 
rebellion from tainting its relations with Bamako. By and large, the volatility and instability of 
the Malian political landscape caused China to be careful of its engagement with the different 
regimes, choosing not to take any sides for as long as they took no action to strain relations 
with Beijing.307  
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The biggest test of China’s indifferent approach to the Malian coup d’états and Tuareg 
insurrections came in 2012 when Mali plunged into chaos under the pressure of “three distinct 
but interrelated types of conflicts that coalesced to produce the 2012-3 crises” (Francis 2013, p. 
2). The three crises included: (1) the Tuareg takeover of northern Mali, (2) a coup d’état that 
overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré’s government, and (3) an attempt by Islamist 
jihadists to establish an Islamic, Sharia-law based state. Occurring just a few months after the 
Libyan intrastate armed conflict, there was overwhelming evidence that the Tuareg had 
advanced more aggressively than before due to the fall of Gaddafi. Accordingly, there was 
significant international focus on Mali as well as fear that the conflict could engulf the whole 
Sahel region (Shaw 2013). In addition, fears that Mali could become an Islamic terrorist hub 
were amplified when it emerged that al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups captured Northern Mali, 
and were advancing toward Bamako.  
Initially China was indifferent to the triple crises in Mali, but when it became apparent that the 
Tuareg rebellion had been successful as it declared the independent state of Azawad, at the 
backdrop of the military overthrow of Amadou Toumani Touré’s government, China’s position 
changed to what can be described as a tepid expression of concern. What proved the tepidness 
of its concern is that unlike France, Britain and the United States that issued statements 
condemning the coup d’état in Mali, China’s reaction was solicited by a journalist in the regular 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference on 22 March 2012. In a brief statement, Hong Lei, 
China’s foreign ministry spokesperson said: “China is concerned about the soldier’s riot in Mali 
and hopes the situation will subside and return to normal as soon as possible. We maintain that 
relevant issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultation.”308 China’s statement, 
although it was in response to a journalist’s question, marked a departure from its practice in 
the previous two coup d’états and multiple Tuareg rebellions. Hitherto, it had avoided issuing 
public statements against Tuareg rebellions or coup d’états in Mali. 
A day after China expressed its concern about the army riots in Bamako, General Amadou 
Sanogo announced on Malian state television and radio that the CNRDR had taken over control 
of the government from Amadou Toumani Touré. The third successful coup d’état in Malian 
history had been completed. General Amadou Sanogo’s takeover of government was met with 
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widespread condemnation from several African countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the 
United Nations, France, and the United States. The U.S. Department of State straightaway 
issued a statement announcing that it stood “with the legitimately elected government of 
President Amadou Toumani Touré.”309 An immediate suspension of financial aid to Bamako, 
and suspension of the military assistance programme which provided the Malian army with 
counter-terrorism training and intelligence operations in the Sahel followed the Department of 
State’s statement.310 France, the most influential power in Mali, mobilised the European Union 
and together they imposed strict restrictions on the military junta and cut-off all non-essential 
aid. In Africa, the response was even swifter. ECOWAS representatives from Cote d’Ivoire, 
Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger convened an emergency meeting in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire on 29 
March 2012; on the following day they “threatened to close Mali’s borders and cut off its 
access to the regional central bank, on which Mali relied for currency” (Chivvis 2015, p. 69). The 
threat of sanctions was acted upon on 3 April 2012, which effectively cut Mali’s fuel supply, and 
access to cash from the regional central bank.  In protest, South Africa closed its Bamako 
embassy on 22 March 2012.311 In addition, two of the most important organisations to Mali, 
ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali’s membership and began making plans for military 
intervention to restore democracy.  
Compared to other states’ responses and action against the military junta in Mali, China’s own 
response was a far cry away. Departing from its ‘tepid concern’, Beijing issued its strongest 
statement against the military junta in Mali: “We are opposed to the unconstitutional takeover 
of power”312 the foreign ministry spokesperson said. But instead of being backed by punitive 
action against the military government of General Sanogo, China added the traditional and 
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official plea in such events,313 it called upon “relevant parties in Mali to restore normal order as 
soon as possible and safeguard national unity and stability for the sake of the fundamental 
interests of the country and the people.”314 Compared with responses from other international 
capitals such as Washington, London and Paris, Beijing’s response exuded apparent 
indifference to the implications of its rhetorical opposition to the military takeover of the 
Malian government.  
In addition, despite major powers and the United Nations Security Council imposing measures 
against the military junta, China remained unperturbed. In fact, when a counter-coup was 
attempted by military guards loyal to the deposed Amadou Touré, the PRC foreign ministry 
through its spokesperson Liu Weimin again called on parties in the Malian conflict to “exercise 
restraint, properly handle their disputes by peaceful means including dialogue and consultation, 
and jointly safeguard constitutional order, so as to ensure a smooth political transition.”315 The 
continued failure by China to take concrete measures against the military government in Mali 
raised concerns that it was a free-rider, 316 trying to “maximize its interests through minimal 
involvement… while staking a claim to the moral high ground”317 by “making hollow calls for a 
political resolution”318, but not acting as a responsible global power, and being “highly reluctant 
to take on more burdens – whether economic, political, or military – preferring to free-ride” 
(Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009).  
Beijing’s position regarding the intrastate armed conflict in Mali only shifted when its nationals 
and interests in Mali appeared to be under threat – suggesting that China’s response was 
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primarily motivated by concerns over protection of its own interests.  To address those threats 
and mitigate losses, possibly to avoid the Libyan debacle, the Foreign Ministry of the People’s 
Republic of China issued a security alert on its website. It urged “Mali to take effective 
measures to ensure the safety and lawful rights and interests of Chinese institutions and 
nationals there”319 Beyond issuing a security alert, the foreign ministry’s spokesperson Hong Lei 
announced several steps taken by the Chinese government in Beijing, the embassy of China in 
Bamako, and Chinese enterprises operating in Mali. The Chinese embassy in Bamako 
proactively engaged Chinese firms and nationals in Mali to assess their needs and security 
status. But as the security situation deteriorated in weeks that followed, the Ministry of 
Commerce warned Chinese firms of the escalating security risks in Mali, and urged them to 
exercise vigilance. It also cautioned against non-essential travel to Mali, advising Chinese 
nationals to temporarily leave the country and consider returning when the security situation 
improves.  The proactivity in taking measures to protect Chinese nationals and interests in Mali 
before extensive losses had occurred suggests the change in China’s perception of threats 
posed by intrastate armed conflicts in Africa to its nationals and interests there. On the other 
hand, it also reflected that China was largely self-focused in its response to international 
security issues.  
 
6.6 From concern to rhetorical support for mediation  
The onward advance toward Bamako by the MNLA and its Islamist allies after they captured 
strategic towns in Northern Mali compelled China to urge ECOWAS to lead mediation efforts. 
To that effect it issued a statement through its foreign ministry spokesperson expressing 
appreciation and support for “efforts made by the African Union, ECOWAS and regional 
countries to mediate the Mali issue.”320 What China did not publicly acknowledge was that the 
mediation efforts by ECOWAS combined dialogue with the threat of political, diplomatic and 
economic sanctions as well as military intervention. One could argue that this was deliberate 
because China considers both the imposition of sanctions and military action as intervention in 
the internal affairs of another state. When the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson was 
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asked to comment on ECOWAS’s demand that the military hand over power or else face 
sanctions such as closure of borders and freeze on central bank accounts and military action, 
Hong Lei avoided commenting on the sanctions and military action; instead he said: “China 
supports the ECOWAS-led peaceful mediation for the Malian crisis. We hope parties concerned 
in Mali will establish a dialogue channel with the ECOWAS as soon as possible to seek an end to 
the crisis through negotiation, and avoid confrontation as well as serious impact on people's 
life.” 321  Reading between the lines, the ECOWAS sanctions were in every respect 
‘confrontational’, with potential to cause ‘serious impact on people’s lives.’ Yet it was only 
through imposition of sanctions that Captain Sanogo was willing to negotiate reinstatement of 
the constitution and hand over power to a transitional government.322  
The rationale behind China’s support for ECOWAS mediation while deliberately avoiding 
express support for imposition of sanctions or taking any punitive action against the military 
regime as other states had done was to preserve its bilateral relations with Mali. The basis for 
exercising caution against giving full and express consent or even implied consent as it had 
done in the case of the NATO-led intervention in Libya is that it wanted to avoid sharing the 
blame in case Mali descended into chaos; at the same time it also wanted to be in support of 
regional and international initiatives toward restoring democracy in Mali. It also wanted to 
portray and maintain its image as a neutral power that does not interfere in the internal affairs 
of other states. But as put by Paul Haenle director of Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global 
Policy, rhetorical support for mediation efforts being taken by others was not commensurate 
with China’s global status.  
Indeed, China’s support for ECOWAS mediation efforts turned out to be mostly rhetorical. The 
European Union, France and the United States provided financial, diplomatic or logistical 
support to ECOWAS, but the Chinese government offered nothing. It simply played no 
significant role in facilitating mediation efforts by ECOWAS. David Shinn maintains that China’s 
support of mediation efforts rather than punitive measures against the military regime was in 
accordance with its non-interference policy. Understandably, China was concerned that 
sanctions or military intervention would escalate the conflict, effectively destabilising the 
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region, as had been the case in Libya. The interconnectedness of the Malian conflict with the 
downfall of Gaddafi as a result of sanctions and military intervention by NATO and other 
Western powers also seemed to cement China’s concerns against confrontational measures 
against Captain Sanogo. So, as noted by a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and 
Security Studies in Addis Ababa, to avoid the controversy of a failed military intervention, 
Beijing simply settled on giving rhetorical support to ECOWAS, while hoping that the situation 
did not escalate in a manner that would cause extreme damage to its interests in Mali and the 
Sahel region. 
Nonetheless, ECOWAS countries had a strong preference for military intervention. As Captain 
Sanogo announced plans to hold a national meeting to decide the country’s democratic 
transition schedule, ECOWAS began plans for a military intervention of Mali. However, within 
the ruling and political elites in Mali, there was no consensus on the proposed ECOWAS-led 
military intervention. In particular, Captain Sanogo and other military leaders controlling key 
ministerial portfolios, including Defence, Home Security and Territorial Administration323 
opposed ECOWAS intervention, arguing that it was an affront to Mali’s state sovereignty. At 
best Captain Sanogo wanted ECOWAS’ role in Mali to be limited to training and logistical 
support for Malian troops. The transitional government also opposed the ECOWAS-led military 
intervention in Mali because even though power had been handed over to them as demanded 
by the AU and ECOWAS, Captain Sanogo and his military junta had “remained influential in the 
background” (Souaré 2014:89). In protest against pressure from Captain Sanogo and the 
military junta to oppose military intervention by ECOWAS, the transitional government’s prime 
minister resigned in November 2012, and a new one, Django Sissoko, was immediately 
appointed in his stead (Francis 2013:3).  
 
6.7 Multilateral action  
In spite of pressure from the military junta, the leader of the transitional government, 
President Dioncounda Traoré, defiantly supported military intervention by ECOWAS. On 1 
September 2012, he sent an official invitation to ECOWAS and France to militarily intervene in 
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Mali in order to quell the Tuareg rebellion.324 In what turned out to be a replay of the Libyan 
case, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2071 on 12 October 
2012. It authorised ECOWAS and the AU to make an actionable plan for military intervention in 
Mali. China voted in favour of that Resolution. But before the AU and the ECOWAS African-led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) became operational, Tuareg separatists and 
their Islamic allies advanced toward Bamako, capturing strategic towns of Konna and Diabaly 
on the way. They took advantage of divisions and political bickering among political and 
military leaders in Mali over military intervention by ECOWAS. 325 In response, the United 
Nations Security Council issued a press statement expressing the determination of members of 
the Security Council “to pursue the full implementation of its resolutions on Mali, in particular 
resolution 2085 (2012) in all its dimensions.” Resolution 2085 (2012) authorised the African-led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to assist the armed forces of Mali in regaining 
of control over its northern territory.326 Taking note of the changed context, they then called 
“for a rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).”327 
However, the continued inability of the Malian military to stop the Tuareg and their Islamist 
allies from advancing toward Bamako, “coupled with failure of the deployment of troops from 
African countries… forced France to act unilaterally, but with the approval of the international 
community, including Russia, China and African regional actors” (Francis 2013, p. 5; see also, 
Okemuo 2013, p. 219). China had also voted in favour of both Resolution 2071 (2012) and 
Resolution 2085 (2012), all of which authorised military intervention in Mali. 
Regarding France’s military intervention in Mali there appeared to be confusion in Beijing. 
Although they supported it at the UN Security Council, they remained adamant that military 
intervention without consent of the target state is illegitimate. “You cannot imagine China 
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would support any bombing. It’s against our principles,”328 is how He Wenping, Director of 
African Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had put it in a discussion on China’s role 
in international peace and security. She then warned that unless opposed, “French forces’ 
involvement in Mali will provide the case for legalization of a new interventionism in Africa.”329 
Along similar lines, researchers at China’s Naval Military Research Institute, Li Jian and Jin Jing, 
retorted that France was behaving like the African gendarmerie, and that its military 
intervention in Mali was a ploy to consolidate its control over Malian gold mines and oil 
reserves. Further drawing comparisons with the military intervention in Libya, they made an 
argument that France’s eagerness to militarily intervene in African countries constituted an 
attempt to recolonise and secure its strategic interests in Africa. What also exacerbated these 
concerns is that “France did not give any explanation why it was going it cavalier seul rather 
than within the EU framework” (Okemuo 2013, p. 219). 
In its defence, France argued that its military intervention in Mali was at the invitation of Mali’s 
interim government led by President Dioncounda Traoré,330 thus it was not a violation of Mali’s 
sovereignty. “France had answered to the request for military assistance issued by the Malian 
authorities by providing, within the bounds of international law, the support of its armed forces 
to the Malian units engaged in the fight against terrorist groups” (Okemuo 2013, p. 236). The 
intervention met the traditional requirement of consent of the country concerned. 
Furthermore, there was near-consensus in ECOWAS and the AU that French forces intervene 
alongside troops from Mali, Niger, Chad and other predominantly West African countries. In 
fact, ECOWAS adopted Resolution A/Res.Msc.1/01/13 expressed gratitude to France for 
militarily intervening in Mali.331 In further defence, the Permanent Representative of France at 
the UN, Gérard Araud, argued that his country’s intervention in Mali was a bridging operation 
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required in Mali before deployment of AFISMA. Thus, France’s “Serval operation mark[ed] a 
clear contrast with the nation’s modus operandi in the Libyan conflict” (Ping 2014, p. 24).  
The incongruence between China’s rhetoric of anti-military intervention in Mali and its actual 
behaviour, such as voting in favour of a post facto authorisation of the intervention332 exposed 
the lack of an elaborate foreign policy position on intervention in foreign conflicts in Beijing. 
Realising that an outright support of France’s intervention in Mali was detrimental to its image 
in Africa, Beijing continued to emphasise concerns of “a potential abuse of the UN mandate, 
like what happened in Libya.”333 He Wenping said, “we have some concerns about the 
intervention… These concerns are based on problems that have arisen as a result of foreign 
intervention in other countries such as Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. The whole African continent 
now has a heavy foreign military presence, with increasing numbers of military bases and 
drones.”334 Arguably, considering what had happened in Libya, if China was serious about 
raising these concerns it would have vetoed the French military intervention in Mali. However, 
as it became clear that the French were effective in pushing MNLA and the Islamists back into 
the Northern Mali hinterland, thus restoring peace and order which was necessary to safeguard 
the security of Chinese nationals, institutions and investments there, there was an about-turn 
in China’s position. He Wenping retorted that none of Chinese officials had opposed France’s 
intervention in Mali because “the French military intervention was necessary… [since] the 
situation was urgent.”335 This sudden change in opinion implied that China had improvised or 
tailored the non-intervention principle in African intrastate armed conflicts in order to protect 
its immediate interests there.   
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6.8 Conclusion: Striking a balance between intervention and non-
intervention 
Struggling to articulate its role in the Malian intrastate armed conflict in order to secure its 
interests there vis-à-vis its non-intervention principle, Guo Xueli, charge d’affaires at the 
Chinese embassy in Bamako, announced that China was considering providing military support 
to the Malian army. In an interview broadcast on television in Bamako, Guo Xueli said: “we are 
going to bring our assistance to the extent possible, specifically in the military, where we 
already have a very old cooperation.”336 Researchers at China’s Naval Military Research 
Institute disagreed –causing another embarrassing discord among foreign policy elites in China. 
In a commentary published in the Global Times soon after, Li Jian and Jin Jing retorted that 
appeals for China to contribute troops were Western ploys to manipulate China, and were 
against China’s principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In 
summation they wrote, “the West will not allow us to get involved in its traditional spheres of 
influence, and deploying troops would also conflict with the guiding principle of our foreign 
affairs.”  
Conceding that safeguarding Chinese interests in Mali and the Sahel region could not be 
entrusted to France and the West, Li Jian and Jin Jing urged Beijing to “look at the situation 
from a broad, global perspective, and carefully consider how we can safeguard the national 
interests that China has developed in this complex and disorderly region.” 337 China’s interests 
in Mali included investments in agriculture and in the construction industry. Prospecting of oil 
in Northern Mali, and threats that the Tuareg rebellion could spread to Niger where China has 
uranium and oil interests added to Chinese anxiety over the Malian conflict. So in order to 
safeguard those broad interests, Li Jian and Jin Jing proposed that China focus on economic 
construction, livelihood issues and infrastructure development in order to present itself as a 
‘constructive, cooperative and responsible major power.’ 
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The discord among Chinese foreign policy makers and academics reflected the underlying 
conflict between protection of its interests abroad and maintaining the non-intervention 
principle. In order to balance those two conflicting imperatives, instead of supporting the 
military in Mali, which would have been interpreted as unilateral military intervention, Beijing 
opted to actively participate in UN-authorised peacekeeping and peace-enforcement 
operations.338 When the U.N. Security Council extended United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)’s mandate “to protect the United Nations 
personnel, notably uniformed personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the safety, 
security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel,”339 China 
grabbed the opportunity.  
For the second time in its UN peacekeeping history since 1990, China sent a separate 
protection unit to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali to protect both Chinese and other 
international UN personnel. Official Chinese statements referred to them as ‘security forces’ 
from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but in actuality they were a combat troop authorised 
“to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of 
deployment.”340 Previously, China had “sent a peacekeeping force consisting of 395 personnel 
to the Mission, of which there is a 170-person police unit, a 155-person engineering unit and a 
70-person medical unit”341 to MINUSMA. However, as put by Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001), the 
sending of the combat troops by China under the UN peacekeeping and enforcement operation 
reflected “a shift from a strict adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle 
of non-intervention.” In an editorial published in the South China Morning Post, Minnie Chan 
also concurred that “sending troops to Mali, in West Africa, indicated a major shift in China’s 
peacekeeping approach.”342  
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Seen from the historical trajectory of the 1970s total rejection of international peacekeeping, 
hesitant participation in the 1980s and then sustained involvement since the 1990s,343 China’s 
deployment of combat troops in Mali reveals a major shift from the doctors, military observers, 
and engineers it deployed before. That it happened a few months after a similar deployment in 
South Sudan implies a changing perception in Beijing concerning intervention in foreign 
intrastate armed conflicts. Previously, China had a policy that the PLA does not operate in 
foreign territory, as doing so would amount to intervention in those foreign countries. But as 
put by Hanauer and Morris (2014, p. 44) there is a growing realisation in Beijing that 
peacekeeping provides its security and military personnel the opportunity to gain combat 
experience in volatile countries, creating avenues to subtly protect its nationals and interests 
abroad in a non-threatening, legitimate manner.   
Accordingly, China’s involvement in the multilateral intervention in Mali has been explained by 
several authors as being motivated by four factors: (1) securing natural resources; (2) 
maintaining trade and economic benefits or interests; (3) exposing its troops to international 
operations; and (4) projecting itself as a responsible global power. Empirical evidence suggests 
the first two points played a major role in China’s intervention in Mali, even though it had no 
significant direct economic interests in Mali to the magnitude comparable to South Sudan and 
Libya. It has regional economic interests, and strong interests in the Uranium deposits in 
Northern Mali and parts of Niger adjacent to the parts controlled by the Tuareg in Northern 
Mali. In Mali, unlike South Sudan and Libya, China’s economic and strategic interests were 
regional such that the risk of transnational spread of the Malian intrastate armed conflict into 
neighbouring countries where it controlled large stakes in Uranium and other strategic 
commodities compelled China to intervene and support interventions by other powers in order 
to control the conflict. “In Mali and the broader Western African region, China is especially 
interested in protecting Chinese civilians, their economic interests, and to contribute to 
regional stability as the best condition to protect their economic interests.”344 Thus, as put by 
Vincenzo Bove, et al., “the risk of transnational spread of a civil war can make states with 
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strong interests in a region intervene to contain the conflict” (2015, p. 2). Also, the renewal of 
oil explorations in Mali gives it an interesting dynamic that has attracted intervention not just 
from China but also France which previously ignored past Tuareg rebellions that occurred 
before oil exploration began in the mid-2000s (Bove, et al., 2015, p. 3).  
As put by Ted Galen Carpenter, the vice-president for Defence and Foreign Policy Studies at 
Cato Institute, China’s intervention in Mali, as is the case in other African countries, is driven by 
its growing economic stake and increased presence of Chinese nationals, thus “Beijing wants to 
promote greater stability in countries where businesses and people may be at risk.”345 While 
this is an immediate motivation, the underlying cause is the gradual change in China’s 
perception of intrastate armed conflict in Mali as being a threat to its interests there. This 
explains why in just over a year, Chinese engagement in the Malian intrastate armed conflict 
went from an indifferent and passive response to rebellion and coup d’états in Mali since 1960, 
to expressions of concern over military takeover of the government by Captain Sanogo; then 
from support for French military intervention to sending 500 combat troops under the 
multidimensional and integration UN peacekeeping operation, MUNISMA, which is authorised 
to take all necessary “steps to prevent the return of armed elements” to northern Mali (Shinn 
2013). It appears that as the intrastate armed conflict intensified, the conflict’s threat to 
Chinese interests in Mali and the region increased, compelling Beijing to improvise its 
intervention accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 7: China in South Sudan intrastate armed conflict: 
assertive and proactive intervention? 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Still reeling from the devastating effects of Libya’s intrastate armed conflict – the loss of billions 
of dollars’ worth of projects and assets, and biggest evacuation of overseas citizens in its recent 
history - China found itself confronted by yet another intrastate armed conflict. This time, 
hardly two years after the Libyan armed conflict and a year after the coup d’état in Mali, the 
conflict was in South Sudan, Africa’s newest nation. To China, South Sudan had been a 
challenge even before it existed as a sovereign state. The complexity of its war of 
independence from the Sudan, the subsequent split, and then the war between the two Sudans 
over oil transit fees and revenue sharing all contributed to making the South Sudan intrastate 
armed conflict more devastating to China’s interests in that country. Chinese oil companies 
were also still coming to terms with the complexities of working with the two antagonistic 
Sudans in their interdependent oil sector. Already they had suffered extensive losses due to oil 
production disruptions during the Juba-Khartoum war hardly a year before. On top of that 
problem, the intrastate armed conflict between the government of South Sudan and forces 
loyal to the country’s former vice-president Riek Machar threatened to wipe out what was left 
of the country’s oil industry – which is largely dominated by China’s own state-owned 
enterprise, CNPC. 
Apart from economic losses, the crises in Libya and Mali had already exposed the inadequacies 
of Beijing’s foreign policy strategies, especially the efficacy of its non-intervention principle 
when faced with intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. The stakes were therefore high for Beijing 
when the South Sudan intrastate armed conflict broke out in December 2013. Just as in Libya, 
China had invested billions in the South Sudan oil sector; furthermore, it had to show its 
citizens as well as other global powers that it was able to handle such situations as a 
responsible global power. It is upon this background that this chapter explores China’s 
intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict. This chapter starts by tracing historical 
relations between China and southern Sudan actors since Sudan’s independence in 1956. It 
then examines China’s pragmatic foreign policy strategies, first in transforming its antagonistic 
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relationship with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) into an amiable one, and 
then in balancing its triangulated relationship with Khartoum and Juba. All in all, the argument 
advanced in this chapter is that unlike in the case of Libya and Mali, China’s intervention in 
South Sudan’s armed conflict was proactive, deliberate and assertive, suggesting that its 
perception of African intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its external economic 
interests is evolving.  
 
7.2 Background of China-South Sudan relations 
Relations between China and South Sudan are a case of ‘enemies turning to friends’.346 
Antagonism between the two started in 1955 when the southern rebellion against the 
Khartoum government broke-out. The antagonism then ended in 2005 with formation of a 
government of national unity under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 347 framework. 
In the course of that forty-year period, two civil wars were fought – with a decade-long peace 
period (1972 - 1983) in-between. The first civil war, from 1955 to 1972, was between the 
government of Sudan and the Anya-Nya movement, which represented people of the southern 
Sudan. After a ten-year long armistice, in 1983 the second civil war (1983-2005) pitting the 
government of Sudan against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) started. In the 
second civil war, the Anya-Nya movement was succeeded by the SPLM in its struggle for 
greater autonomy and subsequent independence of southern Sudan. That period of southern 
Sudan’s war for self-determination is what Daniel Large refer to as the inimical period of China-
South Sudan relations. The amiable period followed the gaining of independence by South 
Sudan in 2011; while the period in-between signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005 and South Sudan becoming an independent sovereign state in 2011 marked the 
transitional period of their relationship from being ‘enemies to friends.’ What this long and 
convoluted historical background of China-South Sudan relations means is that in order to gain 
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a comprehensive understanding of China’s intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed 
conflict, it is critical to first explore relations between China and southern Sudan’s liberation 
war movements, the Anya-Nya and SPLM within the context of China-Khartoum relations.  
On 18 August 1955, four months before independence of the Sudan, the Equatorial Corps, a 
southern military garrison composed of mainly southern Sudanese soldiers mutinied, against 
the government of Sudan in protest to what it saw as over concentration of power in the North, 
and disenfranchisement of the South. That mutiny marked the beginning of Sudan’s first civil 
war. Southern soldiers who rebelled were joined by others forming a southern Sudan rebel 
group known as the Anya-Nya movement. For seventeen years the group fought for greater 
autonomy and independence of the Christian-animist black Africans in southern Sudan from 
the ‘Arab’ Muslims in the north. Politically, culturally, and religiously the North identified with 
the Middle Eastern and North African countries while Southerners were predominantly black 
Africans identifying with sub-Saharan Africa, particularly their East African neighbours.  
Between 1960 and 1972, the North-South intrastate armed conflict became more 
internationalised. Arab states, and communist countries such as the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, and Yugoslavia, including China, provided the government of Sudan with military 
weapons. Their support for Sudan was based on two considerations: General Jaafar 
Mohammed Numayri’s communist ideology, and Cold War geopolitical considerations. Britain, 
being the former colonial power and architect of the political structure that had largely 
resulted in political and economic alienation of southerners, also supported the government. 
As foreign powers flocked to render support to Khartoum, the Anya-Nya movement struggled 
to get backing, even from China which at that time supported national wars and liberation war 
movements in Africa. It was only after the Six-Day war between Israel and Arab countries that 
the Anya-Nya movement started getting meaningful military and administrative assistance 
from the Israeli government and the Israeli Defense Forces.348  
China’s response to southern Sudan’s Anya-Nya movement was at odds with its actions in 
other parts of Africa where it supported liberation war movements fighting for self-
determination. Citing constraints from its foreign policy of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other countries, Beijing “never advanced any rhetorical or material support to Anya-
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Nya rebels”349 even though their struggle met the criteria for a ‘people’s war’ similar to what 
China supported in other African countries.350 To China, the intrastate armed conflict between 
the Anya-Nya and the government of Sudan was an internal issue that it could not interfere 
with. Be that as it may, China’s actions in other countries negate the ‘non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states’ argument. For example, during the Nigerian civil war, China 
supported rebels who sought secession of eastern Nigeria (‘Biafra’) from the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.351 Short of according them diplomatic recognition, the People’s Republic of China 
gave various forms of support and aid to the secessionists, 352 and urged them “to persevere in 
the struggle and wage a people’s war till victory was achieved” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 235). 
Similarly, in Zaire, now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, China supported 
opposition groups that fought against the Congolese government following the ouster of 
Patrice Lumumba in September 1960.353 Accordingly, Beijing’s argument that it was constrained 
from supporting the Anya-Nya by its non-intervention principle was not convincing to 
southerners. 
In addition, “even if China had wanted to support the guerrilla fighters in the south, a rational 
calculation of interests involved in other areas would have weighed against such support, 
especially as there was no guarantee of success for the fighters” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 174). 
With no reasonable prospects of success for the Anya-Nya rebellion, China was not willing to 
risk its friendly diplomatic relations with Sudan. But prospects of Anya-Nya’s success were by 
no means the only reason Beijing never extended any assistance to them. The essential reason 
was that geopolitical considerations and national interests played a critical role in Beijing’s 
selection of which African liberation war movements to support, particularly with regards to 
Sudan. Its main geopolitical concern was dissipating the Soviet Union’s influence in newly 
independent African countries and undermining Taiwan by increasing the number of African 
countries it had diplomatic relations with. The Anya-Nya movement and its struggle against the 
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Sudanese government was in no way going to assist China in achieving those geopolitical 
objectives.  
In that respect, having established diplomatic relations with China in 1959, and as one of the 
first four independent African countries to have recognised the People’s Republic of China, 
Sudan was strategic to China’s ambitions of increasing its influence in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. Moreover, Sudan’s geographical location, as well as its religious 
and political leaning toward the ‘Arab – Muslim’ MENA countries made it even more 
instrumental to China’s geopolitical expansion objective. Accordingly, supporting a secessionist 
movement against the Sudanese government would have jeopardised their friendly diplomatic 
relations and put at risk China’s interests in the newly independent North African Arab states of 
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and the Arab world in general.354 So seriously did China take its 
geopolitical interests and relations with Sudan that when the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) threatened to support the southern Sudan rebels, the Chinese government expressed 
grave concern and “announced its readiness to help the Sudan against any foreign intervention 
aiming at undermining it” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 174). 
Notwithstanding, the first Sudan civil war ended in 1972 when the Anya-Nya movement and 
the government of Sudan signed the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA). Among other things, the 
agreement granted regional autonomy to southern Sudan, and incorporated Anya-Nya forces 
into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and government bureaucracy. However, in the late 1970s, 
President Numayri declared Sudan an Islamic State and introduced Islamic law even in the 
South – effectively withdrawing southern Sudan’s autonomy over its own internal affairs. In 
addition, when oil and other mineral discoveries were made in areas bordering North and 
South Sudan, Numayri unilaterally attempted to “redefine the boundaries between North and 
South, so that the oil rich area around Bentiu, the fertile lands of Renk, together with the nickel 
and uranium deposits all fall into northern territory” (Scott 1984, p. 69). As it became obvious 
to southerners and other foreign parties interested in investing in Sudan’s mining and energy 
sector that the major oil and mineral deposits were located in southern Sudan, “oil and its 
exploration became a burning political issue” (Scott 1974, p. 70). The result was another revolt 
by southern army officers in May 1983. This time the struggle against the Sudanese 
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government was led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the 
leadership of charismatic Colonel John Garang de Mobar.355  
China’s policy regarding SPLM/A in the second civil war the same as it was with the Anya-Nya in 
the first civil war. However, the discovery of oil and other valuable mineral resources increased 
the strategic importance of Sudan to China, further endearing Khartoum to Beijing, and 
diminishing any possibilities of positive relations between Beijing and SPLM. Chances of Beijing 
even considering assisting the SPLM were dealt a heavy blow when China’s National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) took advantage of the departure of Western oil companies such as Chevron, 
Talisman, Lundin and OMV from Sudan due to pressure from their governments and global 
human rights activists. Chinese NOCs were not bothered by Khartoum’s bad human rights 
record, support for terrorism and perpetration of war crimes and genocide in Darfur, so they 
quickly grabbed the opportunity and dominated Sudan’s oil sector. In fact, Sudan became 
China’s leading foreign oil project; and as put by Chen Fengying of the China Contemporary 
International Relations Institute in Beijing, Sudan represented in practice China’s strategy of 
going for oil in places where American and European companies were not present.356  
As Chinese oil companies expanded their investments in Sudan’s oil sector, oil revenue surged. 
In turn, Khartoum increased its military budget, enabling the Sudan Armed Forces to purchase 
more arms to fight the SPLM. “Prior to the increase in oil revenues in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) had consistently complained about its lack of financial 
and material means to wage war effectively against the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A)” (Large 2007, p. 4). But with the oil revenue from Chinese oil fields 
flowing in, China assisted the government of Sudan to set-up and operate three military 
weapon factories near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum.357 In addition, China also became 
Sudan’s major weapons supplier. From the early 1990s, China had been supplying Sudan with 
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SCUD missiles, ammunition, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircraft,358 but as alleged by the 
Human Rights First not only did it increase its weapons supply, it also breached an international 
arms embargo against Sudan by supplying it with light weapons in the years that Khartoum’s 
war against the SPLM intensified.359 Refuting allegations that China had breached the arms 
embargo against Sudan, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang maintained that conventional 
weapons exported from China to Sudan were of a very limited quantity, constituting a small 
portion of Sudan's military import.360 However, the implication was that the growth of Sudan’s 
oil sector as a result of Chinese oil investments became deeply entwined with patterns of 
violence in South Sudan.361  
The apparent symbiotic relationship between Chinese oil companies and the government of 
Sudan made Beijing’s claims of non-intervention in Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict 
implausible. As put by Irene Panozzo, “China’s foreign tenets of state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference in internal affairs had translated into the defence of Khartoum’s 
position against the southern struggle for self-determination and possible independence” 
(2015, p. 177). Making things even more complicated for China to profess non-intervention in 
Sudan is that Sudan Armed Forces often used air strips at the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (GNPOC)’s oil installations to launch attacks against the SPLM/A. The Sudanese army, 
as well as army-backed militias, also provided security to Chinese workers and oil installations 
located in southern Sudan, where SPLM/A and other groups operated. As a result, the 
prevailing opinion among ordinary southern Sudanese, SPLM/A, and other rebel groups was 
that China was part of the conflict, but fighting on the side of the government of Sudan. Lam 
Akol, a rebel commander in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement United (SPLMU), who 
had previously served as Sudan’s transportation minister from 1998 to 2002, encapsulated that 
perception when he said: “the Chinese have every reason not to lose these oil fields, and that is 
why they are committed to fighting the war by supplying the Sudan government the 
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wherewithal.”362 In concurrence, Deng Awou, a former commander in SPLA said: “the suffering 
of the [South Sudan] people is on the hands of the Chinese” (Kline 2010, p. 64).  
Southern Sudanese perceptions that China was an active participant in their conflict against the 
government of Sudan were confirmed by the director of Middle East and North African Studies 
at Shanghai International Studies University, Professor Zhu Weilie. Professor Zhu argued that in 
Sudan, China had to balance its interests in order to protect the supply of oil from Sudan, and 
that meant militarily supporting Sudan’s war against the SPLM. The implication was that 
“during the last ten years of the north-south civil war, China had been considered in the south 
as the enemy’s best friend and financier because of Beijing’s investments in Sudan’s oil sector, 
its arms sales to Khartoum and its political backing of the NCP’s rule” (Panozzo 2015, p. 177). In 
light of the above, prior to 2005, China-SPLM relations were as the proverbial ‘a friend of an 
enemy is an enemy’. 
Up until signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between SPLM and the government of 
Sudan, China was unperturbed by SPLM’s negative opinions regarding its relations with 
Khartoum. For Beijing, as long as the government of Sudan guaranteed the security of Chinese 
oil workers and installations, and as long as the oil was flowing with little or no interruption 
from SPLM, it did not matter what SPLM or southerners thought. Basically, its strategy was to 
ignore the Sudanese civil war for as long as it did not interfere with its oil operations - 
separating, as alluded to by China’s deputy foreign minister Zhou Wenzhong, business from 
politics. In that respect, Beijing considered the SPLM-Khartoum civil war as an internal affair 
with which it was not in a position to interfere (Kurlantzick 2007, p. 222). In like manner, Zhang 
Dong, China’s Ambassador to Sudan asserted: “China never interferes in Sudan’s internal 
affairs.”363 That exactly is what Khartoum had hoped for from Beijing, especially considering its 
isolation by Western countries. So, in an interview, Sudan’s mining minister Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz 
said: “[The] Chinese are very nice, they don’t have anything to do with any politics or problems. 
Things move smoothly, successfully. They are very hard workers looking for business, not 
politics” (Goodman 2004). It was therefore under those circumstances that China consolidated 
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its position as the foremost investor in Sudan’s oil industry despite the majority of the oil 
reserves being in southern Sudan.  
 
7.3 The genesis of Beijing – SPLM relations 
In 2005, there was a paradigm shift in SPLM and government of Sudan relations, which 
compelled China to recalibrate its relations with the SPLM. On 9 January 2005, representatives 
of the two parties appended their signatures to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) - 
not only ending two decades of North-South conflict, but also ushering a new Juba-Beijing-
Khartoum triangular political, economic and diplomatic dispensation. As a compilation of 
several agreements signed between the antagonists from 2002, the CPA covered issues ranging 
from the sharing of oil wealth between North and South, to setting up of a Government of 
National Unity comprising the Sudan’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM. 
But most importantly, the agreement made provision for southerners to decide at the end of a 
six-year transitional period whether to remain united with the North or secede into an 
independent state. It was the referendum that jolted China into considering establishing 
contacts with SPLM while maintaining ties with Khartoum.  
Although it appeared obvious that southerners would choose secession, the National Congress 
Party, China, and some SPLM leaders hoped for unity of the two Sudans. Considering 70 
percent of Sudan’s oil fields were located in southern Sudan and that China had invested in oil 
fields located in oil-rich Muglad and Melut basins straddling the North-South border,364 it was 
mostly out of economic interests that Khartoum and China preferred the status quo – that is, 
one-Sudan-two-systems under NCP’s dominance. In particular, as noted by Anne Itto, SPLM’s 
deputy secretary-general, following her visit to China in August 2009, Chinese government 
officials feared that if southern Sudan seceded, there would be insecurity and their assets in 
the form of pipelines and billions worth of other oil investments would go to waste.365 Apart 
from oil interests, secession of southern Sudan risked putting “China’s foreign policy tenets 
under strain” (Panozzo 2015, p. 179) – it threatened to plunge Beijing into a quagmire of how 
to strategically court SPLM after so many years of hostilities between them.  
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On the other hand, driven by a nationalist agenda, John Garang, leader of SPLM and First Vice-
President in Sudan’s Government of National Unity, advocated an all-inclusive united Sudan366 
under the “one-country-two-systems model, whereby the people of southern Sudan would 
decide after six years whether to remain within the Sudan or to opt for independence.”367 
Although he appeared to have given the responsibility of choosing either secession or unity to 
southerners, Garang was as unapologetic in his support for a united Sudan as he was in his 
opposition to secession. In one of his passionate speeches he declared in 1992 that “if anybody 
wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It 
should not be allowed to disintegrate or fragment itself.”368 On that, Garang was on the same 
page with China because in meetings with SPLM, Chinese government officials emphasised 
continued support for “Sudan’s peace, unification and development.”369 However, the vision of 
a ‘one-country-two-systems’ model in Sudan that John Garang propelled gradually faded370 
with his death in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. Salva Kiir Mayardit, the man who 
succeeded him as both SPLM leader and Sudan’s First Vice-President in the Government of 
National Unity, was pro-secessionist, and therefore the campaign for southern Sudan 
independence gained momentum.371  
 
7.4 China-SPLM courtship: Building relations for a mutually beneficial 
future? 
Prior to the CPA, SPLM and China had no known official contact. Official relations between 
China and the Sudan had all along been north-centric and focused on Khartoum-Beijing 
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engagement. “Khartoum tightly controlled relations with China from the centre, largely 
preventing its ally from having contact with the Southern rebels (International Crisis Group 
2012, p. 2). Conceivably for economic and geopolitical considerations, Beijing reciprocated by 
exclusively dealing with the Khartoum government (Large 2011b, p. 54). The second reason is 
that China claimed to have been precluded from making official contact with the SPLM because 
its relations with Sudan were dictated by the Five Principles on Peaceful Co-existence, in 
particular, the non-interference principle which prohibits China from making contact with 
opposition political parties in other countries. What China’s leaders could not acknowledge 
publicly is that its dominant position in Sudan’s energy sector was necessitated by their support 
for the Khartoum government in its fight against the SPLM. It was also because China chose to 
be indifferent to atrocities committed against southerners and Darfurians by Sudan on the 
basis “that business should not be mixed with politics.”372 The third reason, as put by China’s 
Defence Minister Cao Guangchuan, is that China’s People’s Liberation Army attached greater 
significance to developing relations and cooperating with the Sudanese army on various 
issues.373 To that end, China supplied Khartoum with heavy military weapons that in turn were 
used to fight SPLM in the south. Because of that, there existed a sense of animosity and distrust 
between China and SPLM as they begun to forge official relations after signing of the CPA.  
Be that as it may, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had two major enablement elements 
that fostered relations between Beijing and the SPLM. The foremost factor is that it 
“legitimised the SPLM and opened the door for the gradual expansion of SPLM-CPC political 
relations” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 80). The second factor is that the agreement enabled 
SPLM to transform itself from being a liberation movement into a political party, able and 
“willing to consider engagement with all potential external partners, including China” (Large 
2011, p. 165). On the basis of these two factors, it was almost obvious to Beijing that under the 
CPA framework, the autonomous government of southern Sudan could become a direct 
partner “without obliging China to formally deny sovereignty and territorial integrity tenets or 
alter its warm relations with Khartoum” (Panozzo 2015, p. 177). Accordingly, as soon as the 
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CPA came into effect, Beijing initiated “a ‘dual-track’ diplomatic policy, allowing the 
establishment of warm ‘quasi-diplomatic’ relations with Juba well before the south’s 
independence” (Panozzo 2015, p. 179).  
The first official contact between Beijing and SPLM occurred in March 2005, two months after 
NCP and SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. John Garang, leader of southern 
Sudan and First Vice-President in the central unity government, delegated Salva Kiir his deputy 
to lead an SPLM delegation that included the head of SPLM economic section Akwal Manak, 
chairman of the SPLM external relations Niyal Dheng, and SPLM spokesmen Samson Kwaje and 
Pagan Amum to visit China.374 In Beijing, they discussed possible economic cooperation 
between Beijing and Juba. Perhaps due to the untimely death of John Garang, the next official 
visit by SPLM bureaucrats to China happened two years after the first one. President Hu Jintao, 
who was on a state visit to Khartoum in February 2007, met with and invited Salva Kiir to visit 
China.375 Five months later, in July 2007, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang 
announced the arrival in Beijing of Salva Kiir in his capacity as First Vice-President of the 
Government of Sudan.376 It turned out to be a watershed moment in Beijing - SPLM relations.  
In a subtle but unyielding warning to the Chinese to take relations with SPLM seriously, Salva 
Kiir during his meetings with Chinese government officials in Beijing emphasised the 
concentration of Sudan’s oil reserves in southern Sudan territory and the high probability of its 
secession from northern Sudan. The veiled warning worked because thereafter there was a re-
orientation in China’s policy regarding the SPLM, leading to more contact and interaction 
between the two.377 In the following year, 2008, the special envoy of the Chinese government 
and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited Juba and opened China’s first Consulate in 
southern Sudan,378 which according to China’s first ambassador in South Sudan, Li Zhiguo, 
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played “an important role in strengthening close exchanges and enhancing cooperation.”379 
Thus, as put by Daniel Large, the CPA was “turning enemies into friends” (Large 2011, p. 165).    
Despite several official visits between SPLM and Chinese government and CCP officials, Beijing 
remained hesitant to fully engage SPLM before the independence of southern Sudan. The 
hesitancy continued even after China was given several assurances by SPLM that in terms of 
the CPA, Juba “was entitled to establish its own relations with external actors for purposes of 
developing economic relations in support of development programs in Southern Sudan” 
(Schumann 2010, p. 111). Substantive political relations still remained slow in coming. Instead, 
it was private Chinese businesses and state-owned oil companies already in southern Sudan 
that took the lead in developing economic and trade relations with Juba. The situation, 
however, changed when China recognised the inevitability of a split of the two Sudans as the 
referendum date drew closer. In October 2010, less than three months before the January 
2011 South Sudan referendum, a Chinese Communist Party delegation visited Juba to gather 
more information about South Sudan, but, clearly China was preparing for a new phase of 
relations between China and an SPLM-led South Sudan.  
In subsequent meetings between the SPLM and China, several Chinese government officials 
including Du Yanling, director-general in the International Department of the Communist Party 
of China Central Committee, assured the SPLM that China stood “ready to provide help to the 
south within its capacity, no matter what changes will be in the situation” (Boswell 2010). 
Considering China’s investments in southern oil fields, the future South Sudan government’s 
dependence on oil revenue from Chinese operated oil fields, and the latent capacity of China to 
use its veto against South Sudan’s independence, SPLM officials were delighted to get China’s 
re-assurance just before the referendum. In return for Beijing’s re-assurance, Anne Itto, SPLM’s 
deputy secretary-general and South Sudan’s minister of agriculture, promised Beijing that 
“southern Sudan will continue to respect China’s interests in the region.”380 According to the 
Sudan Tribune, the SPLM secretary-general Pagan Amum also weighed in, saying “the largest 
investment in southern Sudan today is Chinese… They have invested billions of dollars in the oil 
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sector, and have a large number of Chinese workers in the oil fields... We have given 
assurances to the Chinese leadership delegation to protect the Chinese investments in 
southern Sudan, and are desirous to see more investment in the future.”381 
Notwithstanding the mutual assurances, there was no telling what the populist government of 
South Sudan would do if there was public pressure to punish China for supporting Khartoum 
regimes during their struggle for independence. Although the CPA guaranteed security of 
existing oil contracts, senior SPLM officials and commanders commonly made reference to re-
negotiation and revocation of contracts held by Chinese companies as punishment for its role 
in disenfranchisement of southerners and lack of support for SPLM’s struggle for independence. 
One of those senior figures was Anne Itto. In an interview with the Sudan Tribune, she claimed 
to have warned the Chinese government that “if they want to protect their assets, the only way 
is to develop a very strong relationship with the government of Southern Sudan, respect the 
outcome of the referendum, and then we will be doing business.” She then added: “the role of 
China [is] to support peace in Sudan, especially to prevail on the NCP not to take the country 
back to war again.”382 With the intention of protecting its investments in the South, the Chinese 
government intensified engagements with SPLM in the run-up to the referendum, pledging to 
respect its choice for self-determination.  
What all this meant is that China’s attention to and recognition of the SPLM was necessitated 
by an overwhelming need to hedge against risk of losing its oil investments in South Sudan. 
Thus as aptly put by Daniel Large, “in engaging the Government of Southern Sudan… Beijing 
responded to political imperatives flowing from investment protection concerns produced by 
established interests as part of an apparent hedging strategy geared toward the possibility of 
Southern secession” (2009, p. 624). In concurrence, Ben Simpfendorfer suggests that in 
engaging the SPLM, China reflected “a growing recognition that political regimes can and do 
change, and so opening dialogue with opposition movements in conflict with the state is a 
pragmatic means of hedging against this risk” (Simpfendorfer 2015, p. 211). Meanwhile, even 
though SPLM would have wanted to take revenge against Beijing, it was precluded from doing 
so by its overwhelming need for oil revenue from Chinese-operated oil fields to finance the 
new state. Hence, “the fact that China already had invested heavily in oil infrastructure made 
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China an attractive partner” (Antony and Jiang 2014, p. 80). For that reason, South Sudan found 
it imperative to cultivate normal diplomatic relations with China in order not to disrupt the flow 
of oil revenue. All things considered, both the SPLM and Beijing’s responses to the political 
imperatives occasioned by independence of South Sudan were linked to mutual concerns about 
investment projections and hedging against risk rather than political considerations.  
7.5 China in independent South Sudan 
By the time South Sudan gained independence on 9 July 2011, China had made significant 
strides in strengthening bilateral relations. 383 Together with the United States, Britain, and 
Russia, it was one of the first major powers to recognise the new country as an independent 
sovereign state. To confirm Beijing’s position regarding South Sudan’s statehood, its foreign 
minister Yang Jiechi announced China’s official recognition and setting-up of diplomatic 
relations with South Sudan at the ambassadorial level on the basis of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence.384 The Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the two countries was signed by Jiang Weixin, China’s minister of housing and urban-
rural development, on behalf of the Chinese government; on that same day, the Chinese 
embassy in South Sudan was opened.385 To consummate the new diplomatic relations, foreign 
minister Yang Jiechi paid his first official visit to independent South Sudan barely a month after 
South Sudan’s independence; speaking to the South Sudanese press, he restated China’s 
commitment to “step-up friendly exchanges with South Sudan at all levels, particularly at the 
high-level, to cement political mutual trust.”386  
Beside state-to-state relations, SPLM-CPC party-to-party relations assumed critical importance 
in dissipating past antagonistic misgivings and in fostering ‘mutual political trust’ between Juba 
and Beijing. Before South Sudan’s independence, party-to-party ties were restricted and took 
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place within the confines of the Sudanese government of national unity and in the ambit of the 
CPA framework. In essence, China had been restricted from expanding relations with SPLM due 
to domestic political tensions between SPLM and NCP, which compelled it to prefer expanding 
relations with the NCP.387 Starting from 2005, several SPLM delegations had visited China 
initially in their capacity as officials of the government of national unity, and then after 
independence as SPLM officials. In 2009, Riek Machar, deputy chairman of SPLM and vice-
president of the government of South Sudan, met Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing 
Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, to discuss strengthening of ties 
between SPLM and CPC. 388  After independence, the two political parties signed a 
memorandum of understanding to strengthen friendship and cooperation, enabling the 
Communist Party of China to “receive up to three delegations from SPLM each year to learn 
about China’s experiences in various areas.”389 
The first SPLM delegation to visit China under the SPLM-CPC memorandum of understanding 
left for China in April 2011. Comprising ten SPLM officials on a study tour aimed at 
understanding CPC’s experiences in party building, the delegation was led by Antipas Nyok, 
SPLM’s Secretary for Political Affairs and Mobilization. In China, the delegation met several 
officials of the CPC, including Chao Weidong, deputy-director at the International Department 
of the Central Committee of the CPC.390 Six months later, another SPLM delegation led by its 
Secretary-General Pagan Amum visited China in October 2011. During their visit, they met with 
Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China. At the 
meeting, Pagan Amum emphasised the importance his country placed on developing friendly 
ties with China, and he reiterated South Sudan’s commitment to promoting “bilateral 
pragmatic cooperation in areas such as oil, agriculture, minerals, housing construction, 
telecommunications, water conservation and transportation.”391 Speaking of the SPLM-CPC 
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relations, Li Changchun, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party of China, underscored the significance of building and consolidating relations 
between SPLM and CPC to suit the new circumstances, that is, the independence of SPLM-led 
South Sudan.392  
The third SPLM delegation was funded by the CPC to visit China and learn about its financial 
management systems. Accordingly, a ten-member delegation comprising ten finance ministers 
from ten states of South Sudan as well as high ranking SPLM officials such as Atem Garang, the 
party’s chief whip in the National Legislative Assembly, visited China on the study tour.393 The 
final SPLM delegation to visit China in 2012 was led by Political Bureau members Mark 
Nyipouch and Akol Paul was comprised of fourteen members of the SPLM National Liberation 
Council and the SPLM General Secretariat. The ten-day study tour was aimed at learning 
various aspects of CPC governance, and the delegates attended lectures at the China Executive 
Leadership Academy Pudong met Vice-Minister of the International Department of the CPC Li 
Jinjun as well as Director-General of the North Africa Bureau of the International Department 
of the CPC Central Committee, Du Yanling. They also visited leading Chinese firms such as 
Huawei, Sinohydro and the Export-Import Bank of China.394 
Despite the party-to-party and state-to-state exchanges, it was not long before China and 
South Sudan’s commitment to cementing mutual political trust was tested. The first major test 
was a dispute between Juba and Khartoum over oil transit fees, which quickly escalated into an 
interstate armed conflict resulting in South Sudan shutting down oil production, cutting its oil 
supplies to Beijing, and effectively jeopardising billions of dollars in Chinese investments.395 
Within that context, President Salva Kiir honoured an earlier invitation to visit President Hu 
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Jintao in Beijing. 396 In his meeting with President Hu as well as other “Chinese leaders, 
including Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo, 
and Vice Premier, member of the Standing Committee of the Political bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee Li Keqiang”397 Kiir urged China to rein in Khartoum and assist in resolving 
the conflict to ensure continued flow of oil revenue that South Sudan desperately needed.  
In addition to seeking China’s intervention in resolving the conflict with Khartoum, President 
Kiir conveniently used the Beijing trip to send President Omar al-Bashir a veiled message that 
Khartoum no longer had monopoly over relations with Beijing as before – Juba was also getting 
closer to Beijing.398 As put by South Sudan’s Information Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin, 
relations between China and the two Sudans were like “a case of a husband with two wives… 
[So] there must be some sort of relationship where China can play a positive role, even in this 
war” (Raghavan 2012). In response, President Hu confirmed China’s role in taking concrete 
action to resolve the conflict. Trying to play into the Khartoum-Juba feud, President Hu stated 
that for China, “the top priority is to actively cooperate with the mediation efforts of the 
international community and halt armed conflict in the border areas.”399 On balance, it 
appeared President Kiir’s visit to Beijing in the midst of Juba’s interstate armed conflict with 
Khartoum reflected a new confidence in South Sudan’s bilateral relations with China and the 
strategic importance he placed on China and its ability to resolve conflicts with Sudan, but that 
situation was soon tested when South Sudan descended into an intrastate armed conflict of its 
own.  
 
7.6 China and the South Sudan intrastate armed conflict 
As the Khartoum-Juba intrastate armed conflict subsided, on 15 December 2013 South Sudan 
plunged into an intrastate armed conflict of its own pitting the government of South Sudan led 
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by President Salva Kiir against forces loyal to the country’s former Vice-President, Riek Machar. 
What started as a political power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek 
Machar soon took on an ethnic character – dividing the new country’s two largest ethnic 
groups – the Dinka and the Nuer – as well as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The 
subsequent suspension and arrest of senior SPLM officials400 on charges of an attempted coup 
split the SPLM into two main factions and escalated the conflict further. Having escaped arrest 
in Juba, Riek Machar declared himself leader of what then became known as the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), and his forces soon took over control 
of major parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states. 
As the armed conflict gained momentum, the targeting of oil installations in the Unity State and 
Upper Nile State dragged China, South Sudan’s major oil investor and leading importer, into the 
conflict. At the time of independence, oil revenue had represented 98 percent of South Sudan’s 
government revenue, and the majority of which came from Chinese-operated oil fields. With 
3.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of 1 January 2014, three times more than Sudan’s oil 
reserves, CNPC had a major stake in both Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC), 41 
percent share, and 40 percent stake in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) 
both of which were the major oil companies operating in South Sudan. Sinopec, another 
Chinese oil company had a 6 percent stake in DPOC.401 As the conflict raged on, oil fields in 
Unity and Upper Nile State were forced to shut down, and the Adar Yale oilfield came under 
attack on several occasions. Some of the shutdown was too sudden and done so hurriedly that 
machinery was damaged and oil leakages were severe, causing both economic losses and 
damage to the environment. Apart from the loss of 45,000 bbl/day of oil produced at fields in 
Unity State, “satellite images taken by the U.S. – funded Satellite Sentinel Project show[ed] that 
key oil infrastructure was severely damaged, including oil storage tanks and manifolds” (EIA 
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2014, p. 11). As a result production dropped by almost 20%,402 a further decline from an 
already reduced percentage of South Sudan’s oil to China’s total imports when it split from the 
Sudan and when it voluntarily shut down oil production during the interstate armed conflict 
with Sudan. The table below shows the effect of the intrastate armed conflict on oil production 
in South Sudan. 
Figure 7.1: Unplanned oil disruptions in Sudan and South Sudan, 2012-2014 
 
To enhance oil production and also avoid further disruption due to conflicts with Khartoum, 
CNPC had reluctantly agreed to partner with the government of South Sudan to construct 
refineries at Bentiu, located in Unity State and in “South Sudan’s second planned 10,000-
bbl/day refinery in the Upper Nile near Blocks 3 and 7,”403 but that too was forced to stop due 
to the armed conflict–causing innumerable financial and production loses to the Chinese oil 
companies.  
Besides oil companies, Chinese private and state-owned construction and telecommunication 
companies that were active in South Sudan found their operations threatened by the armed 
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conflict as well. Media reports suggested that more than 100 Chinese companies were 
operating in South Sudan in sectors related mainly to petroleum, construction, and 
communications as of December 2013. Chinese companies with major projects in South Sudan 
at the time of the armed conflict included Zhong Hao Overseas, a privately owned construction 
firm in Beijing that built water and sanitation facilities, housing for government officials, a 
hospital and roads in South Sudan. State-owned Sinohydro Corporation dominated South 
Sudan’s engineering and infrastructure sector; it also “provided a water plant in Western 
Equatorial, a thirty-seven kilometer road in Malakal and high-way construction linking the 
North and the South” (Antony and Jiang 2014, p. 81). China Harbour Engineering Corporation 
also won the tender to renovate Juba International Airport, estimated to cost US$1.6 billion. 
ZTE set up the Sudan Telecommunication Network through a 200 million Euro loan from China 
Exim Bank.404 Although some of these companies had completed their projects at the time of 
the intrastate armed conflict, the majority were forced to either suspend operations or scale 
down operations.  
In what also turned out to be a repeat of the Libyan experience for Chinese workers, several 
Chinese companies had to evacuate their workers. For example, China National Petroleum 
Corporation “evacuated 97 of its staff in December 2013 because of the conflict.”405 Its main 
oilfields located in the Unity State and Upper Nile State regions under the control of Riek 
Machar’s rebel fighters were forced to shut down.406 Not wanting to endanger its workers, the 
CNPC announced in December 2013 that it was arranging for the orderly evacuation of its 
workers from the affected oil fields to Juba, the capital city of South Sudan.407 As put by Luke 
Patey, the evacuation of CNPC workers from the Palogue oilfield, South Sudan’s largest oilfield, 
led to extensive loses in production, affecting both the South Sudanese government and the 
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CNPC because as he puts it “without Chinese and other foreign staff, a limited number of South 
Sudanese technicians… struggled to keep production levels high.” 408 
Aside from economic implications of the intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan on China’s 
interests, the conflict tested President Hu’s commitment to upholding peace and security in 
Africa. At the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
China had presented the Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), underscoring for the first time the 
importance of China-Africa cooperation in the fields of peace and security. A specific clause in 
the Beijing Action Plan had acknowledged efforts of the Chinese government’s Special 
Representative for African Affairs, who actively engaged in mediation efforts in Africa’s 
hotspots, and “welcomed his continued constructive role in peace and security endeavors.”409 
It is not a coincidence that the commitment was made hardly a year after the Libyan crisis that 
resulted in loss of significant Chinese investments. In many respects the commitment to peace 
and security in Africa signified a growing recognition in China that intrastate armed conflicts 
threatened its economic interests on the continent. The South Sudan intrastate armed conflict 
was therefore the first test to China’s commitment to assist in resolving peace and security 
issues in Africa.  
 
7.7 Unilateral and multilateral mediation 
In comparison with its ambivalent intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, China’s 
intervention in South Sudan was multi-dimensional, assertive, and definite in its character. But 
it also set it on collision with its non-intervention principle which precluded it from having 
contact with opposition parties in other countries, especially in warring situations. Soon after 
the South Sudan armed conflict broke out on 15 December 2013, China’s ambassador to 
Ethiopia convened a clandestine meeting at an Addis Ababa hotel with representatives of rebel 
forces led by Riek Machar. To support claims that the meeting was supposed to be off-the-
record, Zhong Jianhua, China’s special envoy to South Sudan claimed in a CCTV interview on 1 
March 2014 that China had not made direct contact with the rebels. He said, “we also sent 
messages to the rebels indirectly, telling them we are willing to help achieve peace… I’m now 
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trying to establish direct contact with the rebels to express our will and help achieve a 
ceasefire.”410 An IGAD official privy to that meeting questioned its motive especially considering 
the timing, absence of South Sudan government officials, and of course China’s non-
intervention principle.411 He then opined that from his assessment China wanted to gather 
information and intelligence on the goings on in South Sudan in order to determine its course 
of action rather than mediate the conflict. But still that might not have been the reason to only 
meet rebel forces in Ethiopia rather than officials of the government of South Sudan; China 
wanted to get assurances from Riek Machar that Chinese assets located in oilfields his forces 
had captured on the onset of the conflict were going to be secure. In concurrence with that 
assessment, the International Crisis Group notes that China circumvented IGAD in order to 
protect its oil infrastructure, which was its main priority (2015, p. 19). 
The IGAD official was not far from the truth because it was not coincidental that the Addis 
Ababa hotel meeting was convened soon after President Kiir publicly admitted losing control of 
Unity State and Jonglei amidst claims by Riek Machar that his forces had taken over control of 
oil fields in Unity and Upper Nile State.412 The Upper Nile and Unity State oilfields were 
strategic to China, the government of Sudan, and Riek Machar rebel forces because as put by 
Luke Patey, these fields represented 80% and 20% of oil production, respectively. It is those 
considerations that propelled the Chinese ambassador in Ethiopia to convene an urgent 
meeting with Riek Machar’s representatives. For Riek Machar, capturing those oilfields, and 
announcing that he was going to divert oil revenue from Juba and deal directly with Sudan in 
implementing the cooperation agreements413 which China helped broker between Juba and 
Khartoum in 2012, increased his bargaining leverage, weakened President Salva Kiir’s 
government by cutting its main source of revenue, and attracted the attention of the Chinese 
government.414 A report published by the International Crisis Group alleges that because of the 
strategic importance of Unity State and Upper Nile State oil fields to China and Khartoum, 
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“their security was the subject of an independent agreement between Sudan, China and the 
SPLM/A-IO” (International Crisis Group 2015, p. 11). If this is true, then by its own definition, 
China intervened in South Sudan’s war by entering into an agreement with a rebel force for 
protection of its oil fields there. 
In less than two weeks of the intrastate armed conflict, China announced the arrival of its 
official special envoy in South Sudan. Zhong Jianhua, a diplomat considered to have extensive 
knowledge of Sudan and South Sudan was appointed China’s special envoy to South Sudan. In a 
statement, foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said “on behalf of the Chinese 
government, special envoy Zhong Jianhua is currently visiting South Sudan and neighboring 
countries, and actively carrying out mediation efforts. China is willing to continuously enhance 
communication and coordination with all the relevant parties and jointly push for restoration 
of stability in South Sudan.”415 After wide consultations with parties to the conflict and other 
relevant stakeholders such as the Khartoum government, Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special 
Representative on African Affairs, participated in talks held in January 2014. As a result of the 
negotiations, a ceasefire agreement between South Sudan’s warring parties was signed. In fact, 
Harry Verhoeven maintains that “Chinese diplomats took unprecedented steps in publicly 
pressuring belligerents Salva Kiir and his former vice president, Riek Machar, to sign a ceasefire 
agreement” (2014, p. 64). Thrilled by the role Beijing had played in brokering the ceasefire 
agreement, Zhong Jianhua confirmed the role Chinese diplomats from embassies in Ethiopia 
and South Sudan had played in early attempts toward ceasefire monitoring. He then proudly 
acknowledged the emerging engagement of China in peace and security initiatives in Africa, 
admitting that though it was a new experience for China, it was indeed “a new chapter for 
Chinese foreign affairs,”416 seemingly implying that starting with South Sudan, China was ready 
to take on the challenge of actively resolving African conflicts. 
No sooner than the ink was dry on the ceasefire agreement, fighting resumed. Riding on its 
ceasefire-brokering experience, China offered to continue mediating between the warring 
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parties, risking a further departure from its non-interference principle.417 But this time, partly in 
response to queries that China was departing from its non-intervention tradition due to its 
engagement with rebel forces in South Sudan, Beijing creatively fitted its South Sudan 
mediation within its foreign policy objective of sustaining its economic development and 
protecting overseas citizens and national interests from external threats, of which the 
intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan was one. The explanation was sufficient to silence 
dissenting voices in China assured Chinese citizens worried that the Libyan experience was 
going to be repeated in South Sudan, and most importantly, pre-empted concerns in Africa that 
China was moving toward unilateral intervention in African countries’ internal affairs. 
Nevertheless, in pursuit of the above national core objectives, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited 
Addis Ababa where the fighting parties were holding peace negotiations, and urged both 
parties to cease fighting and resolve the conflict amicably. BBC reported that he even offered 
to mediate personally between the warring sides.418  
The swiftness with which China’s ambassador to Ethiopia organized the meeting with Riek 
Machar’s representatives; and with which Beijing dispatched its special envoy to Juba suggests 
a rising concern in Beijing that “challenges confronting peace and security in Africa are 
increasing”419 and that the increase in conflict and insecurity was detrimental to its economic 
interests. Given that China now considered the emerging intrastate armed conflict in South 
Sudan as threatening its economic interests in that country, it was increasingly prepared to 
take rapid and decisive intervention even though the action would violate its own non-
intervention principle. Secondly, the sending of a special Chinese envoy to South Sudan 
reflected a new perception within China’s foreign policy elites that it was imperative to engage 
all parties in a conflict, whether government or opposition, in order to mitigate losses. This 
meant even engaging opposition forces first, particularly in cases where they controlled areas 
with strategic Chinese assets and investments. In many respects this policy implied a 
substantial shift in how China perceived intrastate armed conflicts in African countries – from a 
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perception that they were non-threatening, as was the case in early stages of the Libyan armed 
conflict, to a perception that they threatened its core national interests in foreign countries, 
thus requiring assertive intervention.  
 
7.8 China as the ‘go-between’  
Leaving nothing to chance, China convened several meetings with parties to the South Sudan 
conflict. In July 2014, South Sudan’s Vice-President and Deputy Chairman of SPLM, James Wani 
Igga, requested a meeting with China’s foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing. From their 
discussions at that meeting, it emerged that the South Sudanese vice-president intended on 
giving assurances to Beijing that “the government of South Sudan will do its utmost to ensure 
the safety of the Chinese personnel and agencies in the country” – a concern which foreign 
minister Wang Yi had also raised in their meeting. In response, Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
expressed China’s willingness to continue playing a positive role in resolving the conflict in 
South Sudan.420 Following on to that meeting, foreign minister Wang Yi met members of the 
SPLM-IO in Beijing in September 2014, before meeting South Sudan government 
representatives in Khartoum. 
In January 2015, China, working with IGAD, facilitated a meeting of foreign ministers and 
representatives of the warring parties in Khartoum. Although the meeting was held under the 
‘Special Consultation in Support of South Sudan Peace Process’ led by IGAD, and was attended 
by foreign ministers of China, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as representatives of 
Riek Machar, China was praised for facilitating the meeting. South Sudan’s foreign minister 
Barnaba Benjamin said: “we welcome the Chinese role which we believe is constructive and 
seeks to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. We hope these consultations, under China's 
patronage, would put the IGAD-led negotiations on the right track.”421 His counterpart, the 
chief negotiator of the rebels, Seyoum Mesfin, said that “we have no objection toward what 
China is doing and we believe the Chinese role is in the interest of the initiative of the IGAD 
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which is patronizing the negotiations between the two conflicting parties in South Sudan.”422 
The same sentiments were echoed by Sudan’s foreign minister Ali Karti, who pointed out that 
“China, as a permanent member state in the UN Security Council, is working seriously and 
sincerely to end the conflict in South Sudan. It is acting on the base of its international 
responsibility and not to achieve any other purposes.”423  
A common feature in China’s mediation efforts and bilateral talks with South Sudan’s 
government officials and rebel forces was a persistent demand that they guarantee protection 
of Chinese assets and economic investments, and ensure security of Chinese nationals in South 
Sudan. For instance, following reports of rebel attacks on oil facilities, the South Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) announced on 16 January 2015 that “oil fields have never been 
under control of anybody. They have been under full control of the SPLA and the general 
command assured the oil companies in Adar and Faluj that their protection is 100%.”424 That 
announcement was a response to pressure from China, which requested assurances at a 
meeting held in Khartoum between China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and his South 
Sudan counterpart, Barnaba Mariel Benjamin, that South Sudan was committed to protecting 
Chinese oil workers and assets. According to the South Sudanese Minister of Information, 
Michael Makuei Leuth, the meeting was initiated by China and was attended by members of 
the opposition faction led by former president Riek Machar. After the meeting, Barnaba Mariel 
Benjamin told the media that “I think it is a very, very important thing – that they (the Chinese) 
wanted the assurance that these institutions are properly protected and not to be destroyed in 
any form.”425 This statement corroborates an AU diplomat’s suspicions that this ‘supposedly 
IGAD-led’ meeting was a parallel meeting organized and designed by China to protect its oil 
investments in South Sudan.426 
The assurances were a confirmation of earlier commitments made in a telephone conversation 
on 14 April 2014 when the Foreign Minister of South Sudan, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, and 
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China’s Minister of Commerce, Gao Hucheng stated that Chinese enterprises were still 
operating in South Sudan and that the “government of South Sudan could take forceful 
measures to protect the safety of lives and properties of Chinese people and enterprises, and 
render more facilitation and guarantee for business production and operation, material 
transportation and personnel entry and exit.”427 The use of language that seemed to imply a 
command to South Sudan’s government to ‘take forceful measures to protect’ Chinese citizens 
and property in South Sudan suggests a more assertive China confident in its ability to pressure 
the Juba government into protecting its economic interests.  
As noted by Luke Patey, the author of The New Kings of Crude: China, India and the Global 
Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan, “China’s concern regarding South Sudan is not 
energy per se but rather a corporate investment from a major Chinese national oil company in 
jeopardy.”428 Luke Patey’s argument is supported by Zhong Jianhua, who reiterated several 
times in an interview with CCTV that both the South Sudanese government and the rebels 
should “ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and firms,” adding that “we [China] told them to 
try to avoid damaging the property of Chinese firms, and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens 
under any circumstances.”429 Foreign Minister Wang Yi had refuted that notion, arguing that 
“China's mediation of South Sudan issues is completely the responsibility and duty of a 
responsible power, and not because of China's own interests.”430 While that might have been 
part of the reason, the major one was, as he had admitted earlier, that “war and conflicts hurt 
the oil industry…, an area in which China, Sudan and South Sudan have worked closely 
together.”431 He had then argued that the mediation was not meant for China to benefit alone - 
it was a mutually beneficial intervention aimed at getting a win-win solution to the conflict. It 
was therefore apparent that China’s efforts toward direct mediation in the South Sudan civil 
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war “runs parallel with its interest in ensuring billions of oil investments in South Sudan stay 
out of harm’s way.”432 This policy was confirmed by Ma Qiang, the Chinese ambassador to 
South Sudan, who told Reuters that “we have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to 
make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.”433  
To force the belligerents in South Sudan to cease fire, and in a marked departure from its 
‘business is business, no politics involved’ precept that it had used to defend selling weapons to 
Khartoum, in its war against the SPLM before South Sudan’s independence, China took a more 
assertive but firm position. It halted the sale of US$38 million worth of arms to the South Sudan 
government by its state-owned arms manufacturer China North Industries Group Corporation 
(NORINCO).  According to Lan Kun, an attaché at the Chinese embassy in Juba, the Chinese 
government decided it was not appropriate to deliver the consignment of weapons to South 
Sudan, therefore “No more weapons are heading to South Sudan… There are some media 
reports that were alleging that the Chinese government was behind this business operation 
and wants to undermine this peace process. That is totally untrue.”434 The Chief of the Political 
Section in the Embassy of China in South Sudan reiterated that since the beginning of the 
armed conflict, the Chinese government ordered all relevant Chinese companies to halt 
weapons trade with South Sudan (Gridneff 2014). The South China Morning Post described 
China’s embargo on sale of weapons to Juba by Chinese companies as indicative of a swap of 
“its reserved diplomacy for a hands-on approach to help resolve a… rebellion in South Sudan 
that threatens Beijing’s oil investments.”435  
 
7.9 Multilateral intervention – leveraging on IGAD 
To legitimize its bilateral engagements and mediation efforts, China leveraged its participation 
in the IGAD mediation processes. Chinese Ambassador to the African Union Xie Xiaoyan worked 
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with the U.S., Norwegian, and U.K. diplomats within the IGAD plus framework to resolve the 
conflict. As reported in the South China Morning Post in June 2014, “the permanent Chinese 
presence at the Addis Ababa talks and their frequent lobby chats and closed-door consultations 
with diplomats from the United States, Britain and Norway – the main Western backers of 
newly independent South Sudan – show China’s more proactive approach.”436 The coming in of 
China to renewed IGAD-PLUS437 mediation talks following breach of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement between Salva Kiir forces and Riek Machar’s “will provide as well the much-needed 
role of China as it has strategic economic interest in South Sudan” (Deng 2015). 
According to an official at IGAD, China has been actively involved in the mediation process in 
South Sudan in different capacities and to a varying extent, but not always to the satisfaction of 
other IGAD-PLUS members, that is, the United States, Norway and Britain. A Norwegian 
diplomat in Addis Ababa who had extensively participated in the IGAD meetings on South 
Sudan dismissed China’s presence in IGAD as a nuisance, arguing that it never meaningfully 
contributed to the peace deliberations. He suspected China only came to the meetings to 
gather information and keep abreast with latest developments in South Sudan’s conflict. The 
same remarks were recounted by several IGAD officials and diplomats from Uganda. For 
instance, in an interview, an IGAD high ranking official complained that although China was 
heavily involved in the mediation process and peace monitoring mechanism, and had seconded 
some Chinese officials to be part of the peace monitoring mechanism, it provided funds off the 
record to rebels to protect their investments. Her argument was that China was in IGAD simply 
to protect its oil investments. However, she quickly added that Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Uganda also had interests in South Sudan. Nevertheless, as admitted by Zhong Jianhua, 
mediation of African intrastate armed conflicts in multilateral frameworks was still a new 
experience for China, and therefore it often could not balance its interests with the common 
objective of bringing peace to South Sudan.  
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7.10 Multilateral intervention –UN Peacekeeping as a platform 
To complement its mediation and bilateral engagements with South Sudan belligerents, China 
used its position in the United Nations Security Council to leverage its influence on multilateral 
interventions. Previously, China had sent engineers, doctors and other non-combat personnel 
as part of the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), and the UN Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) as from 9 July 2011. But an announcement that China had agreed to 
send battalion troops under the auspices of the U.N. was probably the most significant 
intervention made by China in South Sudan’s civil war. The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Wang Yi, reported at the High-Level Meeting on U.N. Peacekeeping that: 
“China will send a 700-strong infantry battalion to the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS). This will be the first Chinese infantry battalion to participate in a 
peacekeeping mission. China is considering sending helicopters to the UN 
Peacekeeping Operation. This would be the first-ever involvement of Chinese airmen in 
a peacekeeping mission. China is ready to send more civilian policemen, including 
forensic experts and criminal detectives, to peacekeeping operations. China will 
continue to support, to the extent of its ability, efforts to strengthen peacekeeping 
capacity building of African countries, including the establishment of African Capacity 
for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).”438   
According to the PRC Defence Commander Wang Zhen, the battalion deployed to South Sudan 
in 2014 was “equipped with drones, armored infantry carriers, antitank missiles, mortars, light 
self-defense weapons, bulletproof uniforms and helmets, among other weapons.”439 Several 
media reports suggested that the deployment was meant to protect Chinese oil workers and 
facilities in South Sudan. This was probably true because the UN Security Council Resolution 
extended the mandate of UNMISS to include protecting and deterring violence against civilians, 
including foreign national and oil installations.  However, as reported in The Wall Street Journal, 
Chinese troops under the UNMISS peacekeeping “are now concentrated not in oil rich states, 
but in Wau of Western Bahr el Gazel state” (Zhou 2014). Notwithstanding this fact, threats to 
its economic interests and citizens in South Sudan was a dominant motivation for China’s 
deployment of the combat troops under the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. 
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7.11 Conclusion 
The case of South Sudan suggests that China’s foreign policy strategy, non-interference 
principle, and perception of African intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its national 
interests is evolving. In addition, its ability to transform hostile relations with South Sudan 
during the struggle for its independence since 1955 into friendly or at least workable relations 
in 2005 and its intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict reflects two essential 
points regarding the non-intervention principle: Foremost, the non-intervention principle is 
designed to protect China from foreigners meddling in its internal affairs; and secondly, it is 
meant to enable China to gain competitive advantage against rival powers440 and woo potential 
partners, particularly in the developing world. China’s relations with South Sudan reflect the 
efficacy of that strategy when it is applied with pragmatism. As stated earlier, China’s 
intervention behaviour in South Sudan was guided by “a distilled pragmatism that serves the 
country’s direct interests.”441 Together with the mutual benefit and win-win rhetoric, the non-
interference principle, in the case of South Sudan was a “little more than a camouflage 
concealing China’s private interests and the pursuit of profoundly different goals.”442 In this 
context, it would be simplistic to talk of China’s foreign policy being guided by the principle of 
non-interference, when in effect, “it has never remained a passive on-looker when its interests 
are at stake;”443 furthermore as noted by Ma Qiang, the Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan, 
in an Al Jazeera interview in June 2014, “non-interference does not mean standing by when 
people of a country are facing disaster.”444 For that reason, the question that should pre-
occupy scholars is not whether China interferes in the domestic affairs of African states or not, 
but when it does and what forms interference takes and with what consequences. This is a 
critical departure from the current dominant discourse on China’s non-interference principle 
vis-a-vis its external behaviour in Africa.  
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Earlier on, it was argued that China takes a pragmatic approach to protecting its national 
interests abroad. It was suggested that the approach is wrapped-up in abstract and ambiguous 
statements of policy that are aimed at enhancing its foreign behavior maneuverability and 
“ability to maintain the policy of noninterference which facilitated business with various 
countries.”445 By seeking to maintain its cordial relations with developing countries such as 
South Sudan that are riddled with political instability while at the same time safeguarding its 
national interests (Chinese national and companies operating in those countries), China’s 
intervention is camouflaged in the non-interference rhetoric, which allows it to intervene in the 
internal armed conflict in South Sudan in a non-threatening manner. It should be noted that 
SPLM has in the past been suspicious of China and Chinese oil companies whom they regarded 
as accomplices of the Khartoum government; for instance, in February 2012, South Sudan 
deported an official of CNPC for failing to abide by its regulations. China thus had to tread 
carefully. 
Undeniably, as security threats faced by Chinese companies and nationals working in politically 
volatile countries became grave, China is being compelled to devise more strategies of 
protecting its foreign interests. That does not mean that China’s non-interference principle is 
evolving; rather, it suggests that it is becoming more useful in securing China’s direct interests 
vis-a-vis the contemporary risks threatening China’s national interests. As noted by Zhong 
Jianhua, there has been “no change of policy as Beijing had now realised that tackling conflicts 
had become necessary for advancing Beijing’s historical policy of promoting African 
development.”446 In employing the non-interference principle as a tool for securing its interests 
abroad, the actual security strategies of intervention are the ones that are evolving. Compared 
to the security strategies of Africa’s traditional partners such as the United States of America 
and the European Union, China’s strategies are still “comparatively far less developed.”447 
Furthermore, the extent of China’s engagement in peace and security in Africa is still unclear.448 
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Consequently, there is need to “examine the challenges that both policies face, in terms of the 
need to adjust to the ever-changing national, continental and global environments”449 and to 
explore the motivations and objectives for China’s non-interference principle in Africa.  
Responding to questions raised by readers of the China Daily newspaper, Li Shaye, Director-
General of African Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 27 February 2013 
admitted that “with the expanding cooperation between China and Africa, China's interests in 
Africa are growing bigger and bigger, so political unrest in Africa will be affecting China to a 
much bigger extent.”450 The cumulative effect is that despite a strong official adherence to non-
intervention, China’s stance on intervention in foreign countries is undergoing a process of 
softening (Kassim 2014, p. 35). A major responsibility of a great power is, according to Yan 
Xuetong, the ability to protect its national interests and citizens in foreign countries. The 
conflict that China was confronted with in Libya was the mounting need to protect its foreign 
interests and nationals with its emphasis on adherence to the principle of non-intervention in 
the Libyan conflict. But because protecting one’s interests and citizens in another country 
entails intervening in the affairs of that country, there was a dilemma in China’s “direct 
involvement in, and responses to, international crises, conflicts and their resolutions” (Kassim 
2014, p. 32). Hence, as China recalibrates its perception of threats emanating from intrastate 
armed conflicts in its African partners, it is also rethinking how it should best respond to crises 
in those countries.  
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CHAPTER 8 - Conclusion: Trends and patterns of China’s 
intervention in Africa 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter assesses trends and patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African 
intrastate armed conflicts. The assessment is based on this thesis’ discussion of the historical 
evolvement of China’s intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts as its relative economic 
power, and perception of threats to its interests abroad changed over time. The conclusion 
made in Chapter 4 is that the general trajectory of China’s intervention behaviour can be 
explained by its position in the international system, measured by its relative economic power. 
This is because as China’s relative economic power increased, it expanded its economic 
interests and political influence abroad; and when it decreased from the middle of the Ming 
dynasty to the end of the Century of Humiliation, and during the Cultural Revolution and Great 
Leap Forward, its overseas interests in Africa also decreased due to the inability to maintain 
and protect them. While that is useful for explaining China’s intervention in African intrastate 
armed conflicts, increase or decrease of relative economic power does not in itself copiously 
explain specific variations in China’s intervention behaviour. This is because as postulated by 
neoclassical realism, and as explained in Chapter 3, specific variations in a state’s foreign policy 
can only be explained when systemic factors such as the increase in a state’s relative economic 
power are translated through domestic level variables.  
Following onto that conclusion, Chapters 5 to 7 examined China’s specific interventions in 
intrastate armed conflicts that started between 2011 and 2013 in Libya (2011), Mali (2012), and 
South Sudan (2013) – in particular, the three chapters explored how changes in China’s 
perception of intrastate armed conflicts as being threats to its interests there shaped its 
intervention behaviour. In the three chapters, the discussion of China’s intervention in each of 
the three countries’ armed conflicts began with a historical analysis of their political, economic 
and diplomatic relations with China since their respective independence. Having established 
those basic fundamentals of their bilateral relations with China, the thesis then examined the 
impact of the intrastate armed conflicts that ensued in the three countries on China’s economic 
interests there. The general findings, which are discussed in detail below, are that China’s main 
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motivating factor in intervening in the three countries’ internal conflicts is to protect its 
nationals and economic interests, which were affected by intrastate armed conflicts in the 
three countries. In all three cases, China’s intervention was more pronounced when the 
intrastate armed conflicts threatened its interests suggesting that the perception of intrastate 
armed conflicts as being a threat to its foreign interests was the domestic level factor that 
influenced its intervention behaviour.  
Based on conclusions made in Chapters 4 to 7, the overall argument advanced in this thesis has 
been that China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts is a result of the 
combined effect of an increase in its relative economic power, which compelled it to expand its 
interests into politically volatile countries in search for raw materials and markets to keep the 
engine of its economy on the trot, and changing perception that intrastate armed conflicts in 
Africa were a threat to its interests there. On the basis of this argument, this chapter assesses 
the trends and patterns of China’s intervention in Africa drawing extensively from arguments 
made in the previous chapters, and the more than twelve interviews conducted with Chinese 
and African diplomats, political leaders and scholars. It then discusses how China’s intervention 
behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts challenges existing conventional understandings 
of intervention as a foreign policy tool used by Western great powers to safeguard their 
strategic interests abroad. It then concludes by making a case for an innovative (re-)definition 
of intervention in other states’ internal affairs that enables an analytical assessment of the 
emerging intervention practices of non-Western rising global powers. 
 
8.2 Emerging trends and patterns 
 
8.2.1 Interpretation and implication of the non-intervention principle 
increasingly becoming flexible 
The first trend is that China’s interpretation of the non-intervention principle is becoming more 
flexible and that flexibility is intricately dependent on its relative economic position in the 
international system. The effect is that China now interprets the non-intervention principle 
broadly and flexibly when its relative economic power is on the increase than when it is in 
decline. This is so because China expands its economic interests abroad when its relative 
economic power is higher, which exposes those overseas interests to threats. This point was 
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made in previous chapters where it was argued that due to the lateral pressure, as China’s 
domestic economic grew exponentially, its relative economic power increased, enabling it to 
expand its economic interests abroad, including to some volatile countries such as South Sudan, 
Mali and Libya. As armed conflicts broke out in those countries China found itself entangled in 
their internal conflicts, compelling it to devise strategies to intervene and protect its interests. 
China’s foreign affairs minister, Wang Yi, made a similar observation on 9 March 2016 when he 
said, “like any major country that is growing, China’s overseas interests are expanding… So it 
has become a pressing task for China's diplomacy to better protect our ever-growing overseas 
interests.”451 In seeking to protect those interests, which involves intervention, China has 
shown from the case of Libya, Mali and South Sudan that it is “willing to be more flexible on the 
questions of both host countries’ consent and non-interference in other countries’ internal 
affairs” (Mariani 2015, p. 258).  
While it is apparent that rising powers with expanding global interests will inevitably be 
compelled to protect those interests, and in the process intervene in other states’ internal 
affairs, China is an exceptional rising power. The official Beijing policy is that China does not 
interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This creates a puzzle because protecting its 
economic interests or nationals abroad will invariably involve a degree of intervention in the 
internal affairs of the concerned state. Balancing those contradictory objectives is what has 
resulted in a mismatch between Beijing’s foreign policy in theory and its foreign policy in 
practice. On the one hand, China claims that the non-intervention principle forms the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy, and is unchangeable, but as discussed in previous chapters, 
China is nevertheless intervening in conflicts that threaten its interests. The resultant effect is 
that there seem to be a concerted effort by Beijing to flexibly interpret the non-intervention 
principle in a manner that justifies its intervention behaviour in Africa, in order to maintain its 
‘identity’ as a non-interventionary power, distinct from Western powers. 
What enables the vacillation of the interpretation of the non-intervention principle by China 
from strict and rigid to flexible is foremost the manner in which the principle is formulated and 
articulated by the People’s Republic of China. Like most Chinese foreign policy principles, the 
principle of non-intervention is more of a maxim than something clearly expounded and 
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articulated principle, hence there is no clarity on whether it is just a principle or a policy. The 
pervasiveness of the lack of clarity is such that Chinese foreign policy scholars refer to it as 
either a principle or a foreign policy, with some using the two terms interchangeably. This may 
seem inconsequential, but it has had a fundamental effect on the analysis of China’s external 
intervention behaviour because principles are different from policies.  
Sonia Lucarelli defines principles as “normative propositions that translate values into general 
‘constitutional’ standards for policy action” (2014, p. 10). On the contrary, policy consists of the 
“development and conscious pursuit of some preferred goal or goals” by a government through 
selective political action.452 The action may “include observable behaviors by countries…, or 
verbal pronouncements that do not necessarily lead to follow-up action” (Kaarbo et al. 2002:4). 
The most notable distinction between principle and policy was given by United Kingdom’s 
former Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain when he said:  
“You can lay down sound and general propositions. You can say that your foreign policy 
is to maintain peace…; you can say that it is to use your influence, such as it is, on 
behalf of the right against wrong… you can lay down all these general principles, but 
that is not policy. Surely, if you have a policy you must take the particular situations 
and consider what action or inaction is suitable for those particular situations. That is 
what I myself mean by policy, and it is quite clear that as the situations and conditions 
in foreign affairs continually change from day to day, your policy cannot be stated once 
and for all, it is to be applicable to every situation that arises” (Chamberlain 1937, p. 
33).  
As put by Chamberlain, there is a clear distinction between principles constituting the 
normative superstructure that guide statesmen in the exercise of foreign policy, and foreign 
policy which is political action that though related to is not determined by such normative 
superstructures.  
The implication is that in its current formulation, the Chinese government puts across non-
intervention as both a foreign policy that can evolve based on particular situations, and also as 
a principle that applies to all situations alike, and is unchangeable. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China collectively describes the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence as “the basic norms in developing state to state relations transcending social 
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systems and ideology.”453 At the 60th Anniversary of the initiation of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, President Xi Jinping said “In the new era today, the spirit of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, instead of being outdated, remains as relevant as ever; its 
significance, rather than diminishing, remains as important as ever; and its role, rather than 
being weakened, has continued to grow.” He then reiterated the official People’s Republic of 
China’s rhetoric that “China neither interferes in other countries' internal affairs nor imposes its 
will on others” – declaring that the Five Principles are enshrined in China’s Constitution and are 
the cornerstone of its foreign policy.454 However, in contradiction to the supposed sanctity and 
unchangeable nature of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, he declared that “all good 
principles should adapt to changing times to remain relevant.”455 Yet, as put by Neville 
Chamberlain, principles do not change, policies do. So while articulating it as a principle, 
Chinese leaders in actual effect take the non-intervention principle as a foreign policy that is 
adaptable to changing times – giving China subtle maneuverability in its implementation.  
The maneuverability is reflected in arguments made by Chinese government officials in 
supporting their country’s intervention or non-intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. 
In the case of South Sudan where China, contrary to its policy of not meeting opposition groups 
or rebel forces in foreign countries, met Riek Machar, the leader of a rebel force fighting 
against the South Sudanese government, Zhong Jianhua said: “I think for the past two or three 
decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries… 
When you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs” (Fabricius 2014). 
However, when a journalist referred to that as a change of policy, Zhong Jianhua’s aide 
“pointed out that there had been no change in policy as Beijing had now simply realized that 
tackling conflicts had become necessary for advancing Beijing’s historical policy of promoting 
African development” (Fabricius 2014). In that case, one would wonder whether China’s 
newfound interest in tackling conflicts in Africa does not mean a change in policy that once 
precluded it from intervening in other states’ internal affairs.  
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Regarding the intrastate armed conflict in Libya, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Li 
Baodong said: “China always opposes the use of force in international relations. During Security 
Council consultations on Resolution 1973, China and some other Council members raised some 
specific issue. Regrettably, however, there is no clarification or answer to many of these issues. 
China has serious concerns over some elements of the resolution.”456 Still, despite ‘no 
clarification’ on the specific issues that China had raised, it still cast a vote of abstention on 
UNSC Resolution 1973 approving a ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya and authorizing ‘all necessary 
measures to protect civilians despite it being against its non-intervention principle. China’s 
argument was that it was merely following the wishes of the African Union and the Arab league 
and that it was compelled by ‘special circumstances in Libya.’ However, when the Arab League 
supported a UN Security Council that sought to approve intervention in Syria, China vetoed it. 
“What this means is that China allows itself the greatest room to maneuver, free to endorse or 
oppose the actions of a regional grouping, depending on its interests” (Ching 2012).  
In South Sudan and Mali, for the first time in its history, and in a radical shift to its policy 
against having the People’s Liberation Army troops operating in foreign lands, China sent 
combat troops under the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission instead of the usual non-
military personnel. Retired Major General Xu Guangyu was at pains to explain that the dispatch 
of these forces was not a shift in Beijing’s non-intervention principle. He was quoted in the 
South China Morning Post as saying “China's combat troops will abide by the UN's 
peacekeeping regulations. Soldiers are allowed to open fire only for self-defence purposes, and 
never take positions to help either party during a civil war.”457  
Overall, the formulation of China’s principle of non-intervention is such that its interpretation 
can be manipulated depending on China’s position in the international system – enabling 
“China to semantically update its critique of the existing international order to resonate with 
evolving conceptions of the system” (Richardson 2012, p. 47). When it seeks to gain access into 
Africa, identify with the developing world, or constrain intervention into its own internal affairs 
                                                          
456 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2011, Explanation of vote by 
Ambassador Li Baodong after adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya, 17 March, viewed 10 
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by other states, it extols the non-intervention principle, but when it best suits its interests, it 
flexibly interprets the principle, enabling it to justify its intervention in other states’ internal 
affairs. Thus, as argued by Frank Ching “China's principle of non-interference in another 
country's internal affairs is alive and well, subject to its own interpretation of whether a 
regional grouping's decision regarding a member country is in China's interests” (2012). 
8.2.2 As China’s relative economic power increases, its external intervention is 
increasing 
Another major finding of this study is that generally, China’s intervention in foreign intrastate 
armed conflicts is historically first determined by its relative economic power – because as 
postulated by the lateral pressure theory, it expands its interests abroad in times when its 
relative economic power is on the increase as it searches for new markets and resources. The 
consequential pattern is that China tends to intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts 
when its relative economic power is higher, and vice versa. This pattern has been persistent 
since imperial China. In its heyday as the Middle Kingdom, superior in its technological 
advancement and economy, which contributed approximately 35% of the global economy, 
China was the centre of its own ‘global’ tributary order. With such a grander relative economic 
power, Chinese emperors had the latent right of intervention in the internal affairs of other 
nations. Although the right to intervene was rarely exercised, the awareness of the right and a 
tendency to intervene when circumstances demanded it was notable.  
When the relative economic power decreased, as other states developed at a faster pace than 
China, the latent right to intervene in the internal affairs of surrounding nations was lost. 
Instead, in times of inferior relative economic power it was China that became subject to 
external intervention in its internal affairs. This was the case during the century of humiliation 
when China was relegated to the peripheries of the global pecking order of states. Combined 
with the effects of being forcibly incorporated into the European-dominated Westphalian 
international system of states where relative economic and military capabilities mattered more 
than cultural supremacy, China lost its claim to the ‘Heavenly Mandate’ and to being the 
Middle Kingdom at the core of its own global order, and with it, the latent right of intervention 
in other states’ internal affairs. Thus, the cyclic pattern: “when Chinese power prevailed, the 
empire was able to force its tribute system and its language of diplomatic discourse on 
surrounding peoples. When the empire was weak, the Chinese perception of the world had 
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little effect on the course of events. The ultimate fact is the fact of power” (Schwartz 1968, p. 
278).  
Benjamin I. Schwartz’s observation that the ultimate fact in China’s foreign policy behaviour is 
relative power resonates with the trajectory of its external intervention behaviour in intrastate 
armed conflicts in Africa. Thus, in order to understand how China interprets its non-
intervention principle, there is need to “review and compare several lists of historical 
intervention events to capture the phenomenon over time and to become aware of the 
variation in the way intervention is construed” (Feste 2003, p. 178). The descriptive historical 
analysis of China’s intervention in foreign conflicts discussed in Chapter 4 suggested that 
China’s intervention in other nations’ internal affairs has always been commensurate with its 
relative economic power. This is because a state’s interest in foreign affairs, particularly the 
internal affairs of other states, rises commensurately with growth in its global power. 
From the imperial times of the Ming and Qing Dynasty, when China was at the centre of its 
global system, “it maintained order in the system and reserved the right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of its vassals” (Wang 2011, p. 145; see also Cohen 1973, p. 474). At the prime of 
its imperial power, and as the paramount leader of the tributary states, China possessed a 
latent right of intervention in their internal affairs, but that went only so far as its relative 
economic power enabled. The ‘Century of Humiliation’ was different – China was riddled by 
political instability and poverty. From being the most powerful nation in its known world, China 
found itself among the peripheral states in the European-dominated Westphalian international 
system – “out of step with its long former history as Asia’s premier power and a major global 
trader” (Hough and Malik 2015, p. 362). Instead of being the one intervening in the affairs of 
other nations, it was the one being subjected to intervention by other states such as Japan, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, France, Portugal and the Netherlands. United States 
overt military intervention in China only stopped at the end of the Chinese civil war and 
establishment of the communist regime in 1949 (Feste 2003, p. 180). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, by the time Mao established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
China’s understanding of intervention was one of national humiliation, oppression and 
exploitation by powerful Western states that played active roles in its internal affairs. To 
protect itself from hegemonic global powers that sought to intervene in its internal affairs, Mao 
espoused the principles of state sovereignty, equality among states and respect for other states’ 
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territorial integrity. Non-intervention became the dominant principle upon which China’s 
foreign policy was based. But as put by Peter Hough and Shahin Malik, what remained an 
overriding logic in Chinese collective mentality is that the century of humiliation was a result of 
China “falling behind the Europeans, Americans and Japanese economically in the nineteenth 
century when those nations industrialised” (2015, p. 362). 
Emerging from the ‘almost-zero’ per capita GDP growth China had from 1800-1950 (Zhu 2012, 
p. 103). China’s understanding and experience of external intervention was as a victim of 
foreign subjugation. But under Mao, there was limited economic recovery in the highly 
unstable years of the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Xiaodong Zhu, a Professor of Economics at 
the University of Toronto suggests that from 1950 to 1978 “the average growth rate of real per 
capita GDP was a modest 3 percent a year, not much different from the growth rate in the 
United States though starting from a much lower base” (2012, p. 106). Consequently, China’s 
relative economic power improved albeit not to levels comparable with the economies of the 
United States, European states, or the Soviet Union. But compared to countries in the 
developing world, especially Africa, China’s relative economic power increased to levels that 
enabled it to expand its interests abroad, and exercise influence over them. 
While it emphasized the Westphalian principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-
intervention in internal affairs of other states mainly to protect itself from external intervention 
in its domestic affairs by superior global powers, China did intervene in intrastate armed 
conflicts for independence in Africa. Beyond supporting liberation movements, it also 
supported dissident armed groups fighting Soviet-aligned governments in independent African 
countries. That resulted in the suspension of diplomatic relations with several independent 
African countries. For, in Africa and the Third World, Mao’s China had secured its position as 
leader of the Third World, and backed by an improving economy, it was confident of its 
geopolitical competitiveness in the struggle for influence over Africa and the rest of the Third 
World.  
China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts receded when its economy faltered 
under the combined weight of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and 
political squabbles that followed the subsequent death of Mao led China to increasingly 
abandon active support for liberation war movements and internationalization of its 
revolutionary ideology in Africa. The economy that had been able to support 
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internationalization of the revolution to the third world, albeit with great difficulties, was no 
longer able to do so, as it failed to rival economic and political support granted to African 
countries by the United States and the Soviet Union.  Thus from the mid-1960S onward Chinese 
intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts slowed down until it was almost negligible 
when Deng Xiaoping took over leadership of the country.  
The shift in China’s national focus from revolution to economic production under Deng 
Xiaoping illustrates the importance and emphasis placed by post-Mao Chinese national leaders 
on strengthening China’s relative economic power. As they replaced ideological considerations 
with economic interest considerations in the theory and practice of China’s foreign policy, they 
argued that China’s contributions to international affairs should be commensurate with its 
relative economic power. As discussed in Chapter 4, according to Deng Xiaoping, the 
disengagement from Africa and from playing a prominent role in its internal affairs was a 
tactical and strategic foreign policy action meant to give China an opportunity to improve its 
relative economic power to levels comparable with the United States. From then on, Deng 
Xiaoping argued that China’s role and participation in international affairs was going to be 
commensurate with its economic power, suggesting that as its economic power increased so 
also would the role it plays in international affairs.  
Sustained increases in China’s domestic economic since 1978, massively increased its relative 
economic power. From having a GNI of US$213 billion in 1980, it reached US$5.752 trillion in 
2010 before doubling to US$10.1 trillion in 2014, making it the second largest economy in the 
world. Also, in 2013, China became Africa’s biggest trading partner, surpassing the United 
States. As was predicted by Deng Xiaoping in 1984, China is now a powerful state, playing a 
bigger role in international affairs as well as contributing more to the Third World. “We are 
seeing more of China flexing its muscles in Africa, exerting influence on African governments 
more than it did before… and that because China is now a big economic power”458 is how a 
diplomat at the African Union reflected on the impact of increases in China’s relative economic 
power. Another respondent working at IGAD in Addis Ababa concurred, but added that the 
“increase in China’s global economic power explains its growing footprint in African civil wars, 
especially in South Sudan and Mali where it is getting entangled in regional geopolitical 
                                                          
458 Interview with AU diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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dynamics in its quest to protect its interests.”459 China is now “truly powerful, exerting a much 
greater influence in the world.”460  Accordingly, one can conclude that China’s external 
intervention behaviour is commensurate with its relative economic power; and that as its 
economic interests expand in Africa, China is “putting a premium on strengthening the stability 
of African countries, irrespective of their political ideology, especially those that are major 
exporters of raw materials or have a significant Chinese presence” (Shinn 2016).  
As enunciated by the lateral pressure theory discussed in Chapter 3, as China’s relative 
economic power rises, it is increasingly expanding its economic interests in Africa, and its 
citizens are also settling and working in Africa. Gary Li concurringly states: “as Chinese 
investments abroad increase every year; overseas Chinese have found themselves caught up in 
conflicts which has required Beijing to expand substantial resources to extract them” (2015). 
Similarly, Irene Chan and Mingjiang Li also argue that “the expansion of Chinese presence 
throughout the world calls for more attention to protecting Chinese interests overseas” (2015, 
p. 266). The effect is that as some of the African countries plunge into intrastate armed 
conflicts, China is being compelled to intervene in order to protect its nationals and interests, 
while balancing that imperative with its identity as a non-interventionist power. The underlying 
factor is that “the growth of Chinese power and capability has certainly made it probable for 
China to adopt a more proactive stance in protecting its nationals and investments in other 
parts of the world” (Chan and Li 2015, p. 266). Thus, as put by Bernardo Mariani, “as befitting 
its global economic presence and place in the world, China can be expected to play a leading 
role in multilateral for a, constructively engaging with critical events beyond a rhetorical 
insistence on non-interference, and leading change in the peace and security agenda – not 
simply reacting to crises” (2015, p. 267).  
 
8.2.3 Changes in perception of foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threats is 
leading to more intervention 
Based on the mutability of China’s non-intervention principle, the emerging trend is that China 
is taking a liberal interpretation of the non-intervention principle, and deepening its external 
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460 Deng, X. 1984, ‘Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the 
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intervention whenever its interests are affected by intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. With 
armed conflicts increasingly proving to be detrimental to China’s economic interests in Africa, 
there is consensus among Chinese government officials, political leaders, and scholars that 
those interests ought to be protected suggesting that they now increasingly perceive intrastate 
armed conflicts in Africa to be a threat to their economic interests there. At the Central 
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs461 held in Beijing in November 2014, President 
Xi underscored that “we should protect China’s foreign interests and continue to improve our 
capacity to provide such protection.”462 Yan Xuetong, a leading international relations scholar 
in China, also suggested that China should “adopt active policies to protect its rapidly expanded 
national interests.”463 In concurrence, Pang Zhongying (2008), another renowned scholar wrote: 
“China needs to carefully consider its right to intervene in humanitarian crises and severe 
attacks on Chinese interests or nationals.” What, however, differs among them is how China 
ought to protect its foreign economic interests from intrastate armed conflicts in Africa.  
Those who subscribe to self-help realist notions expect a rising power like China to back up its 
“economic forays with a projection of military might.”464 But President Xi, in keeping with the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference in other 
countries’ internal affairs, contends that China should “promote peaceful resolution of 
differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, and oppose the 
                                                          
461 “The conference was attended by members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 
members of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, officials of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress, State Councilors, President of the Supreme People's Court, Procurator-
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Special Administrative Region.” (See: ‘Xi eyes more enabling int'l environment for China's peaceful 
development’ 2014, Xinhua, 29 November, viewed 29 November 2014,   
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1, no. 1, p.33. 
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wilful use or threat of force.”465 The official rhetorical opposition to militant approaches to 
protecting its foreign interests is what is mostly construed as China’s adherence to the non-
intervention principle, yet for those who keep an eye on China’s historical and contemporary 
intervention patterns in Africa since the 1950s, the question has never been whether China 
intervenes or not, but when does it intervene and how, especially when “Chinese nationals and 
investments in the region [Africa] are threatened or there are interruptions in the flow from 
Africa of critical raw materials that support China’s economy” (Shinn 2016).  
 
8.2.4 No opposition to intervention by Western global powers 
Based on the above patterns, one of related emerging trends is that China is gradually relaxing 
its opposition to intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts by Western global powers 
such as the United States, France, and NATO. According to Kjell Engelbrekt Beijing is 
demonstrating “flexibility and an acceptance of the notion that handling of challenges to peace 
and security may be ‘delegated’ to authoritative transnational bodies in the regions concerned” 
(2014, p. 51). David Shinn (2013b) concurs: “as threats to Chinese interests in Africa increase, 
there has been a steady strengthening of its willingness to cooperate with others” Furthermore, 
“while it still adheres to the principle of non-interference, China no longer opposes 
international intervention organised by the West, as long as the intervention is legitimate and 
justifiable” (Pang 2008). Yang Razali Kassim agrees that “since the late 1990s China’s attitude to 
international intervention entered a process of change… China no longer simply challenges or 
opposes international intervention initiated by the West” (2014, p. 33). The shift is typified in 
China’s consent to adoption of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, allowing the 
international community to take all means necessary including military intervention to protect 
civilians in countries were the state is unable to. Since then China has supported, directly and 
indirectly unilateral intervention and multilateral intervention led by Western powers in 
countries such as Sudan, Mali, and Libya. 
In the case of Libya, China allowed the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions, 
asset freezes and a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime. The no-fly zone in Libya was heavily 
lobbied for by France, in order to decapitate Gaddafi’s air force which gave it strategic 
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advantage over the NTC. As discussed in Chapter 5, Chinese foreign policy makers and 
diplomats at the United Nations were aware of the intended objective of the no-fly zone, and 
as put by Li Baodong, in deliberations leading to adoption of Resolution 1973, China had raised 
those concerns. But, regardless of its concerns against military intervention in Libya not being 
addressed, China abstained from voting, giving its tacit approval to the NATO-led military 
intervention in Libya. As argued in Chapter 5, the main reason for Chinese support of the 
multilateral intervention in Libya is that the Gaddafi regime had rebuffed all attempts toward a 
political settlement of the armed conflict, further endangering Chinese businesses, assets and 
nationals in Libya.  
In Mali, China supported France’s unilateral intervention in Mali because as put by He Wenping, 
“the situation in Mali was urgent.”466 What made ‘the situation urgent’ is that the Tuareg and 
the Islamists were overrunning Bamako as political bickering in the Transitional Government 
continued. The implication of the Islamists taking over Mali is that China was likely to lose 
significant investments in the Malian agriculture, and construction sector which it dominated. 
Furthermore, French military intervention to retain Malian control of Northern Mali protected 
China’s interests in Niger because there was high probability of the Tuareg rebellion spreading 
into Niger where other Tuareg people are. In Niger, China’s state-owned SINO-U had invested 
US$300 million in a uranium mine at Azelik; CNPC had invested over US$5 billion to develop oil 
reserves and to build a refinery and pipeline in eastern Niger (Shinn and Eisenman 2010:246). 
Both Azelik and eastern Niger are adjacent to Northern Mali which was under the control of 
Islamists and is believed to have significant oil reserves (Boeke and Shuurman 2015, p. 806). By 
supporting French intervention in Mali, China sought to have its interests protected at minimal 
cost to itself, and thus it found it pragmatic to support the intervention.  
Another emerging trend is that China is using multilateral institutions to intervene in African 
intrastate armed conflicts. As argued above, until the 1990s China had a general mistrust of 
international organisations such as the United Nations which it considered extensions of United 
States’ hegemony. “Until the early 1970s, the Chinese government often criticized the UN as a 
faced and instrument of Western domination of the world” (Wang and Rosenau 2009, p. 14). 
But with the increase in its position in the international system as its relative economic power 
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increased, China is increasingly embracing these institutions and exploiting them to its 
advantage. Its actions in the three intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan 
suggests a trend that China is increasingly using its position in the United Nations Security 
Council to protect its interests against armed conflicts in Africa, which entails intervention in 
the countries’ internal affairs. Through the U.N. Security Council, China is taking deliberate 
actions that attempt “to influence designated behaviour of individuals in another nation 
without engaging in a continuing contest of violence” (Feste 2003, p. 191). This strategy fits 
into its objective of seeking to influence the outcome of intrastate armed conflicts in target 
countries through influence rather than force. Furthermore, in the camouflage of multilateral 
interventions, China maintains its legitimacy and identity as a power that does not intervene in 
the internal affairs of other states.   
China’s gradual relaxing of its opposition to intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts by 
Western global powers such as the United States, France, and NATO is motivated by two 
factors: Beijing’s perceived global power status, and pragmatism. The increase in China’s 
relative economic power has effectively boosted Beijing’s self-awareness as a global power. 
Combined with the expansion of its interests abroad, China is also simultaneously realising the 
limitations to its unilateral capabilities to protect those interests. This is where its pragmatism 
comes in. If it is not able to fully protect its foreign interests alone, then when Western powers, 
multilateral institutions and the United Nations take the initiative to resolve armed conflicts in 
areas where China’s interests are threatened, there is little or no reason to object. Thus as 
argued in the case of Mali, Libya and South Sudan, as long as China’s foreign interests are 
secured through action taken by Western governments, the United Nations or other 
multilateral organisations, China is increasingly supporting such action because it serves its 
interests. In addition, intervention by multilateral institutions and the United Nations although 
instigated and led by Western powers is often considered legitimate intervention. Because of 
that veneer of legitimacy, China is increasingly supporting their intervention since its foreign 
interests will be secured at minimal cost to Beijing. At the same time, if there is backlash 
against intervention by Western powers as was the case in Libya, China will simply abdicate 
responsibility and exonerate itself. Either way, China stands to benefit from Western 
intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts that threaten Beijing’s interests there. 
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8.2.5 China is increasingly using UN Peacekeeping Operations to intervene in 
Africa 
In line with the trend of using multilateral institutions to intervene in the internal affairs of 
other states, China is also increasingly using non-threatening multilateral intervention methods 
to protect its interests abroad. This changed is partly in line with the country’s “larger foreign 
policy strategy, during the past two decades, of supporting multilateral solutions rather than 
unilateral actions to address strategic threats” (Hirono and Lanteigne 2012, p. 1). One such 
method is the contribution of peacekeeping and peace monitoring forces to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. In the past China was opposed to peacekeeping operations, 
which it considered intervention in other states’ internal affairs. Shogo Suzuki notes that China 
“viewed PKOs with the utmost suspicion, frequently denouncing them as tools of US or Soviet 
imperialism, and refusing to make any financial or human contributions” (2012, p. 29). Yet since 
its first civilian observers contribution to the UN Peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989, 
China has risen to become the highest personnel contributor among the UN Security Council 
members, and the 8th largest contributor of police, UN Military Experts on Mission, and troops 
(3 042 in total) to UN Peacekeeping operations as of 30 April 2016,467 demonstrating “how far 
its foreign policy in this regard has shifted and changed in a relatively short period of time” 
(Huang 2012, p. 16). 
Its financial contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations also increased from 4% in 2012 to 
6.64% in the 2014-2015 period,468 making China the 6th largest financial contributor to UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. The highest five are: United States (28.38%); Japan (10.83%); France 
(7.22%); Germany (7.14%); and the United Kingdom (6.68%).469 In December 2015, Wang Min, 
China’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, told Xinhua that China’s 
contributions for the 2016-2018 period will increase to 7.9%, and will be expected to further 
                                                          
467 United Nations 2016, Ranking of military and police contributions to UN Operations, viewed 15 May 
2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/apr16_2.pdf ; see also: 
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468 United Nations 2016, Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United 
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469 United Nations 2016, Financing peacekeeping, viewed 15 May 2016,  
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increase to 10.2% in the following next three years.470 In a major surprise, during his UN 
General Assembly speech on September 2015 President Xi Jinping announced:  
China’s decision to establish a 10-year, US1 billion Chin-UN peace and development 
fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more 
to world peace and development… China will join the new UN Peacekeeping Capability 
Readiness System and thus has decided to take the lead in setting up a permanent 
peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops… 
China will provide a total of US$100 million of free military assistance to the African 
Union in the next five years to support establishment of the African Standby Force and 
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis.471  
In May 2016, barely a year after President Xi made that announcement, China’s permanent 
representative to the UN, Liu Jieyi, signed an agreement with Edmond Mulet, UN Secretary-
General's chef de cabinet, regarding a multi-year US$200 million contribution by China toward 
the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund. As reported in Chinese press, the two parties 
agreed that the US$200 million will be hosted at the UN, which will set up a committee made 
up of personnel from China and the UN.472 When fully implemented, these initiatives will make 
China one of the largest human and financial contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations; and 
as put by Wang Min, “the increase is an objective reflection of China’s national strength in the 
international system.”473 
Pang Zhongying asserts that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations reflects a shift 
in its foreign policy of non-intervention in other states. Wang (2013) describes it as a drastic 
shift “from ardent opposition in the 1970s to avid support in the 2000s.” Marc Lanteigne 
attributes the shift to “China’s growing global diplomatic, strategic and economic interests, as 
well as the country’s increasing acceptance of “responsibility to protect” (or R2P, known in 
Chinese as baohu de zeren) principles, [which] all prompted a revisiting of the robust 
peacekeeping question…, including whether China would be in a position to send combat 
forces in addition to support and engineering personnel” (2014, p. 8). China is therefore 
embracing “the current constellation of international institutions, rules, and norms as a means 
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to promote its national interests,”474 such that “the growth of Beijing’s peacekeeping role 
seems, however, to have been accompanied by a subtle shift in China’s position on state 
sovereignty” (Tardy and Wyss 2014, p. 9), putting “it in a position to help protect Chinese 
interests in Africa” (Shinn 2016). 
With the exception of Libya, in addition to non-military personnel, China contributed combat or 
security troops with peace enforcement responsibilities to MINUSMA in Mali, and UNMISS in 
South Sudan. Previously, China had been content with sending engineers, doctors and other 
non-military personnel. Both Missions are ‘multidimensional and integrated’ UN missions that 
take place in unstable situations characterised by ongoing armed conflicts where they have a 
mandate to use force. Unlike peacekeeping operations that normally require the consent to the 
target state, peace enforcement operations “are not based on consent and are deployed to 
create – rather than maintain peace” (Heldt and Wallensteen 2007, p. 10). Furthermore, 
because they are aimed at rebuilding a state, which includes holding of elections, reform and 
restructuring of the legal, judiciary, security sector, these ‘multidimensional and integrated’ UN 
missions “are nothing short of attempts at nation-building, that seek to remake a state’s 
political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements” (Bertran 1995, p. 389). They 
invariably “entail a substantial degree of top-down social engineering..., [they] are problematic 
in that they may constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the host state” (Suzuki 2012, p. 32). 
Accordingly, China’s peacekeeping operations in Mali and South Sudan are as defined by Birger 
Heldt and Peter Wallensteen as “third-party state interventions that involves the deployment 
of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state… Is neutral 
towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behaviour” (Heldt and 
Wallensteen 2007, p. 11). 
The puzzle is that China portrays itself as a ‘responsible global power’ that respects state 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. But, as put by Shogo 
Suzuki, “China’s decision to get involved in various PKOs since the end of the Cold War 
contradicts these self-professed principles… [because] they entail a considerable erosion of the 
host state’s sovereignty” (2012, p. 32). Yet by supporting and actively participating in non-
traditional peacekeeping operations, the use of force, and the ‘use of all means necessary’ to 
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fulfill their mandate, gnaws at other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
deployment of the People’s Liberation Army soldiers under the UN missions in Mali and South 
Sudan demonstrates, as already noted by Marc Lanteigne, that “China continues to make use 
of its support for UN peacekeeping operations not only to advance its strategic agenda but to 
offer an alternative approach to traditional intervention by great powers” (2014, p. 9). In the 
case of South Sudan, a diplomat at the African Union suggested that China had vigorously 
attempted to have the UN troops assigned to protect oil refineries and other Chinese assets in 
South Sudan. Although they eventually were stationed elsewhere, what the Chinese lobby 
meant is that it viewed the UN Peacekeeping mission in South Sudan as a tool to protect its 
interests there rather than as an altruistic attempt at maintaining peace.  
In concurrence, Pang Zhongying states: “China has gradually realized that peacekeeping 
missions can help to secure a peaceful international environment, which works in China’s 
national interests as the country begins to build a sound external environment for its long-term 
economic growth and social development” (2005, p. 81). Although arguing that Chinese 
peacekeepers are not always deployed in resource-rich countries, or that they are a “strategic 
prerequisite to resource access,” Bernardo Mariani agrees that “broadly, China’s involvement 
in peacekeeping stems from the recognition that China’s plans for economic growth and 
modernization are increasingly linked to a stable, secure and peaceful world, and that UN 
peacekeeping operations work in China’s national interest” (2015, p. 256). UN Peacekeeping 
operations are therefore a convenient balance and pragmatic tool for expanding its influence 
over the duration and effect of intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. “These operations suggest… 
a move towards a new model which bridges the gap between more traditional UN 
peacekeeping and the more forceful Western-led humanitarian interventions” (Cottey and 
Bikin-Kita 2006, p. 29); as “China aligns its foreign policy with its expanding global interests” 
(Hille 2013). 
 
8.2.6 From passive and inactive to assertive and proactive intervention 
approach 
Another emerging trend is that China’s approach to intrastate armed conflicts in Africa have 
cautiously, selectively, and incrementally evolved from being inactive and passive, to being 
proactive and assertive in defense of its economic interests. The passive and inactive approach 
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in Libya is to a greater extend related to the perception in Beijing that armed conflicts in Africa 
did not affect its interests there. But with the impact that the Libyan conflict had on its 
nationals and investments there, there has been a radical shift toward a more proactive and 
assertive approach, which was the case in Mali, but more so in South Sudan. This is also 
because China realizes, unlike before the Libyan case, that its economic development requires 
energy and primary commodities in Africa, and that its ability to access those resources and 
sustain its economic growth is tied to stability in those African countries. Accordingly, “peace 
and security in Africa is suddenly China’s interest too” (Allison 2015). 
The shift toward assertive and proactive intervention is also because as China’s relative 
economic power increases, and as its interests in Africa become entrenched, it is assuming 
greater global responsibilities in order to create a conducive international environment for its 
advancement. Since 2010, China overtook the United States to become Africa’s biggest trading 
partner. With the second largest economy in the world, and with interests and influence 
extended beyond its borders and immediate Asian region, there is also an expectation that it 
should play a major role in global governance. Although it denies it is a major global power, 
choosing instead to describe itself as a developing country, there is global consensus, and 
consensus within China as well, that it is a major global power. The pursuance of ‘major-power 
diplomacy’ by China especially under President Xi Jinping suggests a growing confidence and 
acceptance among China’s leadership of its new global power status475 and it “is increasingly 
confident in casting itself as a great power” (Yang 2009, p. 31). That acceptance of China’s 
“status as one of the only two major powers and its attendant responsibilities (and the 
responsibilities of other states to China) is clear and being translated into China’s foreign policy 
actions and intentions” (Cook 2015, p. 114). Accordingly, there is increased domestic and 
international consensus on the “impracticability of keeping a low profile and non-interference, 
as China faces the inevitable need to protect its overseas interests either in a proactive or 
passive way” (Chan and Li 2015, p. 258-259).  
Another factor contributing to the shift toward assertive and proactive intervention is that 
China’s relations with African countries are transitioning from being influenced by ideology and 
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the Sino-Soviet rivalry over geopolitical influence in independent Africa to being influenced by 
economic interests. This “shift on foreign policy orientation is also tied to larger systemic 
processes that affect the nation’s proclivity for foreign engagement and its capability for such 
activity. This allows the question of national interests and capabilities to be separately 
examined rather than take them as given characteristics of autonomous agents” (Feste 2003, p. 
186). Unlike in the past when it did not interfere with conflicts in Mali, and South Sudan due to 
ideological and geopolitical considerations, the burgeoning of economic and trade relations 
with these countries compels it to intervene in cases where its interests are threatened. In such 
cases, as illustrated in Libya, Mali and South Sudan, China takes a liberal interpretation of the 
non-intervention principle, justifying its intervention in those countries’ internal armed 
conflicts and allowing other global powers, and multilateral organisations to intervene. 
In most African countries, the protection of China’s economic interests and nationals are 
guaranteed by the host African government. In many respects this fact absolved China of the 
responsibility to protect its interests in cases of political instability and armed conflicts erupting, 
as long as the host state remained intact. This explains why China delayed intervention in Libya 
and was historically indifferent to insurrections and coup d’états in Mali – it considered the 
regimes in the two countries to be strong enough to guarantee the safety of its citizens and 
assets there. The emerging transition from passivity to proactive intervention in African 
intrastate armed conflicts that is discussed in this study is therefore motivated by the failure of 
African governments to protect Chinese interests and nationals in the event of intrastate 
armed conflicts breaking out. So, even though China demanded that the governments of Mali 
and Libya protect its economic interests there, they still failed to force China to take action to 
protect them. The case was different in South Sudan. In hindsight, given the failures of the 
Malian and Libyan governments to protect Chinese economic interests, in South Sudan China 
was both assertive and proactive in intervening in the conflict and protecting its nationals and 
economic interests.    
From the above discussion it has been argued that as shown from the cases of Libya, Mali, and 
South Sudan, China has moved from ambivalent intervention to reactive multilateral 
intervention and to proactive bilateral intervention. What, however, remains scope for further 
research is whether China will remain proactive and assertive in its intervention in African 
intrastate armed conflicts. If it remains on the above intervention trajectory, it can be argued 
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that China’s future intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts will remain influenced by 
Beijing perception of the threat imposed by the armed conflict on its interests abroad. Where 
its interests are affected materially, China will be more proactive and assertive in its bilateral 
and multilateral intervention, but where its interests are not significantly affected, it may be 
passive and reactionary because as shown in this study, Beijing’s intervention is mainly 
motivated by its perception of threat caused by a foreign intrastate armed conflicts on its 
interests. 
 
8.3 Implications for understandings of intervention 
Apparent from this study is that the nature and method of China’s intervention in African 
intrastate armed conflicts does not squarely fit into the dominant IR understanding of 
intervention as a non-consensual action, usually military in nature taken by a great power 
against another state. Part of the reason is that the dominant understanding of intervention is 
consistent with the dictionary definition of intervention as a ‘noun of action’ that explains “the 
action of intervening, ‘stepping in’, or interfering in any affair, so as to affect its course or 
issue,”476 which suits realists arguments. This conceptualisation of intervention as a non-
consensual concrete action by a sovereign state is also attributable to the behaviourist 
approach which is concerned with an operational definition of intervention. As a result, as 
argued in Chapter 2, literature on intervention is “pervaded with discussions of military 
interventions, propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, 
and ideological interventions, not to mention customs interventions and other highly specific 
actions through which one state experiences the impact of another” (Rosenau 1969, p. 344-
345). Since the “width of activities this term can cover”477 is inexhaustible, understanding 
intervention in that sense makes it imprecise and ‘extremely ambiguous’478 - conveying diverse 
meanings to different actors and scholars. 
Current understandings of intervention place state sovereignty at the centre of the 
intervention discourse. Although principles such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) attempt 
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to limit state sovereignty, the reality is that the current global system is still essentially a 
sovereign order in which sovereign states constitute the core units that at times mandates or 
delegate their individual and collective right to act to multilateral institutions. However, since 
multilateral organisations, be they Regional Organisations (ROs) or International Organisations 
(IOs) are also part of the sovereign order, intervention can no longer be limited to acts by 
sovereign states. ROs and IOs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), etc. are known to have 
intervened in several intrastate and interstate armed conflicts on behalf of their sovereign 
member states. This means that states that are either opposed to intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states, or those that lack the material capabilities to unilaterally intervene in 
foreign conflicts can do so through multilateral institutions. 479 What this suggests is that a 
contemporary definition of intervention ought to take into consideration the linkage between 
sovereign states and multilateral institutions. This is particularly important when analysing 
interventions by rising powers which in most cases do not yet possess the capabilities or the 
political will to conduct unilateral interventions, but that instead use regional and international 
organisations to achieve their intervention objectives in foreign conflicts. 
Secondly, contrary to the notion that intervention only consist of action rather than inaction, it 
can be argued that by not taking action in cases where if action had been taken a different 
outcome would have been reached, states actually intervene. Peter Schraeder explains this 
view in a hypothetical situation: “if Israel were attacked simultaneously by and subjected to an 
extended military conflict with all its Arab neighbors, complete U.S. neutrality most likely would 
ensure Israeli defeat” (Schraeder 1989, p. 2). So even if the United States would not have 
directly intervened, by withholding its support for Israel, it would have intervened because its 
inaction would have affected the direction, duration and outcome of the conflict. Another 
notable example is China’s tacit support for an imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya which 
significantly tilted the balance of power in the Libyan armed conflict against the Gaddafi regime 
leading to its downfall. If China had used its veto in the United Nations Security Council, the no-
fly zone that incapacitated the Gaddafi’s air force would not have been imposed and a different 
outcome might have obtained. By abstaining, China effectively determined the duration and 
possible outcome of the conflict. Using abstention from voting in the UNSC resolution 1978 
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(2011) that imposed a no-fly zone against Libya paved the way for military intervention by 
NATO was part of China’s strategy of intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts through 
inaction. As put by Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor, “abstention is an expedient strategy for China, 
since it precludes both criticism from the West regarding obstructionist opposition to 
contentious peace operations and criticism from the developing world, allowing China either to 
disassociate itself from controversial operations or to remain in accordance with its doctrine of 
non-interference even with respect to popular peace operations” (2012, p. 11). Thus, 
intervention is not confined to actions by sovereign states and International Organizations such 
as the United Nations. It also includes their inaction. 
Thirdly, intervention can be defined as an action or inaction undertaken by a sovereign state or 
an intergovernmental actor of the international system, the purpose of which is to affect the 
duration, direction or outcome of an intrastate armed conflict. Implicit within this definition is 
the non-consensual nature of the action or inaction taken by the intervening actor. The widely 
held view is that where there is consent, there is legitimacy, therefore the act is not considered 
as amounting to intervention. As a result, intervening actors strive to get the consent of the 
target of the intervention to avoid the controversies of non-consensual intervention. The 
challenge with consent is that it is difficult to determine whether it has even been given 
voluntarily by the appropriate authority or whether it has even been given in the first place. In 
the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo versus 
Uganda) case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered arguments by Uganda that its 
armed forces were in the DRC at the invitation of the latter even though it was clear that the 
DRC government did not have effective control of major parts of the country. Similarly, states 
whose foreign policy is against intervention use consent to justify their intervention in other 
states. For instance, China argues that it is mediating the conflict in South Sudan at the 
invitation of the parties involved; and therefore its actions are not intervention. Susan D. Wing 
describe it as intervention by invitation (2016, p. 71). But even when interventions are 
consensual or by invitation they also “subvert the managerial capacity of the state vis-a-vis the 
welfare of its citizens” (Conteh-Morgan 2001). Accordingly, the challenge with making consent 
or its absence central to the conceptualization of intervention is that the same act, or inaction 
taken with the objective of affecting the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate conflict 
may be an act of intervention or not by merely determining whether consent was given by the 
target state. 
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The issue of whether or not there was consent potentially leads to inconsistency and lack of 
precision in the meanings attached to intervention – the understanding of intervention will be 
‘structured by pre-existing vocabularies’ and dependent on what states say intervention is and 
is not. As observed by Christian Reus-Smit, “just as meanings attached to words can change 
over time, actors can use different words to refer to the same thing;” 480 making the 
conceptualization of intervention subjective and dependent on state interests. For example, 
the United States’ support for rebel movements in Nicaragua was considered as intervention 
whereas China’s support of liberation movements in Africa was seen as ‘friendly’ support. 
Some may argue that the purpose of intervention and the relationship between the intervening 
actor and the target of intervention determines whether an action is considered to be an act of 
intervention or not. As an example, the government of South Sudan welcomed China’s 
mediation efforts in the country’s civil war, saying: “we welcome the Chinese role which we 
believe is constructive and seeks to resolve the conflict in South Sudan;”481 but when the 
United States attempted to aid the process by imposing sanctions on those forces that could 
threaten the stability in South Sudan, the South Sudanese government accused the United 
States of meddling in its internal affairs,482 yet the objective of the sanctions was to compel 
unwilling opposition and government leaders to respect the peace agreement signed in Addis 
Ababa. It cannot be argued that the United States had an ill-motive in forcing parties to abide 
by a peace agreement they had agreed upon. As shown in these two examples, if the 
conceptualization of intervention is left to the whims of states to decide, then anything can 
either be intervention or not depending on the actors involved. It would simply make the 
concept more subjective and unscientific, giving it a “perplexing vagueness of meaning” 
(Winfield 1932, p. 236). 
In an attempt to suit different circumstances, but in no way different from the above, Martha 
Finnemore suggests that “to qualify as intervention states had to use the term to describe the 
activity. Those involved had to understand that they were engaging in something called 
‘intervention’ and had to use the term when writing to and talking with one another at the 
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time” (Finnemore 2003, p. 11-12). As previously argued, rather than avoiding vagueness and 
subjectivity in defining ‘intervention’, Martha Finnemore adds to the confusion and amplifies 
the term’s vagueness. Intervening states always justify their actions and do not usually refer to 
their actions as interventions. President Hollande framed his country’s 2013 military 
intervention in Mali “as repayment of the country’s historical debt toward Mali and this as a 
more acceptable framework of gift and counter gift between states and peoples” (Wing 2016, p. 
72). Even more, states such as China that claim strict adherence to the principle of non-
interference never describe their actions as intervention even in cases where they are. In cases 
when it does intervene, along the same lines as President Hollande, China describes the 
intervention as mutually beneficial for the country it would have intervened in. Accordingly, the 
conceptualization of intervention should go beyond the “telltale terminology… [because states] 
often engage in practices, and make justificatory claims, without describing what they are 
doing, or arguing their cases, with recognizable signature terms (‘intervention’, ‘sovereignty’, 
‘rights’, ‘responsibilities’, ‘democracy’, etc.)” (Reus-Smit 2013, p. 1059). Therefore, there is 
need for a conceptualization that “form the basis for a general theory of intervention”483 by 
analytically distinguishing ‘acts of intervention’ from states’ intentions, interests and 
justifications.  
Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that unlike the United States, China does not 
openly regard itself as a global power, Chinese soldiers are still largely confined within Chinese 
boundaries except those deployed under the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Mali 
and South Sudan; and above all, Beijing still portrays its foreign policy as non-interventionary, 
and does not regard its behaviour as intervening in the internal affairs of other states. The 
common understanding of intervention as an intrusion by a sovereign state into the domestic 
affairs of another sovereign state is based on three assumptions: (1) intervening actors and the 
targets of intervention are sovereign states; 484 (2) intervention consists of action rather than 
inaction; and (3) intervention is non-consensual, meaning the target of intervention is opposed 
to it;485 therefore the term does not explain China’s activities in Africa and across the globe. 
Based on that understanding of intervention, it would be difficult to describe China’s ‘actions’ 
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in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan as intervention. Traditional and 
conventional conceptualizations of intervention as a non-consensual intrusion by a sovereign 
state into the domestic affairs of another sovereign state therefore do not articulate China’s 
emerging behavior in African intrastate armed conflicts 
Unlike the United States and France that have a propensity to unilaterally intervene militarily or 
impose sanctions against African countries, China tends to prefer using multilateral institutions 
to effect pressure on warring parties to either protect its interests or affect outcomes of the 
intrastate armed conflicts. As discussed above, this policy has enabled China to avoid being 
perceived as ‘interventionist’ when in actual effect it uses its position in multilateral institutions 
such as the United Nations Security Council to intervene through action or inaction (votes of 
abstention, giving tacit approval for interventions) in African intrastate armed conflicts. As 
noted by Courtney J. Fung, in cases such as Sudan where “host states can block peacekeeping 
missions from actually deploying by refusing consent or rejecting potential troop contributions, 
China’s perceived reputation as an ‘anti-intervention’ state can [and has] been a competitive 
advantage to getting the host state to accept China’s troop contribution” (2015, p. 2). Hence 
troops deployed by China are not considered as intervention forces, while troops from the 
United States or France are considered intervention forces - the same action with the same 
impact, but perceived differently. What this means is that conventional Western-centric and 
realist oriented conceptualizations of intervention in foreign conflicts as being a foreign policy 
tool used by great powers that possess immense military capabilities to unilaterally intervene 
in foreign countries do not assist in analyzing the evolving nature of China’s intervention 
behavior in Africa. 
In addition, China is subtly but creatively employing its economic, political and diplomatic 
influence on African states and critical stakeholders to determine the duration, direction and 
outcomes of their intrastate armed conflicts. Using its dominance in the South Sudan oil sector, 
and South Sudan’s reliance on China for revenue, China was able to compel the warring parties 
in South Sudan to guarantee protection of its assets and oil-facilities. In Libya, it used the 
strategy of abstention to affect the direction and outcome of the conflict; and in Mali as well as 
in South Sudan it employed ‘non-threatening’ UN peacekeeping to create a conducive 
environment in which its economic interests and nationals’ safety is guaranteed. In all cases, 
China’s actions and inactions, whether multilateral or unilateral, consensual or non-consensual 
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affected the duration, direction and outcome of the respective intrastate armed conflicts. And, 
this is not just peculiar to China, but also to other a non-Western rising power such as India, 
Brazil and South Africa that frown upon military and ‘non-consensual’ intervention in other 
states’ intrastate armed conflicts.  
In order to capture Chinese external intervention behaviour, the focus should not be on its 
actions in foreign intrastate armed conflicts, but on the impact of such actions. Cognizant of the 
impact of China’s actions and engagement in intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and 
South Sudan, it can be argued that intervention ought to be understood as being political, 
military, economic or diplomatic actions or inactions undertaken by a governmental or 
intergovernmental actor of the international system [with or without consent of the target 
state], the purpose of which is to affect the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate 
armed conflict (Rioux & Bucher 2003, p. 7). The ultimate test for whether an action or inaction 
taken by one state regarding a conflict in another is intervention or not should be whether that 
action or inaction, taken unilaterally or multilaterally, with or without consent affects the 
duration, direction and outcome of the conflict. This is a test that can be replicated in other 
cases involving rising powers, or even existing great powers that seek to maintain legitimacy 
and avoid criticisms that they are intervening in another state’s internal armed conflicts. As put 
by Karen Feste, the definition of intervention can be extended “to include various forms of 
involvement and assistance by an external state in an ongoing civil war (e.g., U.S. commitments 
to Greece in the 1940s and covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters in the 1980s)” (2003, p. 178). 
Similarly, Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001) also broadly conceptualizes intervention to include “both 
coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military coercive forms of intervention.” 
Accordingly, in determining whether an action or inaction amounts to intervention or not, for 
China, the most important factor is to determine whether it affected the duration, direction or 
outcome of the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. 
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